Bradley v. City of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 2, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01216
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEFAN BRADLEY, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01216-CAB-JLB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS

14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., [ECF No. 7] 15 Defendants. 16 17 On July 16, 2024, Plaintiff Stefan Bradley sued Defendants City of San Diego and 18 San Diego Police Department Officer Doe under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating 19 his right to freedom of movement, right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, and right 20 to be free from the use of excessive force, all purportedly arising under the Fourth 21 Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiff brings state law claims for negligence, assault, battery, 22 and violation of California’s Bane Act. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the four state 23 law causes of action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 7.] At this juncture, 24 Defendants have not challenged Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The Court DENIES 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff alleges that on July 31, 2023, while riding his “pit bike” in his 28 neighborhood, Defendant Officer Doe bumped him from behind with his police 1 motorcycle. [Compl. ¶¶ 12–14.] Plaintiff complains that he did not hear a siren or any 2 commands from Officer Doe. [Id. at ¶ 16.] Nor did he see any flashing lights. [Id.] 3 Plaintiff claims he was confused, scared, and attempted to distance himself from Officer 4 Doe before the officer rear ended him. [Id. at ¶¶ 18–19.] Officer Doe allegedly caused 5 Plaintiff to fall off his bike and sustain injuries. [Id. at 20.] Then, Plaintiff claims that 6 Officer Doe arrested and handcuffed him until another police officer arrived and uncuffed 7 him. [Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.] 8 On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff timely mailed a tort claim pursuant to the California 9 Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) 1 to the City of San Diego. [Id. at ¶ 7.] The City allegedly 10 acknowledged receipt of the claim on February 2, 2024. [Id.] On April 9, 2024, the Claims 11 Division allegedly rejected Plaintiff’s claim, after which Plaintiff brought this suit against 12 Defendants. [Id.] 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise the defense that the 15 complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Court evaluates 16 whether a complaint states a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the 18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require 19 ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the 20 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 21 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 22 The Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and construes the 23 allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 24

25 26 1 Plaintiff refers to the relevant statute—Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–978.8—as the “California Tort Claims Act” while Defendants refer to it as the “Government Claims Act.” Both are used by courts, see 27 Dominguez v. Abraham, No. 20-CV-09416-EMC, 2021 WL 10716858 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (citing City of Stockton v. Sup. Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 730, 741–42 (cal. 2007). The Court elects to refer to it as the 28 1 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 2 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’” 3 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court 5 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 6 Id. There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 7 Id. Facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible 8 entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept 9 as true “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint, id., or other “allegations that are 10 merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels- 11 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s letter to the City of San Diego did not satisfy the 14 notice requirements of the CTCA for his state law claims. Further, they assert that 15 Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is insufficiently pled, and his negligence claim is “not 16 sustainable as a matter of law” because the City allegedly cannot be held liable for general 17 negligence. [ECF No. 7, 2–3.] 18 A. California Tort Claims Act 19 i. Incorporation-by-Reference 20 Plaintiff states in his complaint that he “mailed a timely tort claim pursuant to the 21 [CTCA] . . . against the City of San Diego” and that “the City acknowledged receipt of the 22 claim.” [Compl. ¶ 7.] Plaintiff did not attach a copy of his letter to the complaint. 23 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 24 the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),” however, the incorporation-by- 25 reference doctrine permits the Court to treat “certain documents as though they are part of 26 the complaint itself. . . . if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document 27 forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 28 988, 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants provided a 1 copy of Plaintiff’s letter as an exhibit in their motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 7, Ex. 1.] 2 Plaintiff does not contest the authenticity of the copy of the letter. As Plaintiff refers to 3 and relies on the claim letter in his complaint, the Court finds it proper to incorporate the 4 letter into the pleadings by reference. 