Bradley L. Bridges v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 27, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03487
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRADLEY L. BRIDGES, No. 2:24-cv-03487-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying applications for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and 20 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act 21 (“Act”), respectively. The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. For the 22 reasons discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 23 remand for further proceedings and deny the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 24 judgment. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff, born in 1969, applied for DIB and SSI on December 20, 2021, alleging disability 27 beginning November 14, 2020. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 27, 158. Plaintiff alleged he 28 was unable to work due to problems with his neck, hip, and shoulder, PTSD, depression, 1 migraines, and degenerative disc disease. AT 161. On January 8, 2024, an Administrative Law 2 Judge (ALJ) issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled between the alleged onset date in 3 2020 and the date of the decision. AT 27-41. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 4 20 C.F.R. omitted): 5 1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022. 6 2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 7 November 14, 2020, the alleged onset date. 8 3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; right shoulder 9 impingement; loss of vision in the left eye; scoliosis; and mild degeneration of the thoracic spine. 10 4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 11 impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 12 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 13 finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with the following limitations: He can frequently stoop 14 and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He can frequently crawl and can occasionally reach overhead with the right 15 dominant upper extremity. He must avoid heights and dangerous machinery and work environments that require good bilateral vision 16 for safety. 17 6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a Nurse Assistant (DOT 355.674-014). This work does not require the 18 performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 19 7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 20 Social Security Act, from November 14, 2020 through the date of this decision. 21

22 AT 30-41. 23 ISSUES PRESENTED 24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not 25 disabled: (1) the ALJ erred by not finding severe mental impairment or factoring mental 26 impairment into the RFC; (2) the ALJ erred in discrediting plaintiff’s subjective statements about 27 his mental symptoms; (3) the ALJ erred by not developing the record with lay testimony by 28 plaintiff’s friend; (4) the ALJ erred in determining the physical residual functional capacity 1 (RFC). 2 LEGAL STANDARDS 3 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 4 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 5 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 6 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 7 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 8 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 9 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 10 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 11 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 12 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 13 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 15 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 16 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 17 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 18 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 19 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 20 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 21 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 22 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 ANALYSIS 24 A. Mental Impairment 25 1. Step Two Non-Severity 26 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation by finding his 27 mental impairments non-severe. Plaintiff argues that this was harmful error because his severe 28 mental impairments were not considered in the RFC determination, and the vocational expert 1 (VE) was never asked how they would affect his ability to work. Thus, plaintiff contends, the 2 step two finding of non-severe mental impairment was consequential to the ultimate finding that 3 he was not disabled. See Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (error is 4 harmless if “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 5 Step two of the Commissioner’s five-step evaluation process inquires whether the 6 claimant had severe impairments during the period for which he seeks disability benefits. 20 7 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits” an individual’s 8 “ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “[A]n ALJ may find an 9 impairment or combination of impairments ‘not severe’ at step two only if the evidence 10 establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability 11 to work.” Glanden v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Webb v. Barnhart, 433 12 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). “In analyzing a 13 mental impairment ..., the Secretary must consider the evidence in the case record—the mental 14 status examination and psychiatric history.” Corrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 The step two severity analysis is a “de minimis requirement that screens out only frivolous 16 claims.” Glanden, 86 .F.4th at 843 (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1987)). The 17 purpose is to identify at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight 18 that it is unlikely they are disabled even if their age, education, and experience is considered. 19 Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153. The court analyzes step two by asking whether the ALJ had substantial 20 evidence to find that the medical evidence “clearly established” that plaintiff did not have a 21 severe mental impairment or combination of impairments. Webb, 433 F.3d at 687; see also 22 Glanden, 86 F.4th at 844. 