Bracken v. McDonnell Enterprises
This text of 2014 MT 164N (Bracken v. McDonnell Enterprises) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
June 24 2014
DA 13-0744
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2014 MT 164N
MICHAEL R. BRACKEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MCDONNELL ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a BIG SKY COLLISION CENTER,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DV 12-0744 Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
W. Scott Green, Patten, Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, PLLC, Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Brian Kohn, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 11, 2014 Decided: June 24, 2014
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Michael Bracken appeals from the District Court’s Order and Memorandum dated
October 29, 2013, granting summary judgment to McDonnell Enterprises. We reverse and
remand.
¶3 In September 2011 a car driven by a third party collided with Bracken’s 2009 Infiniti
M35XS. The collision was the fault of the other driver, who was insured by Safeco. Safeco
does not insure McDonnell’s Big Sky Collision Center and is not a party to this litigation.
Bracken took his Infiniti to Big Sky for repairs. Big Sky attempted to repair Bracken’s
vehicle but failed to adequately do so after several attempts. Safeco agreed with Bracken
that Big Sky’s repair of the Infiniti was substandard and determined that the vehicle was a
“total loss.” Safeco made a unilateral determination that the value of Bracken’s Infiniti prior
to the accident had been $34,860 and that it had a “salvage value” of $8455.62. Bracken
elected to keep the vehicle and so Safeco paid him the difference between those two sums, or
$26,455.69. Bracken did not enter any settlement of his claim with the other driver and did
not enter a settlement with Safeco.
¶4 Bracken brought this action against Big Sky for damages and for violation of the
Montana Consumer Protection Act, § 30-14-101, et seq., MCA. He sought to recover
2 damages including the value of the Infiniti, the cost of replacement transportation, the cost of
getting the repairs properly done, and treble damages under the Consumer Protection Act.
¶5 Big Sky moved for summary judgment, contending that Bracken could not maintain
an action for damages because he had suffered no loss arising from the damage to his
vehicle. The motion was based solely upon Safeco’s unilateral determination of Bracken’s
loss, and payment of that amount to Bracken on behalf of the other driver. The District
Court granted summary judgment to McDonnell, concluding that Bracken’s damage was
“the value of the car had the accident not occurred.” The District Court determined that the
$34,860 pre-accident value set by Safeco was in fact the pre-accident value of the vehicle.
The District Court dismissed Bracken’s argument that the Infiniti was worth as much as
$55,000 as an attempt to obtain a new vehicle to replace his used vehicle. The District Court
concluded that Bracken could not maintain any action against Big Sky, including his claim
under the Consumer Protection Act, because all his losses had been paid by Safeco.
¶6 A party is not entitled to summary judgment unless “there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A court considering summary judgment must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Thornton v. Flathead County, 2009 MT 367, ¶ 13, 353 Mont. 252,
220 P.3d 395. Summary judgment is not appropriate unless the “pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Boyes v. Eddie, 1998 MT 311, ¶ 16, 292 Mont.
152, 970 P.2d. 91.
3 ¶7 Here there was clearly a genuine issue of material fact regarding the pre-accident
value of the Infiniti vehicle and regarding the other categories of loss that Bracken seeks to
recover from Big Sky. Big Sky’s motion for summary judgment relied solely upon Safeco’s
unilateral determination of the vehicle’s value. Big Sky did not submit any affidavits or other
admissible evidence except for copies of Safeco correspondence attached to its brief.
Bracken opposed the motion for summary judgment and submitted excerpts of deposition
testimony and his own affidavit. The affidavit affirmed the amount he had received from
Safeco; that he had not entered a settlement of his claims with anyone; that he had installed
$10,000 worth of after-market equipment on the vehicle; that the vehicle was worth
approximately $60,000 prior to the accident; that the replacement cost for a substantially
similar vehicle would be $55,000; that he had incurred $7,000 in damage as a result of
having to use alternative transportation; and that he had spent time and money to take the
vehicle to Spokane seeking to have it repaired.
¶8 A plaintiff’s proof of damage is an essential component of a negligence action,
Causenbury v. Mortensen, 1999 MT 221, ¶ 21, 296 Mont. 25, 987 P.2d 351, and is therefore
a material issue in this case. Bracken contended through his affidavit and other materials
submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that he suffered more damage
than the vehicle value determined by Safeco.
¶9 The party seeking summary judgment, Big Sky in this case, has the burden to
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and then the burden shifts to the
opposing party to present evidence of a dispute over material facts. Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins.
Co., 2001 MT 59, ¶¶ 25-26, 304 Mont. 356, 22 P.3d 631. In the present case Bracken met
4 the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute as to the nature and extent of
his damages. The District Court incorrectly determined that Safeco’s unilateral
determination of the “total loss” value of Bracken’s Infiniti was both the measure and limit
of Bracken’s damages. Considering the materials submitted by the parties and construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Bracken as the party opposing summary judgment,
there is a genuine issue as to the nature and extent of damages and Bracken is entitled to
prove his claims.
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. Because there is a
genuine issue of material fact in this case, the District Court failed to apply settled Montana
law and erred in granting summary judgment to Big Sky on the negligence and Consumer
Protection Act claims.
¶11 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2014 MT 164N, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bracken-v-mcdonnell-enterprises-mont-2014.