318 Ga. 142 FINAL COPY
S24A0010. BRADLEY v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Benjamin Bradley was convicted of the malice murder of
Dequavious Harris, aggravated assault of Clarence Lewis and
Quaimaine Harris, aggravated battery of Ricky Davis, and related
crimes.1 On appeal, Bradley argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions and that trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. We disagree and affirm.
1 The crimes occurred on January 15, 2018. In April 2018, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Bradley for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3), aggravated assault of Dequavious (Count 4), aggravated assault of Lewis (Count 5), aggravated assault of Quaimaine (Count 6), aggravated assault of Davis (Count 7), aggravated battery of Davis (Count 8), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 9), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). At a November 2019 jury trial, Bradley was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Bradley to serve life in prison on Count 1, ten years consecutive on each of Counts 5 and 6, fifteen years consecutive on Count 8, and five years consecutive on each of Counts 9 and 10. The remaining counts were vacated or merged. Bradley filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended. Bradley thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term commencing in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed as follows. The day before the
crimes occurred, Bradley’s car was stolen from the parking lot of an
Atlanta gas station. Later that day, Bradley’s girlfriend overheard
Bradley, who was on the phone with his friend Ronnie Bradford, say
that “somebody was going to feel his pain because he was angry
because the car was stolen,” as well as “something about bringing a
stick.” Bradley later explained to his girlfriend that a “stick” is a
gun.
The next night, January 15, 2018, Bradley and Bradford were
driven to the gas station by an acquaintance in a white Dodge
Journey. Bradley initially entered the store to ask the cashier if
anyone had mentioned his stolen car. Then, surveillance footage
showed Bradley exit the store, approach the Dodge Journey’s front
passenger window, and speak to Bradford. Bradford handed Bradley
a small black object, and Bradley raised his shirt, tucked the object
into his waistband, and lowered his shirt to cover the object. Bradley
reentered the store and approached Davis, Quaimaine, and a man
2 identified only as “Black.” Davis testified that Bradley was
“clutching” his pants, as if he were “holding a pistol or something,”2
while Quaimaine indicated that Bradley had his hands in his
pockets. Bradley asked the men if they knew anything about a stolen
car. Though the group denied any knowledge, their interaction with
Bradley quickly became acrimonious, and the cashier told them to
leave.
Surveillance footage showed that, outside the store, Bradley
continued arguing with the group, until Black gave physical
indications that he was prepared to engage in a physical conflict.
Bradley then retreated to the Dodge Journey, which drove out of the
gas station’s parking lot, while the group of men, which had been
joined by Dequavious and Lewis, remained outside in front of the
gas station. Approximately three minutes later, gunshots were fired
outside the gas station from a location not within the view of the
surveillance cameras. Davis was struck in the arm, and Dequavious
2 Davis testified that Bradley was not “clutching” his pants when he first
entered the store and spoke to the cashier. 3 was struck in the head, resulting in his death.
Davis and Lewis testified that, just before the shooting, they
saw Bradley, who was standing by the side of the gas station,
pointing a gun at the group.3 After the shooting stopped, Lewis
retrieved his own firearm from his vehicle, ran to where Bradley had
been standing, and saw Bradley entering a white Dodge Journey.
Bradley again pointed his gun at Lewis, and Lewis fired his weapon.
Quaimaine also observed a white Dodge Journey driving near the
gas station just after the shooting. Davis and Lewis identified
Bradley as the shooter in a six-photograph array. Quaimaine, who
did not see the shooter, identified Bradley, also in a six-photograph
array, as the person who confronted the group at the gas station. At
trial, the parties stipulated that Bradley is a convicted felon.
On appeal, Bradley asserts that the evidence recounted above
was insufficient as a matter of due process to support his
convictions. In support of this claim, Bradley points to
3 Both men testified that the shooter was wearing a blue sweater, and
surveillance footage showed Bradley dressed in a blue sweater. 4 inconsistencies in the evidence that he says undermined the
reliability of the eyewitness testimony and notes the absence of
physical evidence tying him to the shooting. But “it is axiomatic that
resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing witness credibility are
within the exclusive province of the jury,” Graves v. State, 298 Ga.
