This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1355
Bradford Cain Dopkins, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed June 3, 2024 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Larkin, Judge
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CR-18-3927
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his request for relief, in
which he claimed that his guilty pleas to first-degree assault and making threats of violence
were invalid. Because appellant’s guilty plea to first-degree assault lacked an adequate factual basis and was therefore inaccurate, we reverse in part and remand for further
proceedings. However, because appellant has not met his burden to establish that his guilty
pleas were unintelligent, we reject his request for relief on that ground. We also reject
appellant’s additional pro se arguments for relief.
FACTS
In 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Bradford Cain Dopkins
with several offenses, including making threats of violence and first-degree assault. During
the ensuing criminal proceeding, Dopkins’s competency to stand trial was questioned, and
at one point, he was found incompetent to stand trial. Ultimately, the district court found
Dopkins competent.
Dopkins resolved the charges against him pursuant to a plea agreement with the
state. He pleaded guilty to one count of making threats of violence and one count of
first-degree assault resulting in great bodily harm. In exchange for those guilty pleas, the
state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, to an executed sentence of 117 months for
first-degree assault, and to not seek an aggravated sentence. The district court entered
judgment of conviction and sentenced Dopkins to serve 366 days for making threats of
violence and a concurrent sentence of 117 months for first-degree assault.
Nearly two years after Dopkins pleaded guilty, he petitioned for postconviction
relief, asserting that his guilty pleas were invalid. The postconviction court denied relief
without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Dopkins appeals.
2 DECISION
Under Minnesota’s postconviction statutes, a person convicted of a crime may seek
relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1(1) (2022). “The person seeking postconviction relief bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims merit relief.” Crow v. State,
923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019).
We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Colbert
v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 2015). In doing so, we review legal issues de novo
and factual findings for clear error. Id. The postconviction court “abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
“A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing upon a timely motion and
proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Minn. 1994) (quotation
omitted) (applying Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, in the context of a postconviction
challenge to the validity of a guilty plea). A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not
valid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid, a guilty plea must
be “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. “A defendant bears
the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
Id.
3 I.
Dopkins contends that his guilty plea to first-degree assault was invalid because it
was inaccurate. “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant
from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to
insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “A proper
factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at
716. To determine whether a guilty plea has an adequate factual basis, “we examine
whether there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s
conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Lussier v. State,
853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Dopkins argues that the record does not establish a necessary element of
first-degree assault, specifically, great bodily harm. First-degree assault occurs when a
person “assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1
(2016). An assault includes “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm
upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2016). “‘Great bodily harm’ means bodily
injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Id., subd. 8 (2016).
Dopkins provided sworn admissions as support for his guilty plea. He admitted that
on May 31, 2018, he threatened to harm JS with the intent to make her “very, very afraid.”
He also admitted that from May 31, 2018, to June 10, 2018, he repeatedly choked JS with
his hands until she lost consciousness and physically harmed her by hitting her with a coat
4 hanger. Finally, Dopkins admitted that JS sought treatment for her resulting injuries at a
hospital and that the injuries included bruising on her chest, arms, legs, and back, as well
as petechia in her eye.
In denying relief, the postconviction court reasoned that Dopkins’s guilty plea was
accurate because his factual basis established “other serious bodily harm” under section
609.02, subdivision 8:
The injuries [Dopkins] inflicted on [JS,] including petechiae of the eye, a known sign of occlusion to the airways; repeatedly choking until [JS] lost consciousness over a period of 11 days; and hitting [JS] with a [coat] hanger resulting in substantial bruising over multiple areas of her body all contributed to the [district] court’s finding that “other serious bodily harm” had been inflicted on [JS].
Dopkins argues that the record does not show that he inflicted bodily injury that
created a high probability of death or other serious bodily harm. We address each form of
great bodily harm in turn.1
High Probability of Death
When determining whether a victim suffered great bodily harm, we must “focus on
the injury to the victim rather than the actions of the assailant.” State v. Gerald,
486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. App. 1992). For a bodily injury to create a high probability
of death, “the injury itself must be life-threatening.” Id. “The fact that a lesser injury is
1 The record does not suggest, and the state does not argue that the record established, either of the other two types of great bodily harm: “serious permanent disfigurement” or “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8.