23 At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairment of PTSD 24 did not cause more than minimal limitation and was non-severe. AT 31. The ALJ noted that, as 25 there was “substantial overlap in symptomology between different mental impairments, . . . the 26 claimant’s psychological symptoms and their effect on his functioning have been considered 27 together, instead of separately, regardless of the diagnostic label attached.” AT 31. The ALJ 28 explained his finding of non-severe mental limitation by noting that “the majority of [plaintiff’s] 1 mental status findings were within normal limits,” though he had “mildly abnormal” examination 2 findings on “a few occasions[.]” AT 32. 3 When a claimant has presented a “colorable claim” of mental impairment, the ALJ is 4 required “to follow a special psychiatric review technique.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 5 648 F.3d 721, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). In it, the ALJ rates the degree of 6 functional limitation for four functional areas and determines whether the impairment is severe. 7 Keyser, 648 F.3d at 725; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. The four areas are known as the “paragraph B” 8 criteria: understanding and applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, 9 persisting, and maintain pace; and adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 10 Appendix 1 §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B), 12.15(B). Agency policy explains that “the limitations 11 identified in the ‘paragraph B’ . . . criteria are not an RFC assessment[.] . . . The mental RFC 12 assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed 13 assessment[.]” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. 14 Using the psychiatric review technique, the ALJ found plaintiff to have mild limitations in 15 all four areas. AT 32-33. In making these determinations, the ALJ cited plaintiff’s “largely 16 normal” mental status examination findings; his ability to perform daily activities (e.g., “go 17 places without reminders, prepare meals, pay bills, and take public transportation . . . handle self- 18 care and personal hygiene, care for pets, care for others”); and medical evidence that plaintiff was 19 “consistently noted as pleasant, cooperative, and friendly, with good eye contact.” AT 32-33. 20 The ALJ also credited the opinions of two state agency consultants, who found that plaintiff had 21 mild limitations in each of the four areas. AT 33. 22 Plaintiff argues that the above analysis improperly disregards evidence that his mental 23 impairments significantly limited his ability to work. Plaintiff first cites the August 2015 opinion 24 of Dr. Deborah Lacy, who found plaintiff moderately impaired in five work-related mental 25 functions. AT 501. The ALJ considered Dr. Lacy’s opinion but discounted it as “so remote in 26 time” as to be irrelevant to the period at issue, beginning with the alleged onset date in November 27 2020. AT 33. 28 Plaintiff next cites the April 2022 opinion of Dr. Morgen Aita, who found plaintiff to have 1 mild limitation in interacting with others and moderate limitation in coping with normal stressors 2 in a work environment, including completing a normal workday or workweek and responding 3 appropriately to changes in a work setting. AT 1150. The ALJ found Dr. Aita’s opinion “largely 4 persuasive” and supported by “thorough examination findings.” AT 33. The ALJ disagreed with 5 “the conclusion that the claimant has moderate limitations in interacting with others,” finding 6 only mild limitation in that area. AT 33-34. However, like the ALJ, Dr. Aita found plaintiff to 7 have mild limitations in interacting with others. Because the ALJ apparently conflated Dr. Aita’s 8 findings in two different areas, the ALJ did not address Dr. Aita’s finding of moderate limitation 9 in coping with the stressors of a work environment. Put another way, the ALJ cited no evidence 10 to discount Dr. Aita’s finding of moderate mental impairment in completing a normal 11 workday/workweek and handling changes in a work setting. 12 At the September 12, 2023 hearing, the ALJ ordered another psychiatric evaluation due to 13 plaintiff’s “prior issues with mental health” and recent changes to medication. AT 76. 14 Accordingly, a third consultative examiner, Dr. Charles Odipo, examined plaintiff in October 15 2023. Dr. Odipo noted that plaintiff was currently homeless and had moderate mental symptoms 16 (including fearfulness, heightened anxiety, hyper-vigilance, irritability, anger outbursts) that 17 “occur on a daily basis” and had become “worse and more persistent” since they started. AT 18 1422-23. Dr. Odipo noted that plaintiff had been diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive 19 disorder and was anxious throughout the interview. AT 1422-23. Dr. Odipo further noted: 20 He has difficulty being around people, He said, ‘I don’t trust people, I always get burned. I fear people and have to watch my environment 21 because of everything that has happened to me. 1 used to have three jobs to having nothing after I was hit by a semi-truck. Talking about 22 it brings sadness and emotions’ (he started tearing). 23 AT 1422. 24 As to mental limitations, Dr. Odipo concluded in part: 25 Has difficulty performing complex tasks adequately without accommodations due to stress, anxiety and depressive symptoms and 26 social difficulties. He is deemed markedly restricted. . . . 27 Has difficulty accepting instructions from supervisors and interacting with coworkers and the public without accommodations 28 due to stress, anxiety and social difficulties. He is deemed to be 1 moderately impaired. 2 Has difficulty maintaining regular attendance in the workplace without accommodations due to anxiety and pain symptoms. He is 3 deemed to be markedly restricted. 4 Has difficulty handling normal work-related stress from a competitive work environment without accommodations. His stress, 5 anxiety, depression and pain problems and difficulty being around people will impact claimant’s ability to handle work related stress. 6 He is deemed markedly restricted.