551, 553 (1) (783 SE2d 891) (2016), and, contrary to Bradley’s
contention, “the State was not required to produce any physical
evidence,” Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 259 (2) (824 SE2d 326)
(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Plez v. State, 300
Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796 SE2d 704) (2017) (“Although the State is
required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no
requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of
evidence.”). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury’s verdicts, we readily conclude as a matter of due process
that it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradley was guilty of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319
(III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
5 Bradley also asserts that the evidence against him was
insufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6 because, he says, the State’s case
was based “solely on circumstantial evidence” that failed to exclude
“every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.” See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). But, contrary to
Bradley’s argument, his convictions were not based solely on
circumstantial evidence. The eyewitness testimony of Davis and
Lewis identifying Bradley as the shooter was direct evidence. See
Gittens v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 843 (1) n.2 (838 SE2d 888) (2020)
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318 Ga. 142 FINAL COPY
S24A0010. BRADLEY v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Benjamin Bradley was convicted of the malice murder of
Dequavious Harris, aggravated assault of Clarence Lewis and
Quaimaine Harris, aggravated battery of Ricky Davis, and related
crimes.1 On appeal, Bradley argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions and that trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. We disagree and affirm.
1 The crimes occurred on January 15, 2018. In April 2018, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Bradley for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3), aggravated assault of Dequavious (Count 4), aggravated assault of Lewis (Count 5), aggravated assault of Quaimaine (Count 6), aggravated assault of Davis (Count 7), aggravated battery of Davis (Count 8), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 9), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 10). At a November 2019 jury trial, Bradley was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Bradley to serve life in prison on Count 1, ten years consecutive on each of Counts 5 and 6, fifteen years consecutive on Count 8, and five years consecutive on each of Counts 9 and 10. The remaining counts were vacated or merged. Bradley filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended. Bradley thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term commencing in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed as follows. The day before the
crimes occurred, Bradley’s car was stolen from the parking lot of an
Atlanta gas station. Later that day, Bradley’s girlfriend overheard
Bradley, who was on the phone with his friend Ronnie Bradford, say
that “somebody was going to feel his pain because he was angry
because the car was stolen,” as well as “something about bringing a
stick.” Bradley later explained to his girlfriend that a “stick” is a
gun.
The next night, January 15, 2018, Bradley and Bradford were
driven to the gas station by an acquaintance in a white Dodge
Journey. Bradley initially entered the store to ask the cashier if
anyone had mentioned his stolen car. Then, surveillance footage
showed Bradley exit the store, approach the Dodge Journey’s front
passenger window, and speak to Bradford. Bradford handed Bradley
a small black object, and Bradley raised his shirt, tucked the object
into his waistband, and lowered his shirt to cover the object. Bradley
reentered the store and approached Davis, Quaimaine, and a man
2 identified only as “Black.” Davis testified that Bradley was
“clutching” his pants, as if he were “holding a pistol or something,”2
while Quaimaine indicated that Bradley had his hands in his
pockets. Bradley asked the men if they knew anything about a stolen
car. Though the group denied any knowledge, their interaction with
Bradley quickly became acrimonious, and the cashier told them to
leave.
Surveillance footage showed that, outside the store, Bradley
continued arguing with the group, until Black gave physical
indications that he was prepared to engage in a physical conflict.
Bradley then retreated to the Dodge Journey, which drove out of the
gas station’s parking lot, while the group of men, which had been
joined by Dequavious and Lewis, remained outside in front of the
gas station. Approximately three minutes later, gunshots were fired
outside the gas station from a location not within the view of the
surveillance cameras. Davis was struck in the arm, and Dequavious
2 Davis testified that Bradley was not “clutching” his pants when he first
entered the store and spoke to the cashier. 3 was struck in the head, resulting in his death.
Davis and Lewis testified that, just before the shooting, they
saw Bradley, who was standing by the side of the gas station,
pointing a gun at the group.3 After the shooting stopped, Lewis
retrieved his own firearm from his vehicle, ran to where Bradley had
been standing, and saw Bradley entering a white Dodge Journey.
Bradley again pointed his gun at Lewis, and Lewis fired his weapon.