5 located near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not
sufficient . . . .” Id.
The factual basis for Dopkins’s guilty plea includes the following exchange:
PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], when you say that you threatened to hurt her, the types of threats that you were making were to hurt her very badly; true?
DEFENDANT: True.
....
PROSECUTOR: As the days went by with [JS], is it true that you physically hurt her in a number of different ways?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: From May 31st through June 10th, [JS] reported that you had choked her on several occasions to the point that she lost consciousness. Is that true?
PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], are you telling the [c]ourt that every time that you choked [JS] until she became unconscious, you only did it with your hands?
PROSECUTOR: [Dopkins], you don’t have to plead guilty today, but what [JS] reported that you did to her is very different from what you’re saying today. What is it that you did to her that makes you guilty of first-degree assault?
DEFENDANT: I’m not sure what first[-]degree assault means.
COURT: Well, I can help you with that, [Dopkins].
6 First[-]degree assault means that you assaulted her[,] and she suffered great bodily harm. And great bodily harm doesn’t really have a technical definition so much as it’s serious bodily harm. So the [c]omplaint that I’m reading indicates that [JS] did have to go to the hospital, that her eyes had petechiae . . . , which means, like, a lot of blood visible in her eyes; she had bruises on her body, including on her chest, arms, legs, and back. So I’m going to ask you, is that the results of your assaulting her?
COURT: So did you also hit her at some point with a coat hanger?
COURT: And you agree that you beat her and caused those bruises on her body?
COURT: The [c]ourt’s satisfied that that is great bodily harm . . . .
We turn to caselaw to determine whether Dopkins’s factual basis established an
injury with a high probability of death.
In Gerald, the victim sustained half-inch lacerations on the ear and neck. Id. at 801.
The state argued that because one of the lacerations was close to a major vein and artery,
the victim “could have bled to death.” Id. at 802. The state further argued that the injury
therefore “created a high probability of death” and constituted great bodily harm. Id. We
rejected the state’s argument, reasoning that “[t]he fact that a lesser injury is located near
7 a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more serious is not sufficient to
satisfy the statut[ory]” requirement of a high probability of death. Id.
We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Dye, reasoning that a gun-shot injury
was not life threatening. 871 N.W.2d 916, 921-22 (Minn. App. 2015). In Dye, testimony
established that despite the gun-shot injury, the victim could walk, talk, and breathe, and
that she walked down a set of stairs to an ambulance. Id. at 920. We rejected the state’s
argument that “a bullet that enters the torso where it did on [the victim] can hit critical body
parts, such as the lungs, heart, kidneys, aorta, or spine, and that other patients have died
from gunshot wounds in the same area as [the victim’s].” Id. at 921. We reasoned that
although medical staff treated the injury as if it were life-threatening, a CT scan revealed
that the bullet traveled in a straight line without hitting any critical body parts. Id. In sum,
the injury in Dye could have been life-threatening for purposes of establishing great bodily
harm, but in fact it was not.
In contrast, in State v. Anderson, we held that the evidence of the victim’s injuries
showed a high probability of death and was sufficient to sustain a first-degree assault
conviction. 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 1985).
The Anderson victim suffered a laceration to her liver, and a physician testified at trial that
the laceration was ‘“life-threatening’” and that it was ‘“a serious injury because if the
bleeding does not stop or is not stopped, a person can bleed and die.’” Id. Unlike Anderson,
the record here does not contain medical evidence indicating that the particular injuries in
this case were life-threatening or created a high probability of death.
8 Given the caselaw above, we conclude that the record does not establish that
Dopkins inflicted injuries that created a high probability of death. Like the circumstances
in Gerald and Dye, although JS’s injuries may have had the potential to be life-threatening,
Dopkins did not admit that he inflicted life-threatening injuries and the record does not
establish that JS’s injuries did in fact create a high probability of death. The record does
not contain any information regarding the number of times that Dopkins rendered JS
unconsciousness or for how long. Nor does the record contain any medical evidence
indicating that JS’s injuries created a high probability of death. To be clear, we do not
suggest that choking leading to unconsciousness could never create a high probability of
death. But caselaw indicates that such a determination must be based on the particular
facts of a case. And in this case, the factual record is very weak on that issue. More facts
were necessary to show that the injuries that Dopkins inflicted did in fact create a high
probability of death.
