Brad Brinson v. State of California, California Highway Patrol, Officer P. Santiago, Bay Area Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services, Joshua Hammack

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-02381
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRAD BRINSON, Case No. 25-cv-02381-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 9 v. AND DISCOVERY LETTER

10 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 39, 40, 47 11 Defendants.

12 Plaintiff Brad Brinson filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants 13 State of California, California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), Officer P. Santiago, Bay Area 14 Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services (“BAPLS”), and Joshua Hammack. [Docket No. 37 (SAC).] 15 On July 15, 2025, BAPLS and Hammack (“Lab Defendants”) moved to dismiss the claims against 16 them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Docket Nos. 39 (Lab Mot.); 43 (Lab 17 Reply).] On July 21, 2025, the State of California, CHP, and Santiago (“State Defendants”) also 18 moved to dismiss the claims.1 [Docket Nos. 40 (State Mot.); 44 (State Reply).] Brinson filed 19 oppositions. [Docket Nos. 41 (Lab Opp’n); 42 (State Opp’n).] On September 30, 2025, Lab 20 Defendants filed a unilateral discovery letter seeking to compel responses from Brinson. [Docket 21 No. 47.] 22 This matter is suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the 23 reasons stated below, the court grants both motions to dismiss and denies the motion to compel 24 discovery as moot. 25 26

