Bradley v. Bradley

297 N.W. 856, 230 Iowa 407
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 13, 1941
DocketNo. 45493.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 297 N.W. 856 (Bradley v. Bradley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bradley v. Bradley, 297 N.W. 856, 230 Iowa 407 (iowa 1941).

Opinion

Mitchell, J.

Plaintiff commenced this action in equity, claiming that she is entitled to possession of an undivided one-third interest in and to certain real estate in Dubuque County of which John H. Bradley died seized, by virtue of her marriage to the said deceased.

The defendant denied that the plaintiff was married to John H. Bradley, and denied that she was entitled to any interest in his estate. During the trial, by leave of court, the . defendants filed an amended defense that the plaintiff had married one James Long in February, 1930, and that during September of 1930, she filed a bill for divorce against him in Jo Daviess County, Illinois, alleging that she was a resident of Jo Daviess County for the necessary period of time, when in truth and fact, she never resided anywhere in the State of Illinois; and hence the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess County, Illinois, never acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter in said divorce action, and that, therefore, the decree of divorce she obtained from James Long was null and void.

Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the said amendment to the answer, and the court sustained said motion.

The trial court found that the plaintiff was not the wife of John H. Bradley, deceased, during his lifetime, and was not his widow, and thereupon decreed that her petition be dismissed.

Plaintiff being dissatisfied has appealed. The defendants have also filed a cross-appeal from the ruling of the trial court dismissing the amendment to the answer. The plaintiff will be hereinafter referred to as the appellant and the defendants, the appellees.

*409 John H. Bradley died March 26, 1939, at the age of 72 years. He was survived by three children, two sons and a daughter. Mr. Bradley’s wife and the mother of his children died July 2, 1917.

At the time of the trial, the appellant was forty-two years of age. Her maiden name was Madeline McCauley. In 1927 she commenced a breach of promise suit against another party, which was settled. According to appellant’s brief, she met John H. Bradley on New Year’s Day, 1926, and kept company with him until 1929. In September of 1929, she went to Chicago, where she was employed as a practical nurse. On February 1, 1930, she was married to James Long. On September 30, 1930, she filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess County, Illinois, and at the November term a decree was entered. It is claimed by appellees that the decree of divorce was null and void, because under the Illinois law the complainant in a divorce proceeding must live in the county where the suit is filed, and that Madeline McCauley never lived in Jo Daviess County, Illinois.

The evidence shows that John H. Bradley, the decedent, was addicted to the use of morphine and required the services of a nurse. Appellant testified that she administered morphine to Mr. Bradley through the years. That when she first met him he was using six grains of morphine a day, and at the time of his death he was using twenty-six grains. In January of 1931, she went to live at the home of John H. Bradley and lived there continuously until the time of his death. She admits that she was paid wages in 1931 and part of 1932. From 1931 on, they traveled to various cities in the middlewest and they registered at hotels in these cities as Mr. and Mrs. John H. Bradley. She admits that they engaged in an illicit relationship up until September 1, 1934.

It is her claim that on September 1, 1934, she became the common-law wife of John H. Bradley and she offered in evidence Exhibit “A” which is as follows:

“September 1st, 1934
“I, John H. Bradley has asked Madeline McCauley to come back and live with me again and stay untill death do we part, *410 All papers are cancels which we have both sign, in Aug-— 1934— against each other.
“(Signed) John II. Braadley.”

After Exhibit “A’” was signed they went to Chicago, and she testified that Mr. Bradley gave her a ring, without any markings on it, which had five small diamonds, referred to- as chip diamonds.

Proper objections were made to the introduction of Exhibit “A” and the testimony in regard to the ring, on the grounds that she was incompetent to testify as to the exhibit and the whole transaction surrounding* it under what is commonly known as the “Dead man’s statute”.

In appellant’s brief we find this concession, we quote:

“While the appellant may'have been incompetent under the “Dead man’s Statute” to testify to any transaction or communication with the deceased, yet she was competent to testify to the circumstances under which their cohabitation was begun and continued.”

Exhibit “A” is a very interesting paper. It is signed by 'only one person and while it is claimed it was signed by John H. Bradley the signature is Braadley, while the correct spelling is Bradley. We do not find it necessary to pass upon the question of the admissibility of Exhibit “A” or the testimony in regard to the ring.

The appellant makes the following concession in her brief and argument. We quote:

“In order to save the time of the appellees and of the Court, the appellant admits that prior to September 1, 1934, her cohabitation with the deceased, John H. Bradley, Sr., was illicit and meretricious. She also concedes the rule of law is, that where cohabitation between two parties is illicit and meretricious in its inception, it is presumed to continue in that status until the said cohabitation is shown to be marital in its intention, and that the burden of proof is upon the party asserting such marriage to show that the said illicit and meretricious relations have, in fact, changed to lawful cohabitation.
“ In the case of Love v. Love, 185 Iowa 930, 171 N. W. 257, *411 this Honorable Court, following a long line of earlier eases, defined the present status of common-law marriages in Iowa in this language on Page 931 of the Official Report.
‘‘ Common-law marriages have long been recognized by the law of this State. Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228; McFarland y. McFarland, 51 Iowa 565. The difficulty is not in defining common-law marriage, but arises generally from the uncertainty of proof. If the parties are capable of contraoting and mutually agree that they are husband and wife, with the present intention of becoming such, and this is followed by a consummation of the marriage relation, the contract is complete. The consummation of the contract does not depend upon cohabitation for a period of time, but like other contracts, it is complete when made. Marriage, whether solemnized in the usual way or by mutual consent and agreement, is generally followed by the parties dwelling together and performing the duties and obligations of the marriage relation. Proof, therefore, of continued cohabitation between parties who have held themselves out to the public as husband and wife justifies the inference that the parties’ are married.

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297 N.W. 856, 230 Iowa 407, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bradley-v-bradley-iowa-1941.