The state’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. The state argues that JS’s loss
of consciousness “was because her brain, a major organ was deprived of oxygen, which is
known to lead to death.” (Emphasis added.) That argument is unavailing because, as
explained above, the possibility of death is not sufficient to establish great bodily harm.
See Gerald, 486 N.W.2d at 802 (explaining that “the injury itself must be life-threatening”).
The evidence must show that the particular injury did in fact create a high probability of
death. See id. Thus, the state’s general assertion that loss of oxygen is known to cause
death is not adequate to establish that the particular loss of oxygen in this case created a
high probability of death.
9 Moreover, the caselaw on which the state relies is distinguishable. In those cases,
courts considered whether a temporary loss of consciousness constitutes “substantial
bodily harm” for the purpose of third-degree assault; the courts did not decide that a
temporary loss of consciousness constitutes “great bodily harm” for the purpose of first-
degree assault. State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983) (declining to decide
whether great bodily harm is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly); State v. Larkin,
620 N.W.2d 335, 335 (Minn. App. 2001) (“An individual who assaults another, causing
temporary loss of consciousness, has inflicted substantial bodily harm and is guilty of third-
degree assault . . . .”). The state does not cite, and we are not aware of, any precedential
authority holding that a temporary loss of consciousness constitutes great bodily harm for
the purpose of first-degree assault.2
Other Serious Bodily Harm
“Other serious bodily harm” is not defined by statute, and it “should be taken in the
context of the other three alternative definitions.” State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 739
(Minn. 2005). “To determine whether a victim’s injuries constitute ‘other serious bodily
harm,’ courts must consider the totality of the victim’s injuries.” Dye, 871 N.W.2d at 922.
In State v. Barner, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the following
injuries constituted “other serious bodily harm”: a swollen head that caused the victim to
have difficulty eating for several days, multiple stab wounds that left scars, and a
2 State v. Lindsey, which the postconviction court cited, is also not on point. 654 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Minn. App. 2002) (reviewing jury instruction regarding the requisite mental state for the crime of first-degree assault of a correctional employee, which has different elements than the offense here).
10 debilitating injury to the victim’s hand. 510 N.W.2d 202, 202 (Minn. 1993). “Other
serious bodily harm” was also established in Anderson, based on injuries that included a
lacerated liver, a head laceration that required stitches, bruises, other head injuries that
caused periods of unconsciousness, and a long scar running the length of the victim’s upper
body. 370 N.W.2d at 706.
In State v. Jones, the victim was found unconscious and nearly in shock:
She had to be put in a “shock suit” for transfer to the hospital. She did not regain consciousness until the following day. She remained hospitalized for a week. She testified that [two] weeks after the attack she almost suffered a miscarriage and was prescribed bed rest. While there was no medical evidence tying this to the attack, it certainly was evidence which the jury could consider in determining whether she had suffered great bodily harm. She testified that her left leg was numb for several weeks, she had dizziness and headaches until just before trial, and she still had a numbness in her teeth at the time of trial.
266 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1978). The Jones court concluded that, “[a]t the very least,
[the victim’s] injuries would seem to fit within the phrase ‘“other serious bodily harm.’”
Once again, the record does not contain any information regarding the number of
times that Dopkins rendered JS unconscious or for how long. And the record does not
contain any medical evidence indicating that JS’s injuries compared with those in Barner,
Anderson, or Jones. Nor does the record indicate that Dopkins’s assault left JS with
permanent scars. In sum, the injuries here simply do not compare to the injuries that have
supported a finding of “other serious bodily harm.”
11 In arguing that the record shows “other serious bodily harm,” the state once again
relies on Stafford and Larkin. Again, those cases are not on point because they involved
allegations of “substantial,” and not “great,” bodily harm. See 340 N.W.2d at 670; 620
N.W.2d at 335. And the state does not cite any caselaw suggesting that temporary,
unmeasured periods of unconsciousness coupled with significant bruising constitutes
“other serious bodily harm.”
In Gerald, we explained that, because the focus of Minnesota’s first-degree assault
statute is the severity of the victim’s injury, there may be situations in which a person who
commits a “grievous assault on another may escape a first[-]degree assault conviction
because the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury.” 486 N.W.2d. at 802-03.