Quaimaine also observed a white Dodge Journey driving near the
gas station just after the shooting. Davis and Lewis identified
Bradley as the shooter in a six-photograph array. Quaimaine, who
did not see the shooter, identified Bradley, also in a six-photograph
array, as the person who confronted the group at the gas station. At
trial, the parties stipulated that Bradley is a convicted felon.
On appeal, Bradley asserts that the evidence recounted above
was insufficient as a matter of due process to support his
convictions. In support of this claim, Bradley points to
3 Both men testified that the shooter was wearing a blue sweater, and
surveillance footage showed Bradley dressed in a blue sweater. 4 inconsistencies in the evidence that he says undermined the
reliability of the eyewitness testimony and notes the absence of
physical evidence tying him to the shooting. But “it is axiomatic that
resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing witness credibility are
within the exclusive province of the jury,” Graves v. State, 298 Ga.
551, 553 (1) (783 SE2d 891) (2016), and, contrary to Bradley’s
contention, “the State was not required to produce any physical
evidence,” Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 259 (2) (824 SE2d 326)
(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Plez v. State, 300
Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796 SE2d 704) (2017) (“Although the State is
required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no
requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of
evidence.”). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury’s verdicts, we readily conclude as a matter of due process
that it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradley was guilty of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319
(III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
5 Bradley also asserts that the evidence against him was
insufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6 because, he says, the State’s case
was based “solely on circumstantial evidence” that failed to exclude
“every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.” See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). But, contrary to
Bradley’s argument, his convictions were not based solely on
circumstantial evidence. The eyewitness testimony of Davis and
Lewis identifying Bradley as the shooter was direct evidence. See
Gittens v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 843 (1) n.2 (838 SE2d 888) (2020)
(“Eyewitness testimony based on the witness’s firsthand
observations of the crime is direct, not circumstantial, evidence.”).
“And if there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the
circumstantial evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency
analysis.” Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 498 (2) (b) (893 SE2d 724)
(2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Bradley’s
6 statutory sufficiency claim fails.
2. In a series of vague, conclusory arguments on appeal,
Bradley asserts that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to present the testimony of certain unidentified defense
witnesses at trial and for failing to pursue “other theories of defense
or innocence.” To prevail on this claim, Bradley bears the burden of
showing both that trial counsel’s performance was professionally
deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result of that deficient
performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (III)
(B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). The failure to demonstrate
either deficient performance or resulting prejudice is fatal to a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel and obviates the need even to
consider the other. See Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 97 (5) (856
SE2d 289) (2021).
Here, Bradley has not even attempted to show that he was
prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s purportedly deficient
performance. Bradley asserts without elaboration that “prejudice
should be presumed.” But Bradley ignores that “this Court has
7 declined to presume prejudice in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on attorney performance[.]” Keller
v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 496 (2) (a) (842 SE2d 22) (2020); see also Reid
v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c) (690 SE2d 177) (2010). Instead, as
we have oft recognized, “Strickland places a heavy burden on the
defendant to ‘affirmatively prove’ prejudice,” that is, to
“demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability the trial would
have had a different outcome.” Neuman, 311 Ga. at 97 (5). Bradley,
however, has not identified the additional witnesses he contends
counsel should have called to testify at trial or demonstrated what
their testimony would have shown.4 See Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675,
684 (4) (b) (872 SE2d 722) (2022). And beyond a passing complaint
that trial counsel “did not advance other theories of defense or
innocence — such as that [ ] Bradley was defending himself and his
4 Bradley asserts for the first time in his reply brief that trial counsel
could have called Bradley’s girlfriend, Ronnie Bradford, “Black,” or an unspecified “Atlanta native” to contradict the State’s theory of the case. “[B]ut an appellant who raises an argument for the first time in a reply brief is not entitled to have that argument considered.” Williams v. State, 307 Ga. 689, 689 n.2 (838 SE2d 314) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 property,” Bradley does not articulate how he was prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to pursue these defenses, which find no support in
the evidence presented at trial and would have been inconsistent
with his defense of misidentification. See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga.
634, 637-639 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020). Bradley’s complete
failure to make these required affirmative showings dooms his claim
of ineffective assistance.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided January 17, 2024.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Dunaway.
Brownstone, P.A., George W. Thomas, Robert L. Sirianni, Jr.,
for appellant.
Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Charles
A. Jones, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C.
Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,
Chelsea S. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.