7 8 AT 1424. The ALJ found Dr. Odipo’s opinion unpersuasive, reasoning that it was “not well 9 supported by [his] examination findings, which showed abnormal mood and affect, but otherwise 10 normal or mild findings.” AT 34. The ALJ also found the opinion “inconsistent with the 11 longitudinal evidence, which also showed relatively mild findings.” AT 34. 12 Plaintiff argues that, in addition to discounting moderate and marked mental limitations 13 opined by the examining physicians, the ALJ disregarded record evidence of plaintiff’s poor 14 mental functioning during the period at issue. In December 2021, plaintiff was assessed with 15 “delusions” and “symptoms concerning for schizophrenia” when he told a medical provider that 16 his cell phone had been hacked, his disability checks had been stolen, and his siblings were 17 working with the police to torment and hurt him. AT 721-723. A month earlier, in November 18 2021, plaintiff was homeless and brought to the emergency room by ambulance “due to 19 depression.” AT 544. Medical notes state that he presented “with paranoid delusions stating that 20 people are following him and stealing his personal belongings. Patient further states that people 21 are controlling his phone and watching him through this platform.” AT 544. However, he stated 22 he was not interested in psychiatric medications or therapy. AT 544. 23 In sum, both consultative examiners who interviewed plaintiff during the relevant period 24 found moderate or marked mental limitations, and plaintiff’s self-reports during that period 25 suggest that, at least at times, he experienced paranoia, delusions, and anxiety, though he may 26 have been unwilling to seek treatment. After reviewing the record, the court finds that the ALJ’s 27 conclusion that plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than minimal limitation was not 28 1 supported by substantial evidence. Rather, the evidence establishes that the combination of 2 plaintiff’s mental impairments satisfies step two’s de minimis standard. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 3 (“At the step two inquiry, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all the claimant's 4 impairments on her ability to function, without regard to whether each alone was sufficiently 5 severe.”) 6 However, this step two error was, in itself, harmless. Because the ALJ determined at step 7 two that plaintiff suffered severe physical impairments, the sequential evaluation process 8 continued to the next steps. In subsequent steps, regardless of the step two findings, “the ALJ 9 was required to consider all impairments—severe and non-severe—in his RFC analysis.” 10 Michelle L.A. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4361615, *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) (citing Loader v. 11 Berryhill, 722 F. App'x 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2018); Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048–49 (9th 12 Cir. 2017)). As the Ninth Circuit explained, 13 step two is merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims. It is not meant to identify the impairments that should 14 be taken into account when determining the RFC. In fact, in assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions 15 imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not severe. 16 17 Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049 (cleaned up). Thus, the court turns to whether the ALJ considered the 18 limitations imposed by plaintiff’s mental impairments when determining the RFC. 19 2. Harmful Error 20 As noted above, the RFC contains no mental limitations. Though the ALJ assessed mild 21 mental limitations at step two, he did not mention these limitations or any evidence concerning 22 mental issues after step two of the evaluation. See AT 36-39 (discussing physical impairments in 23 RFC determination). Nor did the ALJ pose a hypothetical question to the VE about a person with 24 plaintiff’s physical RFC and any kind of mental limitation. 25 Residual functional capacity is what a person “can still do despite [the individual’s] 26 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003); see also Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 27 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). RFC is assessed based on the relevant evidence in the case record, 28 1 including the medical history, medical source statements, and subjective descriptions and 2 observations made by the claimant, family, neighbors, friends, or other persons. 20 C.F.R. §§ 3 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1545(a)(3). When assessing RFC, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s 4 “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 5 404.1545(a)(4). As to mental impairment, as noted above, “the limitations identified in the 6 ‘paragraph B’ . . . criteria are not an RFC assessment[.] . . . The mental RFC assessment used at 7 steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment[.]” Social 8 Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. 