Those seem to be the circumstances here. The record simply does not establish either an
“injury which creates a high probability of death” or “other serious bodily harm” as
required to sustain a conviction of first-degree assault.
We do not minimize the harm that Dopkins inflicted. And we recognize that
domestic violence is a significant problem that must be treated seriously. But we are bound
to follow the law, and caselaw indicates that a determination of great bodily harm must be
based on the particular facts of a case. We are also bound by the facts in the record, and in
this case, the factual record is weak. More facts are necessary to show that the injuries that
Dopkins inflicted did in fact create a high probability of death or constitute other serious
bodily harm. Thus, Dopkins’s plea to first-degree assault is inaccurate and invalid, and he
must be allowed to withdraw his plea to avoid a manifest injustice. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d
12 at 650 (noting that “a manifest injustice exists [when] a guilty plea is invalid,” and
“withdrawal of the plea [must] be allowed”).
II.
Dopkins also contends that his guilty pleas to first-degree assault and making threats
of violence were unintelligent. A guilty plea is intelligent if the defendant understands
(1) the charges against him, (2) the rights he is giving up by pleading guilty, and (3) the
direct consequences of pleading guilty. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. A district court must
ensure that a defendant has such an understanding before accepting his guilty plea. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1 (stating that before a judge accepts a guilty plea, the
defendant must be sworn and questioned on whether he or she understands the crime
charged and the rights being waived).
Dopkins argues that his guilty pleas were unintelligent because the district court did
not verify that he understood his rights or the guilty-plea process. He notes that he
repeatedly indicated that he did not understand the charges against him and his most basic
trial rights. He argues that the district court “did not ensure that [he] understood the
charges, his trial rights [that] he was waiving, and the plea consequences.”
The district court’s extensive effort to ensure that Dopkins understood the charges,
his rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty were accurately summarized by the
postconviction court as follows:
Dopkins’[s] [p]etition focuses on whether [he] adequately understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty. First, Dopkins acknowledged signing a [p]etition to [e]nter [a] [g]uilty [p]lea which enumerated all of his various trial rights. Counsel noted on the record that they had “sat through the glass
13 and talked about everything [in the plea petition], and then [Dopkins] was given a copy.” When Dopkins was first questioned about whether he wanted to proceed, he stated “no[,]” and the court immediately recessed and allowed him and his attorneys more time to speak. Upon returning, an amended offer was placed on the record, the court inquired of Dopkins if [he] wished to proceed with the plea[,] and he stated “yes.” When asked if he had any specific questions concerning his rights, Dopkins said “no.” The plea hearing transcript spans thirty-eight pages[,] and the last page reflects that court did not conclude until 5:15 p.m., indicating ample time was spent ensuring that he understood everything. While [Dopkins] equivocated during various point[s] during the proceeding about whether he understood specific rights and whether he had read the [r]ule 15 [p]etition, these instances should be viewed in the context of his agreement, upon questioning by counsel, that “we watched you review each page and ultimately sign the last page of the document.” Counsel specifically asked Dopkins, “do you recall that?”; to which his response was “yes.” Throughout the hearing, both the court and counsel questioned [Dopkins] repeatedly on whether he wanted to continue with the plea agreement or take the case to trial. The court inquired of [Dopkins] three times whether he wanted to plead guilty and continue through with the plea agreement. Defense counsel asked [Dopkins] twice whether he wished to plead guilty and continue with the plea. Each time, [Dopkins] stated he did not want a trial and confirmed his intentions to plead guilty. Even though defense counsel went through the [r]ule 15 [p]etition with [Dopkins], and [Dopkins] signed it, inquiry occurred on the record where [Dopkins] acknowledged several specific rights, including the right to challenge how the police did their job and the right to have a jury or court trial. When defense counsel referenced the fact that the [s]tate would have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, [Dopkins] said “no” when asked if he understood. Defense counsel went on to explain that this was the standard of proof for a jury to unanimously find him guilty. When asked if he had questions about that, Dopkins replied[,] “I don’t know.” The court then explained further that “beyond a reasonable doubt” was the “highest burden of proof” and reiterated that the burden would
