Bracamonte-Palma v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 23-970
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCO BRACAMONTE-PALMA, No. 23-970 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-577-995 v. MEMORANDUM** TODD BLANCHE*, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted September 11, 2024 Submission Deferred March 12, 2025 Resubmitted January 22, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: RAWLINSON and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

Marco Bracamonte-Palma (Bracamonte-Palma), a native and citizen of

* Todd Blanche is substituted as Acting Attorney General pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)’s

dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge (IJ)’s denial of his application

for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), based on his

violation of a protection order under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). “Where, as here,

the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. . . .” Garcia-

Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “We

review de novo the BIA’s determination of purely legal questions, including the

BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. . . .” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). We deny the petition.

Although Chevron1 deference was essentially eliminated by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412

(2024), we have subsequently concluded that when an agency “has not

promulgated a new interpretation of the statute to prompt us to reconsider our

precedent,” such as here, we remain bound by our prior precedent “that relied on

the Chevron framework.” Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412).

In Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2019), we applied

Chevron deference in concluding that the categorical approach does not apply to

the determination of “whether [a non-citizen’s] violation of a protection order

1 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

2 23-970 under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) renders him convicted of an offense under §

1229b(b)(1)(C).” This precedent forecloses Bracamonte-Palma’s challenge to his

conviction. In Diaz-Quirazco, we determined that “[t]he BIA sufficiently

reviewed the evidence in the record,” id. at 847, and that the evidence reviewed

“reliably evinced that Diaz-Quirazco’s offense was a direct violation of the ‘no

contact’ portion of the Restraining Order, which had been issued for the purpose of

protecting [the victim] ‘against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment,

or bodily injury’ to her and her child.” Id. We determined that “the BIA fully

considered the necessary steps for determining whether Diaz-Quirazco was

ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a violation of the Restraining

Order.” Id. Thus, we concluded that “the BIA’s decision can be sustained upon its

reasoning.” Id. at 848.

Here, the BIA reviewed the record evidence that Bracamonte-Palma violated

an order of protection entered for the safety of the victim, including a police report

documenting that incident. Contrary to Bracamonte-Palma’s argument, the police

report is reliable and probative evidence of the underlying factual circumstances of

his offense of conviction. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41-43 (2009); see

also Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The sole test for

admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is

fundamentally fair. . . .”) (citation omitted). The Arizona court minutes confirm

3 23-970 that Bracamonte-Palma pled guilty to violating a court order. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-2810. Because his wife was the victim of that violation, his violation of the

court order qualified as a domestic violence offense. Moreover, the plea

agreement specifically states that the factual basis for the plea was “contained in

DR # 18-092124,” which is the report number for the police report. Thus,

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the “Arizona court found”

that Bracamonte-Palma “violated the portion of a protection order that involve[d]

protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily

injury.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). The BIA committed no error in deciding

that Bracamonte-Palma’s conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of

removal. See Diaz-Quirazco, 931 F.3d at 848.

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-970