Bradford County NAACP v. City of Starke

712 F. Supp. 1523, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5507, 1989 WL 52835
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 27, 1989
Docket86-5 Civ-J-12
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 712 F. Supp. 1523 (Bradford County NAACP v. City of Starke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bradford County NAACP v. City of Starke, 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5507, 1989 WL 52835 (M.D. Fla. 1989).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HODGES, Chief Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs instituted this action on January 3,1986, seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief against the at-large, city-wide municipal elections held for members of the Starke City Commission. Plaintiffs allege that the at-large election system unlawfully dilutes the voting strength of black citizens and has a discriminatory result in violation of Section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights *1526 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. 1 The named Plaintiffs are three black citizens who, as residents and registered voters of Starke, Florida, represent Plaintiffs’ class. 2 Additionally, the Bradford County Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is also a Plaintiff in the case. The Defendants are the City of Starke, and the four City Commissioners and the Mayor of Starke, and their successors in office, all of whom are sued solely in their official capacities.

The case was tried before the Court without a jury on June 14 through June 23, 1988. Pursuant to the Court’s Order of September 12, 1986, the issues of liability and remedy have been bifurcated. Consequently, the trial addressed, and the Court in this decision addresses, the liability issue only. At the conclusion of the trial it was agreed by counsel and ordered by the Court that the respective parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties have made their submissions and the case is now ready for decision. Accordingly, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits states and their political subdivisions from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices, or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial and language minorities. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2762, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). As the Supreme Court stated in Gingles, its seminal opinion construing Section 2, “the essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2764-65.

The Gingles Court began its analysis of Section 2 by recognizing that a violation of the statute can be proven simply by showing discriminatory effect alone rather than by proving discriminatory intent. Id. at 2759. The Court went on to caution, however, that although “multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population’ [citations omitted], ... [such schemes] are not per se violative of minority voters’ rights.” Id. at 2765. Thus, “minority voters who contend that the multi-member form of districting violates § 2, must prove that the use of a multimember electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candidates.” Id.

After establishing those general principles, the Court in Gingles reviewed a number of factors, taken from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1982 amendment of the Voting Rights Act, which are to be considered in evaluating a Section 2 claim. These factors include:

*1527 1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;

2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;

3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;

4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of a minority group have been denied access to that process;

5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;

6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;

7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group, whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

Id. at 2759-60 quoting S.Rep. 97-417, pp. 28-29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 177, 206-207. While all these factors are to be considered, the Gingles Court made it clear that they are not to be given equal weight. Gingles, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 15; Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. Carrollton, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1111, 99 L.Ed.2d 272 (1988). The most important of the Senate factors to be considered are minority electoral success and racial bloc voting. Id. All other factors are merely “supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter’s claim.” Gingles, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 15 (emphasis in original). 3

Using the Senate factors as a guide, the Court then set out three conditions which must be proven by plaintiffs advancing a Section 2 vote dilution claim. Carrollton, 829 F.2d at 1550. The Gingles conditions *1528

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Bluebook (online)
712 F. Supp. 1523, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5507, 1989 WL 52835, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bradford-county-naacp-v-city-of-starke-flmd-1989.