27 1 Although State Defendants’ motion cites both Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), the arguments made in the I. BACKGROUND 1 A. Statement of Facts 2 Brinson makes the following allegations in the SAC, all of which are taken as true for 3 purposes of these motions.2 On August 28, 2019, CHP Officer Santiago arrested Brinson for 4 driving under the influence. SAC ¶ 8. Brinson was unable to take a breathalyzer test, so Santiago 5 told Brinson to submit to a blood test. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Before his blood was drawn, Brinson was 6 presented with a consent form which warned him that if he was taking an anticoagulant, he should 7 not allow his blood to be drawn. Id. ¶ 11. Brinson explained that he was taking an anticoagulant 8 and attempted to refuse consent, but Santiago threatened Brinson with jail time and losing his 9 driver’s license for a year if he refused the blood draw. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Brinson was not offered a 10 urine test as an alternative to the blood draw. Id. ¶ 14. 11 Hammack is a phlebotomist employed by BAPLS who administered the blood test on 12 Brinson. Id. ¶¶ 10, 20. When Brinson asked Hammack if the blood draw was safe for someone 13 taking anticoagulants, Hammack responded that he did not know. Id. ¶ 16. Brinson was 14 frightened because the CHP station where he was being held did not have an antidote to reverse 15 the anticoagulant medication, even though such medication “is always available under medically 16 accepted practices.” Id. ¶ 17. Brinson alleges that a person in his medical condition “could bleed 17 out right there in the CHP office from this blood draw or a mistake by the phlebotomist.” Id. 18 Brinson ultimately agreed to have his blood drawn, but “spent the night fearful of uncontrolled 19 bleeding and catastrophic medical consequences.” Id. ¶ 18. 20 The SAC also includes this paragraph: “The statute of limitations has been tolled while the 21 criminal case arising from this incident had been pending in the Superior Court of California, San 22 Francisco City and County, Case No.: 2518300.” Id. ¶ 7. 23 B. Procedural History 24 Brinson initially filed his complaint and first amended complaint in the Superior Court of 25 26 2 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 27 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 1 San Francisco. [Docket No. 1 (Removal Notice).] On March 7, 2025, Lab Defendants removed 2 the case to federal court then moved to dismiss all claims against them. [Docket No. 5.] On May 3 3, 2025, State Defendants filed an answer to the FAC. [Docket No. 28.] On June 16, 2025, the 4 court granted Lab Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend. [Docket No. 32 (Order on 5 First MTD).] Among other things, the court held that Brinson had failed to plead sufficient facts 6 to show that his claims were timely filed. Id. at 10. Brinson filed the SAC on July 7, 2025. 7 Brinson brings six claims against Defendants: 1) a section 1983 claim brought under the 8 Excessive Force clause of the Fourth Amendment, against all Defendants; 2) a section 1983 claim 9 brought under the Unlawful Search and Seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment, against all 10 Defendants; 3) a section 1983 claim for unconstitutional policies, customs or habits against the 11 State of California, CHP, and BAPLS; 4) a state law battery claim against Hammack; 5) a state 12 law negligence claim against Lab Defendants; and 6) a state law negligent hiring, supervision, and 13 retention claim against BAPLS. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 15 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 16 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 18 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a 19 claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual 20 matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief,” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 21 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); 22 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has 23 facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 24 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 25 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and 26 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. 27 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). 1 of course, at least until the defendant files a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After 2 that point, Rule 15(a) provides generally that leave to amend the pleadings before trial should be 3 given “freely . . . when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied 4 with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 5 2003) (quotation omitted). However, leave to amend may be denied where the complaint “could 6 not be saved by any amendment,” i.e., “where the amendment would be futile.” Thinket Ink Info. 7 Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 A. Statute of Limitations 10 Defendants argue that all claims are time-barred. Section 1983 borrows the state statute of 11 limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years pursuant to California Code of Civil 12 Procedure section 335.1. Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 13 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is well-established that claims brought under § 1983 borrow 14 the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims . . . and in California, that 15 limitations period is two years.”). In addition, Lab Defendants argue that California Code of Civil 16 Procedure Section 340.5 governs the statute of limitations period for Brinson’s fourth (battery), 17 fifth (negligence), and sixth (negligent, hiring, supervision, and retention) claims against them, 18 which Brinson does not dispute. The statute of limitations under section 340.5 is one year. 19 Brinson’s injury occurred on August 28, 2019, but he did not file the complaint until December 7, 20 2023, more than four years later. 21 Brinson contends his lawsuit is timely pursuant to California Government Code Section 22 945.3, which provides that the statute of limitations for civil claims “against a peace officer or the 23 public entity employing a peace officer” is tolled during the pendency of the plaintiff’s criminal 24 case where the civil claim is based on the conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for 25 which the plaintiff is charged. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3; see also Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 26 906, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3 tolling provision applies to 27 section 1983 claims). Brinson concedes that he “neglected to augment the allegations regarding 1 plead that his claims are not time-barred. Lab Opp’n 1; State Opp’n 1. He attaches exhibits to his 2 opposition briefs to demonstrate that he had a pending criminal case in connection with this 3 incident that was dismissed on December 30, 2021. Lab Opp’n 2, Ex. 3. Brinson argues that 4 leave to amend should be granted with respect to the tolling issue because he has a factual basis 5 for his assertion that tolling applies. 6 State Defendants do not challenge that the tolling provision in Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3 7 applies to the claims made against them. They simply argue that the court already ordered 8 Brinson to amend his complaint to add allegations that support his tolling theory, and Brinson 9 failed to do so. State Reply 1. In general, leave to amend should only be denied “where the 10 amendment would be futile.” Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 11 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Although Brinson’s failure to address this deficiency in the SAC was 12 inexplicably careless and wasteful of judicial and party resources, the court does not find that 13 amendment would be futile. The court grants Brinson’s request to amend his complaint, with a 14 warning that he will not be given a further opportunity to properly allege tolling. 15 With respect to Lab Defendants, the court reaches a different conclusion. Section 945.3 16 clearly states that it only applies to actions “against a peace officer or the public entity employing 17 a peace officer.” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3. The Ninth Circuit and district courts have interpreted 18 this to mean that claims against federal employees and civilians are not tolled by the statute, 19 because they do not meet the definition of a California “peace officer.” See, e.g., Matthews v. 20 Macanas, 990 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[f]ederal criminal investigators and law 21 enforcement officers are not California peace officers . . . [therefore] section 945.3’s tolling 22 provision does not apply to federal officials”); Mitchell v. Culver, No. 2:15-CV-00058-GEB, 2015 23 WL 5037398, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (“Since the Federal Rangers are not ‘peace officers’ 24 as prescribed in section 945.3 Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims are barred by the statute of 25 limitations”); Cox v. Mariposa Cnty., No. 119CV01105AWIBAM, 2021 WL 4975361, at *6 (E.D. 26 Cal. Oct. 26, 2021) (“[T]he Court sees no basis for extending Section 945.3 tolling to claims 27 against a civilian . . . regardless of policy considerations or a supposed conspiracy.”). 1 WL 163473, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2013) is persuasive. In Peinado, the plaintiff alleged he was 2 arrested because of a false accusation by a parking control officer for the San Francisco Municipal 3 Transportation Agency. Id. The court held that a parking control officer was not a peace officer 4 as defined by California law:

5 The California Penal Code narrowly and specifically defines a “peace officer.” A parking officer is not included in that definition. . . . 6 Furthermore, the Penal Code requires, at a minimum, that all peace officers satisfactorily complete an introductory course of training 7 prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). Parking control officers are not required to 8 complete POST training, and thus do not fall within the Penal Code's definition of a “peace officer.” . . . Thus, section 945.3 does not toll 9 Plaintiff's first cause of action. 10 Id. (citations omitted). 11 Brinson fails to argue, must less demonstrate, that Lab Defendants are “a peace officer or 12 the public entity employing a peace officer.” See Cal. Gov. Code § 945.3. The tolling statute does 13 not apply to Lab Defendants. Therefore, Brinson’s claims against Lab Defendants are time- 14 barred, and the court grants Lab Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The claims against the Lab 15 Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 16 B. Claims Against State Defendants 17 As discussed above, it is possible Brinson will be able to amend his complaint to assert 18 tolling with respect to his claims against the State Defendants. The court therefore evaluates the 19 merits of State Defendants’ other arguments. 20 State Defendants argue that Brinson’s section 1983 claims against the State of California 21 and CHP are barred because the State and its agencies are not “persons” who can be sued under 22 the statute. Brinson concedes the point. State Opp’n 1. The court grants the motion to dismiss as 23 to Defendants State of California and CHP with prejudice. 24 Next, State Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the constitutional claims 25 against Santiago, arguing that Brinson’s allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 26 granted. Brinson responds that he has sufficiently pleaded those claims. 27 State Defendants cannot prevail on their Rule 12(b) challenge because they already had the 1 an answer to the FAC on May 3, 2025. [Docket No. 28.] After Brinson filed a SAC, State 2 Defendants ignored their answer and seized the opportunity to file a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. 3 “[A] motion asserting a 12(b) defense must be made before filing an answer. . . . ‘[A]mending a 4 complaint does not automatically revive defenses and objections the defendant ha[s] previously 5 waived.’ . . . Thus, a defendant may bring a Rule 12(b) motion objecting to an amended complaint 6 only to the extent the challenges asserted in that motion are based on the new matter in the 7 amended complaint.” Pascal v. Concentra, Inc., No. 19-CV-02559-JCS, 2020 WL 4923974, at *2 8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (quoting Townsend Farms v. Goknur Gida Madderleri Enerji Imalat 9 Ithalat Ihracat Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S., No. SACV150837DOCJCGX, 2016 WL 10570248, at *6 10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016)). All arguments raised in State Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC 11 could have been raised before they filed an answer to the FAC. State Defendants have provided 12 no reason or legal support for the ability to file a motion to dismiss after having filed an answer to 13 the same claims. In sum, State Defendants have waived their ability to file a Rule 12(b) challenge 14 to the SAC. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 Lab Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Lab Defendants are dismissed from the 17 case with prejudice and judgment is entered in their favor. Lab Defendants’ motion to compel 18 discovery is denied as moot. 19 State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. State of California and CHP are dismissed 20 from the case with prejudice. Brinson shall file a third amended complaint against Defendant 21 Santiago by November 4, 2025. 22 The Case Management Conference currently set for October 29, 2025 is CONTINUED to 23 February 4, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. A joint case management conference statement is due on January 24 28, 2026. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: October 20, 2025 27 ______________________________________