9 In this case, the ALJ considered only evidence of physical limitation when assessing the 10 RFC. Though acknowledging that steps 4 and 5 “require[] a more detailed assessment” of a 11 claimant’s mental impairment (AT 34), the ALJ never returned to the evidence of mental 12 impairment after step two, nor did he explain how his finding of mild mental limitations factored 13 into the RFC. See Hutton v. Astrue, 491 Fed. App’x 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ erred in RFC 14 analysis by failing to consider his own finding that claimant’s non-severe PTSD caused mild 15 limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace); Tammy W. v. Comm’r, 787 F.Supp.3d 1175, 16 1183 (W.D. Wash. June 20, 2025) (noting that “an ALJ is not required to impose any restriction 17 in the RFC based on a ‘mild’ mental limitation but does need to at least consider the issue” in the 18 RFC analysis). As to mental limitations, “the question is not whether the ALJ’s paragraph B 19 findings are consistent with the RFC, but whether the ALJ has provided an adequate explanation 20 for the mental limitations contained in the RFC.” Id. 21 The ALJ’s decision included a boilerplate statement that he “has considered all symptoms 22 and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 23 objective medical evidence and other evidence” per the applicable regulations. AT 36. However, 24 several district courts have found that an ALJ’s boilerplate statement that he considered “all 25 symptoms” does not satisfy the requirement that he provide a detailed RFC assessment. See 26 Michelle L.A., 2024 WL 4361615, *7 (collecting cases). Here as in Michelle L.A., “[t]he ALJ is 27 not required to include every impairment in the RFC, but he is required to consider each 28 impairment, and in this regard, the ALJ erred.” 2024 WL 4361615, at *6. 1 Moreover, this error was not harmless. Based on VE testimony (where the VE did not 2 consider any mental limitations), the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform past relevant work as 3 a nurse assistant (DOT 355.674-014). AT 40, 74-75. The VE testified that if an individual with 4 plaintiff’s RFC missed work two or more times a month, there would be no work available. AT 5 76. The ALJ did not make alternate findings if plaintiff could not perform his past job as a nurse 6 assistant. The court finds that the ALJ’s failure to consider mental impairment in the RFC was 7 consequential to the ultimate finding of nondisability, constituting harmful error. Plaintiff is 8 entitled to summary judgment on this claim.1 9 CONCLUSION 10 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 11 benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 12 under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 13 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 14 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 15 whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 16 would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

17 18 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the 19 “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when 20 the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within 21 the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 22 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 23 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 24 benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105 (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is 25 uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”). 26 Here, the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant was, in fact, 27

28 1 The court does not reach the remaining claims. 1 | disabled during the relevant period. On remand, the ALJ is free to develop the record as needed, 2 || including asking a vocational expert hypothetical questions about available jobs based on a 3 || revised RFC. The court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately be 4 || weighed, and any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not 5 || instruct the ALJ to credit any particular opinion or testimony. The ALJ may ultimately find 6 || plaintiff disabled during the entirety of the relevant period; may find plaintiff eligible for some 7 || type of closed period of disability benefits; or may find that plaintiff was never disabled during 8 | the relevant period, provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal 9 || standards and is supported by the record as a whole. 10 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 11 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED; 12 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED; 13 3. Judgment is entered for plaintiff; and 14 4. This matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this 15 || order. 16 | Dated: January 27, 2026 / ae □□ / a Ly a

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 || 2/brid3487.bothdibssi.ckd 25 26 27 28 1]