14 be on the [s]tate to prove [him] guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court went on to ask[,] “do you understand that’s what would happen if we had a trial?” to which Dopkins failed to respond. When he claimed not to understand this explanation, the court responded[,] “Okay. So tell me where your question is. You have to help me out here [so] I can help you, okay?” Dopkins responded[,] “I’m not sure.” Later, when Dopkins claimed not to understand what it meant to testify, the court told him[,] “testify simply means you tell what happened under oath, after you’ve taken an oath to tell the truth. That’s what you’re doing right now, because I gave you an oath to tell the truth, and you promised me to tell the truth to the best of your ability.” After a long pause, the court noted that Dopkins had signed a [p]etition to [e]nter a [p]lea of [g]uilty, and the court needed to determine what he wanted to do. If he did not want to proceed, the court made it clear that the trial would commence in January. Defense counsel then picked up questioning Dopkins once again, explaining that testifying was witnesses coming into court and telling the jury “what they know and what they saw[,]” which Dopkins acknowledged with “okay.” Counsel then explained that “we as your defense team can present witnesses on your behalf, people who have things to say about you. Do you understand?” He replied[,] “yes.” Counsel further explained that he could give up his right to remain silent and testify. But if he pled guilty, there would be no trial. Dopkins then claimed that he did not want to either plead guilty or have a trial. The court interjected and advised him as follows: “So, [Dopkins], I completely understand that it is difficult to make a decision. But if you decide that you’re not going to accept the [s]tate’s offer, that is fine, but then you are choosing to have the trial. Do you understand what I am saying?” Dopkins replied, “maybe.” The court continued, “do you wish to go forward with the jury trial in January and have all the witnesses testify and have a trial, or do you wish to enter into this agreement that you’ve signed off on the petition with the [s]tate?” He replied, “the agreement.” The court clarified, “so you want to go forward with the agreement. That means you’re pleading guilty to these two charges, right?” He replied[,] “right.” The court then noted that five other charges in the complaint would be dismissed, which the prosecutor confirmed. In addition, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that
15 the [s]tate would not seek an aggravated sentence and would withdraw its motion for a higher maximum sentence. The thirty-eight page transcript of the plea hearing demonstrates that [Dopkins] made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice to plead guilty in order to limit his prison time to 117 months and avoid a sentence of up to 20 years. As noted by the court towards the conclusion of the proceedings, counsel “bent over backwards to make sure” Dopkins understood what he was doing. Throughout the lengthy hearing, Dopkins not only reviewed a [r]ule 15 [p]etition thoroughly with his counsel, but he asked many questions in order to have legal concepts and the consequences of his guilty plea explained. As a result, at the conclusion of the proceedings, Dopkins confirmed that he had no other questions. Therefore, the record as a whole demonstrates that Dopkins’[s] guilty plea was accurate, knowing[,] and intelligent. His request to withdraw it must be denied as he has not met his burden to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Although we review the validity of a guilty plea de novo, if a defendant makes
inconsistent statements regarding the validity of his guilty plea, “credibility determinations
are crucial, [and] a reviewing court will give deference to the primary observations and
trustworthiness assessments made by the district court.” State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561
N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. June 11, 1997).
The district court’s obligation to ensure that Dopkins’s guilty pleas were intelligent
was complicated by Dopkins’s inconsistent statements regarding his understanding of the
charges, his rights, and the consequences of his guilty pleas. The district court’s ultimate
acceptance of Dopkins’s guilty pleas, as well as the same judge’s subsequent rejection of
his postconviction claim that his guilty pleas were unintelligent, inevitably depended on
the district court’s resolution of his inconsistent statements and an assessment of his
16 credibility. We defer to the court’s implicit determination that despite Dopkins’s
inconsistent and equivocal statements, Dopkins understood the charges against him, the
rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and the direct consequences of pleading guilty.
We therefore conclude that his guilty pleas were intelligent.
In conclusion, because the factual basis for Dopkins’s guilty plea to first-degree
assault was inaccurate, we reverse and remand in part for Dopkins to withdraw his guilty
plea to that offense. However, because Dopkins has not met his burden to establish that
his guilty pleas were unintelligent, and we are not persuaded that his remaining pro se
arguments provide a basis for relief, we affirm in all other respects. See Ture v. State, 681
N.W.2d 9, 20 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting pro se arguments after thorough review of the record
and without detailed discussion).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.