5 ii. Plaintiff’s Claim Letter 6 Under the CTCA, before one can sue a California government entity or employee 7 for damages, he must timely present his claim to the entity, which then must reject it in 8 whole or part. See, e.g., Portillo v. City of Nat’l City, No. 20-CV-2429 W (MDD), 2022 9 WL 1004238, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2022); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. The 10 claimant must state the date, place, circumstances of the claim, name of any employees 11 responsible if known, and a general description of the injury, damage, or loss as is known 12 at the time the claim is presented to the entity. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 910; see also Sanders 13 v. City of Fresno, No. CIVA 05-0469 AWISMS, 2006 WL 1883394, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14 7, 2006). These requirements are intended to “provide the public entity sufficient 15 information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, 16 without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Ct., 525 P.2d 701, 706 17 (Cal. 1974). “Although federal courts do not have jurisdiction over the underlying 18 petitions, it is proper for federal courts to determine whether a plaintiff bringing tort claims 19 against a public entity has complied with the [C]TCA.” Acevedo v. City of Farmersville, 20 No. 1:18-cv-01747-LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 3003996, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) (citing 21 United States v. State of Cal., 655 F.2d 914, 918–19, n.3 (9th Cir. 1980)). 22 Plaintiff’s letter was titled “Claim for Damages Against City of San Diego for Torts 23 and Constitutional Violations Occurring on or about July 31, 2023.” [ECF No. 7, Ex. 1, 24 2.] Plaintiff’s description of the event within the letter was as follows: 25 On or about July 31, 2023, an officer with the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) used excessive force against [Plaintiff] and arrested him. The officers 26 [sic] conduct caused [Plaintiff] to suffer injuries, including mental anguish. 27 [Plaintiff[ was riding his bike near the Carmel Mountain Ranch Library when an officer came up beside him on his police motorcycle. The officer did not have 28 1 lights and sirens on, nor did [Plaintiff] hear him tell him to stop. The officer then hit [Plaintiff] with his motorcycle. 2 3 [Id. at 3.] Moreover, Plaintiff noted his damages exceeded $25,000 and that he did not 4 know the identities of the responsible officers and dispatcher involved, but that the 5 investigation was ongoing. [Id.] 6 Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s letter on grounds that it did not satisfy the 7 requirements of the CTCA because “[t]he only cause of action named by Plaintiff in his 8 Claim Letter to the City that is also included in his [complaint] is excessive force” and the 9 letter “does not otherwise describe the causes of action pled in his [complaint]: the Bane 10 Act, Negligence, Assault, and Battery.” [ECF No. 7, 4–5.] In other words, Plaintiff did 11 not provide “sufficient information to enable [Defendants] to adequately investigate all 12 claims except for the one for excessive force.” [Id. at 5.] 13 The CTCA, however, does not require Plaintiff “to specify each cause of action he 14 intends to assert; rather, it requires only that ‘each cause of action . . . be[] reflected in a 15 timely claim.’” Carr v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 19-CV-1139 JLS (MDD), 2020 WL 16 1046874, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Nelson v. 17 California, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72, 79 (1982)). “Because the CTCA is designed to give a 18 public entity ‘notice sufficient for it to investigate and evaluate the claim . . . [it] need not 19 contain the detail and specificity required of the pleading, but need only fairly describe 20 what the entity is alleged to have done.’” Garber v. City of Clovis, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 21 1216 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (citing Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint 22 Powers Ins. Auth., 99 P.3d 500, 502 (Cal. 2004)). 23 The caselaw makes clear that the propriety of notice depends on the facts alleged in 24 the claim form. “A complaint’s fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given in 25 the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an entirely different set of 26 facts.” Stockett, 99 P.3d at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only where there has 27 been a ‘complete shift in allegations, usually involving . . . acts or omissions committed at 28 different times or by different persons than those described in the claim,’ have courts 1 generally found the complaint barred.” Id. (quoting Blair v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. App. 2 3d 221, 226 (Ct. App. 1990)). Indeed, “it is permissible to plead additional theories where 3 the additional theories [are] based on the same factual foundation as those in the claim, and 4 the claim provide[s] sufficient information to allow the public agency to conduct an 5 investigation into the merits of the claim.” Carr, 2020 WL 1046874, at *4 (alterations in 6 original) (internal quotations mark omitted). 7 In White v. Superior Court, the plaintiff presented a claim against the City of San 8 Francisco that alleged that a police officer brutally beat and falsely arrested plaintiff, which 9 the city denied. 225 Cal. App. 3d 1505, 1507 (Ct. App. 1990). Plaintiff then sued in state 10 court alleging causes of action for, inter alia, negligent hiring and failure to train. Id. 11 Although the claim form made no allegation nor offered any facts pertaining to the training 12 or hiring of the defendant officer, the court held it gave proper notice to defendants for 13 those causes of action as “[p]laintiff did not shift the fundamental facts about her injury.” 14 Id. at 1511 (emphasis added). 