Bradley Tuttle v. Daniel Plake

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00319-CV

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BRADLEY TUTTLE, Appellant V.

DANIEL PLAKE, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 457th District Court Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 25-06-10304

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Bradley Tuttle filed a lawsuit against Daniel Plake, the Assistant County Attorney defending a Montgomery County employee in a separate lawsuit filed by Tuttle.1 The trial court dismissed Tuttle’s lawsuit against Plake. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. Tuttle appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appeal from the dismissal of that lawsuit has been docketed as Appeal 1

Number 09-25-00289-CV, Bradley Tuttle v. Shelly Black.

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Background

Tuttle sued Shelly Black, a court administrator for County Court at Law Number 3 of Montgomery County. Plake, acting in his capacity as an Assistant County Attorney for County Attorney B.D. Griffin, filed an answer and special exceptions as counsel of record for Black. The trial court sustained Black’s special exceptions and ordered Tuttle to amend or supplement his pleadings. Tuttle did not amend his pleadings and the trial court dismissed the case.

On June 27, 2025, Tuttle filed “Plaintiff’s Notice of Demand and Petition for ‘Trial by Jury’ Tribunal Regarding Rights Violation Against one of the People.” Tuttle alleged:

[A] judicial court of record requires the maxims of law, by which the jury finds and declares law conveying jurisdiction over the Defendant.

Any inferior form of tribunal brought by a magistrate, including of rules of procedure, court doctrines, or enactments by the legislature, etc., may produce a non-judicial tribunal, which becomes a private attack upon the people’s constitutions.

Tuttle alleged that in Tuttle v. Black, Plake “did use inferior ‘rules of procedure’ and non-jurisdictional case motions to block Plaintiff (one of the people) from exercising his inviolate right of a ‘trial by jury’ tribunal.” Tuttle alleged that Plake, “as a government attorney, has been granted NO authority over the people’s ‘liberty right’ in the constitutions, yet did continue to block Plaintiff’s right of trial by jury, even after a written notice of warning. Defendant did commit maladministration by his private acts of insubordination and breach of trust.” Tuttle

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alleged, “Defendant was shown that his adverse actions against Bradley Tuttle, as Plaintiff in the 457th District Court Case No. 25-03-04585, are a violation of the terms in his Contract and Trust Indenture with the people of Texas. In the written notice, Defendant’s non-performance of contract was documented.” Tuttle alleged, “Defendant was instructed to remedy his ‘unofficial acts’ by rescinding his suit filings and recusing himself from the 457th District Court suit; which he has refused to do.” No request for damages, declaratory, or injunctive relief was requested in Tuttle’s pleading.

On July 15, 2025, Plake filed a General Denial and a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 91a. Plake alleged Tuttle’s alleged causes of action have no basis in law or fact because attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.2 Plake argues, “Tuttle’s attempt to hold Mr. Plake liable for simply filing a pleading in another suit is without merit and his case should be dismissed.”

Tuttle filed a “Notice and Motion to Transfer This Case # 25-06-10304 to Different Montgomery County District Court.” As grounds for transferring the case to a different district court in Montgomery County, Tuttle stated, “in a recent case 25-03-04585 brought by Plaintiff Bradley Tuttle, Judge Santini used procedural grounds to block Plaintiff’s constitutional right of Due Process of Law. By private

2 See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015).

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act on July 12th 2025, Judge Santini dismissed Plaintiff’s case and Justice was not served.” Plake objected to the motion to transfer.

On August 14, 2025, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 91a and dismissed “all causes of action with prejudice.” Tuttle appealed.

Issues

Tuttle presents five issues in his Appellant’s Brief:

1) Given the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges its TRCP was never passed by the Texas Legislature, did the trial court err when no law was declared during the course of the judicial proceeding?

2) In August, 2025 did the trial court err when it took personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff and dismissed his case without due process of law?

3) Is Plaintiff’s right of due process of law impervious to judicial discretion, obligating the court to proceed at the common law by delivering Plaintiff Tuttle’s “regular allegations” to a grand jury of inquiry, fulfilling the 1845 TX Const. SEC. 11 promise that “every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law[?]”

