Bradley J. Harris v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 29, 2016
• Docket: 89A01-1505-CR-524
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 29 2016, 8:58 am court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE Bradley J. Harris New Castle, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bradley J. Harris, January 29, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 89A01-1505-CR-524 v. Appeal from the Wayne Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Appellee-Plaintiff Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 89C01-0301-FC-001

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1505-CR-524 | January 29, 2016 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Bradley Harris appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for jail time credit.

Because the Department of Correction (the DOC) applied Harris’ 249-day pre-

sentence confinement jail-time credit to his sentence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Harris was arrested on January 21, 2003, and incarcerated until May 1, 2003,

which is one hundred days. After being out on bond, Harris was incarcerated

from September 1, 2005, the date of his conviction, for two counts of Class A

felony child molesting, until January 27, 2006, the date of his sentencing, which

is an additional one-hundred and forty-nine days. At the time of sentencing,

the trial court awarded Harris the two-hundred and forty-nine days of pre-

sentence confinement jail-time credit that he had earned.

[3] At some point in 2015, Harris advised the Indiana Department of Correction

(the DOC) that his two-hundred and forty-nine days of jail-time credit had not

been applied to his sentence. Randy Short, a DOC classification-division

representative, advised Harris that his credit had been properly applied, and

that his earliest possible release date is May 23, 2016. In May 2015, Harris filed

a motion for jail-time credit, which the trial court denied. Harris appeals.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1505-CR-524 | January 29, 2016 Page 2 of 5 Discussion and Decision [4] At the outset we note that Harris proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se

is held to the rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith

v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert.

dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not

know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to

accomplish. Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for

us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule

for the orderly and proper conduct of the appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d

494, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[5] We further note that the State has failed to file an appellate brief in this matter.

In cases where the appellee fails to submit a brief, we will not undertake the

burden of developing arguments on its behalf. Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671,

673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Instead, we apply a less stringent standard of review

and will reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which is error “at first

sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.

[6] Under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-4, “[a] person who is not a credit restricted

felon and who is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing

is initially assigned to Class I” for the purposes of assigning credit. In Class I, a

person “earns one (1) day of credit time for each day the person is imprisoned

for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1505-CR-524 | January 29, 2016 Page 3 of 5 [7] Because pre-sentence jail-time credit is a matter of statutory right, trial courts

generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying credit. Molden v. State,

750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, those sentencing

decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and

will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse

of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d

1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012).

[8] Here, Harris claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion for jail-time credit. Specifically, he contends that the trial court should

have granted the motion because the DOC did not apply his credit time to his

sentence. In support of his contention, he directs us to a computer print-out

that shows a zero under the column for adjusted earned credit time.

Appellant’s App. p. 7. However, our review of the print-out shows that the

DOC did apply the 249 days to Harris’ sentence. Specifically, the print-out lists

the “initial action” date as May 23, 2005. The initial action date is the date the

DOC uses to begin computing an offender’s sentence. Harris’ sentencing date

was January 27, 2006, which is 249 days after the initial action date used by the

DOC. Had the DOC used Harris’ sentencing date as the initial action date and

given him 249 days of credit for time served, his release date would be the

same. In other words, the DOC used different dates to calculate the credit, but

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1505-CR-524 | January 29, 2016 Page 4 of 5 the amount of the credit was the same either way, and Harris received it. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’ motion.

[9] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1505-CR-524 | January 29, 2016 Page 5 of 5