15 Similarly, in IDC v. City of Vallejo, the plaintiff alleged on their claim form to the 16 city that the police used excessive force against them. No. 2:13-CV-1987 DAD, 2013 WL 17 6670557, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013). The plaintiff brought additional causes of action 18 in his complaint, including for negligence and false arrest. Id. at 3. The city argued that 19 since the plaintiff only described excessive force in the claim form, the additional causes 20 of action that he alleged in the complaint required dismissal under the CTCA. Id. The 21 court found that because the plaintiff’s complaint was “predicated on the same fundamental 22 actions or failures to act alleged against the defendants in the Government Tort Claim 23 form,” there was no violation of the CTCA and accordingly denied defendants’ motion to 24 dismiss the aforementioned causes of action. Id. at 4–5. 25 Here, the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, though certainly provided in 26 greater detail, are identical to those made in his claim letter. The core alleged facts— 27 Officer Doe’s failure to notify Plaintiff that he must stop, Officer Doe’s striking of Plaintiff 28 with his police motorcycle, and Plaintiff’s arrest—did not change between claim and 1 complaint. That Plaintiff pleads additional theories of liability in his complaint relative to 2 his claim letter does not bar those theories or causes of action under the CTCA. See 3 Acevedo, 2019 WL 3003996, at *8 (finding plaintiff complied with CTCA in bringing 4 intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) cause of action, despite not describing 5 any emotional or mental injuries in written claim to city, because IIED claim stemmed 6 from “same core acts as Plaintiff’s other causes of action, i.e., the allegedly excessive force 7 used”). 8 Plaintiff adequately described the relevant time, date, claimed injuries, and 9 circumstances in his claim letter to provide Defendants with fair notice to investigate 10 whether Defendant Officer Doe used excessive force when he allegedly hit Plaintiff with 11 his motorcycle before arresting him. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s state law 12 causes of action alleged in the complaint comply with the CTCA given that they are based 13 on the same facts he alleged in his claim letter, and that those facts in his letter “fairly 14 describe[d] what [the] entity is alleged to have done.” Stockett, 99 P.3d at 502. 15 B. Bane Act 16 “The Bane Act provides a cause of action for interference ‘by threats, intimidation, 17 or coercion’ or attempted interference, ‘with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual 18 or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 19 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’” Muhammad v. Garrett, 66 F. 20 Supp. 3d 1287, 1295 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). To prove 21 a Bane Act claim, plaintiff must demonstrate interference with a constitutional right 22 accompanied by coercion. Id. (citing Jones v. Kmart, 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998)). 23 Defendants argue that because Plaintiff allegedly did not name the constitutional 24 right that Defendants interfered with in his complaint, his Bane Act claim should be 25 dismissed. Plaintiff, however, indeed pled that Defendants interfered with, inter alia, his 26 right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force under the Fourth 27 Amendment when Officer Doe allegedly hit him with his motorcycle and arrested him. 28 [Compl. ¶ 48.] 1 Defendants additionally contend that nothing in the complaint shows that Officer 2 Doe engaged in an act of coercion, made a threat, or committed any violence against 3 Plaintiff so as to satisfy the interference prong of the Bane Act. Plaintiff, however, alleges 4 that Officer Doe attempted to grab Plaintiff off his bike before rear ending him and causing 5 him to fall and sustain injuries. Taking these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 6 inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot imagine that such conduct by Officer Doe 7 could not plausibly constitute an intentional, coercive act. Moreover, Plaintiff is not 8 required “to allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the 9 seizure or use of force” when a “Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or excessive 10 force[] claim[] [is] raised and intentional conduct is at issue.” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los 11 Angeles, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1052–53 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2023) (quoting Johnson v. 12 Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 934 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015)). Accordingly, the Court 13 rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff insufficiently pled his Bane Act claim. 14 C. Negligence 15 Defendants argue that the City of San Diego is immune from suits for general 16 negligence because there is no statute providing liability. The Court disagrees. Pursuant 17 to Section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, “[a] public entity is liable for any 18 injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within 19 the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have 20 given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” See D.C. by & through Cabelka v. 21 Cnty. of San Diego, 445 F. Supp. 3d 869, 897 (S.D. Cal. 2020). Indeed, this District has 22 previously recognized a negligence claim under Section 815.2(a) against a San Diego 23 police officer. Perez v. City of San Diego, No. 3:22-cv-0712-BEN-AGS, 2022 WL 24 17541025, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2022). 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 The Court finds that (1) Plaintiff’s state law claims satisfy the requirements of the 27 CTCA, (2) Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to state a Bane Act claim, and (3) 28 Defendants are not immune from Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action under the immunity | ||theory proffered. As such, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 2 3 It is SO ORDERED. 4 5 Dated: January 2, 2025 € 6 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28