4) In Texas does the judicial court trustee have the power to turn a common law allegation into an accusation-- or is it the people’s grand jury of peers that wields the powers of inquiry and accusation by indictment?

5) After an indictment is returned to the trial court, does the trial by jury tribunal have the power to “say what the law is[?]”

Discussion

In issue one, Tuttle argues the trial court deprived Tuttle of due process of law when it “failed to bring law to a judicial tribunal[.]” Tuttle contends the Texas Rules

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of Civil Procedure, having been created by the Texas Supreme Court, “was not enacted by the Texas Legislature and is not law.” We disagree with Tuttle’s premise that a trial court cannot render judgment based on the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 91a in particular.

The Supreme Court adopted Rule 91a to implement the Legislature’s 2011 amendment to the statutory authorization for the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Misc. Docket No. 12–9191, Adoption of Rules for Dismissals and Expedited Actions (Tex. Nov. 13, 2012) (eff. Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.txcourts.gov/AII_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/Administrative Orders/miscdocket/12/12919100.pdf; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.004(g) (“The supreme court shall adopt rules to provide for the dismissal of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact on motion and without evidence. The rules shall provide that the motion to dismiss shall be granted or denied within 45 days of the filing of the motion to dismiss. The rules shall not apply to actions under the Family Code.”).

“The commonly understood meaning of ‘law’ includes judicial decisions and rules promulgated by the judiciary, such as rules of procedure and evidence.” In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). The Legislature delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court almost ninety years ago. See Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen.

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Laws 201 (former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1731a). In 1985, people of Texas amended the Texas Constitution to vest the Supreme Court with the constitutional authority to promulgate rules of civil procedure. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 31(b) (“The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.”). “The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes.” Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. 1973).

We conclude that the trial court possessed the authority to dismiss Tuttle’s lawsuit pursuant to Rule 91a. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. We overrule issue one.

We address Tuttle’s remaining issues together. We understand Tuttle’s argument in issues two through five to be (1) the trial court dismissed Tuttle’s case without due process of law, (2) due course of law required the district judge to present Tuttle’s complaint against Plake to a grand jury, (3) a grand jury must indict Plake before the trial court may assume jurisdiction over Tuttle’s lawsuit against Plake, and (4) only a petit jury, not the trial judge, could decide if Plake deprived Tuttle of his rights under the Texas Constitution. Regarding the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit against Plake, Tuttle limits his complaint in issues two through five of his Appellant’s Brief to his contention that the trial court failed to adjudicate the lawsuit using the proper procedure.

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Tuttle cites no constitutional or statutory provision that grants to a district judge the authority to present a claim—civil or criminal, public or private—to a grand jury. The authority to present to a grand jury is within the purview of a different Article 5 department, the District Attorney. See generally Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2A.102 (“Each district attorney shall represent the state in all criminal cases in the district courts of the attorney’s district and in appeals from those cases.”); see also id. arts. 20A.102 (a District Judge is not one of the persons authorized to be present in the grand jury room while the grand jury is conducting proceedings); 20A.103 (“The attorney representing the state is entitled to appear before the grand jury and inform the grand jury of offenses subject to indictment at any time except when the grand jury is discussing the propriety of finding an indictment or is voting on an indictment.”); 20A.104 (“No person may address the grand jury about a matter before the grand jury other than the attorney representing the state, a witness, or the accused or suspected person or the attorney for the accused or suspected person if approved by the attorney representing the state.”).

Tuttle argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Tuttle’s claim of a violation of his constitutional rights without first securing an indictment from a grand jury. “To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022).

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Subject matter jurisdiction derives solely from the Texas Constitution and state statutes. Id. “Personal jurisdiction is composed of two elements: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) the plaintiff must validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.” Id. at 379-80.

The trial Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Tuttle’s claimed violation of his constitutional rights. See Tex. Const. Art. 5, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”). The trial court had personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit, which the plaintiff involved by valid service of process on the defendant, who answered the plaintiff’s petition. See Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379. Due process required notice and a hearing, which Tuttle does not argue he failed to receive before the trial court dismissed the case. Tuttle has not shown that the trial court used the wrong procedure in adjudicating Tuttle’s lawsuit. We overrule issues two through five.

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Having overruled the issues presented in Appellant’s Brief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT

Justice

Submitted on August 18, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.