Bozeman v. McDonald

40 So. 2d 517, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 511
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 30, 1949
DocketNo. 7319.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 40 So. 2d 517 (Bozeman v. McDonald) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bozeman v. McDonald, 40 So. 2d 517, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 511 (La. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

On November 13, 1947, plaintiff, for the price of $8,500.00, purchased from the defendant a lot of ground in the City of Shreveport, Louisiana, with a new five-room residence thereon, which had been recently built by the defendant for sale. Plaintiff moved into the house the fourth day after deed was passed. The building very soon thereafter developed the vices and defects hereinafter stated, which, not being remedied by the defendant after demand, provoked the institution of this suit.

Plaintiff alleged that because of nonapparent defects in the house at the time he purchased it, due to "inferior and inadequate workmanship and materials", the property had not then a value in excess of $6,000.00. As regards the defects to which referred, he specifically alleged that the entire floor of the house has sagged and become uneven; that the sagging of the floor has brought about the following developments, to-wit:

The partition walls have become separated from the ceiling and floor; doors drag and do not properly fit in their frames; the cement joints between sections of sheet rock in the walls and ceiling have in places broken. In addition to the above enumerated conditions, plaintiff also alleged that the rear door of the building has warped so badly that rainwater enters through it; that the rear concrete steps have slipped downward from their proper position, and the doors of one of the kitchen cabinets have so badly warped as to be useless. Finally, he alleged that to "remedy the conditions set forth" will require the expenditure of $2,000.00. However, he prayed for judgment for $2,500.00 on this account but prior to beginning of trial, in open court, reduced his demand to $2,000.00.

Defendant denied articulately the allegations concerning the alleged defects in the building at the time it was purchased by the plaintiff, and further avers that if the building has developed the conditions described by plaintiff, the same are due entirely to his own acts after buying and taking possession of the property; that when the house was erected the foundations thereof were constructed and arranged in the manner designed by a competent architect, so that its weight would be equally distributed, but that plaintiff has altered the set-up by installing over the partition separating the west front room from the kitchen, a central attic heating furnace weighing approximately 340 pounds; that the added weight of this furnace has caused a center foundation pier to sink and settle, to which the sagging of the floor with consequent results is attributable.

Plaintiff's demand was rejected and his suit was dismissed at his cost. He appealed to this court.

Defendant objected to the introduction of any testimony to prove the essential allegations of the petition, on the ground that same were too vague and indefinite to admit of proof. The objection was overruled. It is urged in this court.

While it may be conceded that the petition to some extent is deficient in precision of allegations, yet a fair appraisal of it as a whole leaves no doubt with respect to what plaintiff is seeking, and the grounds therefor. These allegations clearly disclose that he bought the house and that within one year, Article 2534 of Civil Code, thereafter latent defects of a material character developed therein that had the effect of diminishing the value of the property to a substantial extent.

After stating the nature and character of the defects that allegedly diminish the value of the property, plaintiff further alleged:

"In order to remedy the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph, your petitioner would be required to pay at *Page 519 least Two Thousand and No/100 ($2,000.00) Dollars."

This obviously means that to remedy the alleged developed defects and bring the building's physical condition to the status it should have had, and was believed by plaintiff to have had when he purchased it, an expenditure in the sum of $2,000.00 will have to be made. This amount is the measure of the alleged shrinkage in value due to said defects. This, of course, relates back to the allegations that the defects "consisted of inferior and inadequate workmanship and materials" employed in erecting the building.

As we construe the petition, this action, in effect, is one in diminution of the purchase price, or quanti minoris, authorized by Articles Nos. 2541 to 2544, inclusive, of the Civil Code. Article No. 2541 and 2544 read as follows:

"Whether the defect in the thing sold be such as to render it useless and altogether unsuited to its purpose, or whether it be such as merely to diminish the value, the buyer may limit his demand to the reduction of the price.

* * * * * *

"The action for a reduction of price is subject to the same rules and to the same limitations as the redhibitory action."

These articles of the Civil Code, it has been held, have application to sales of realty as they do to personalty. De Armas v. Gray et al., 10 La. 575, 579. These articles and others of the Civil Code leave no doubt on this subject.

In Morehouse Ice Company, Inc., v. Tooke Reynolds, La. App., 154 So. 402, 405, this court said:

"Whether the purchaser sues for a reduction of the price eo nomine, the measure of which is the difference in value of a sound and unsound article, or whether he sues for the amount necessarily expended by him to convert the unsound article into one of soundness, is a distinction without a difference."

This statement is apropos here.

It is a well fixed rule of law and equity that in order to determine its true character and the nature of the relief sought, a court should and will look to the substance of a demand, rather than address itself to technicalities; and that a litigant seeking the aid of the court to enforce a right will not be turned away, even temporarily, on account of inartful pleading unless no other course is open to it. We are of the opinion that the trial judge's ruling on the objection was correct, and it is approved.

Two theories are advanced to account for the sagging of the floors. One is that the concrete pier above and about which the sagging is most pronounced, because of the unstable and damp character of the soil, has, from the weight of the house, sunk. The other theory, not set up, however, in answer, but in argument, is that the partition walls were not erected directly above the sills, and the weight of the building resting thereupon, augmented by the weight of the attic furnace and attachments, has caused the floor joists to bow.

Prior to the construction of the building the Federal Housing Administration made commitment to underwrite a loan by defendant on the property to the amount of $6,700.00.

Strange as it may seem, the testimony is contradictory as concerns the exact cause or causes of the floor's sagging. Several witnesses of long experience in the constructing and sale of frame buildings examined the house involved in this case, but they all do not agree as to the cause of the trouble; and their testimony, with little or no dissent, proves that plaintiff has not in his petition exaggerated the character and extent of the developed defects.

E. M. Freeman, a civil engineer of the City of Shreveport, of twenty years experience, who specializes in structural phases of his profession, examined plaintiff's building not long before date of trial, and testified in support of the first named theory, that is, that the sagging of the floors is attributable to the sinking of piers, especially one of those about the center of the building. He evidently did not observe, if such be true, that the partition walls were not erected over the sills. *Page 520

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Crawley v. Terhune
437 S.W.2d 743 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1969)
Unverzagt v. Young Builders, Inc.
207 So. 2d 405 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1967)
Gabriel v. Jeansonne
162 So. 2d 798 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1964)
Lewis MacHine & Welding Serv. v. Amite Ready Mix Co.
148 So. 2d 869 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1963)
Pursell v. Kelly
139 So. 2d 12 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1962)
A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v. Law
106 So. 2d 802 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1958)
Madere v. Sharp
89 So. 2d 214 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1956)
Jones v. Dyer
71 So. 2d 648 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1954)
Bulova Watch Co. v. Nobles
71 So. 2d 396 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1954)
Di Pietro v. Le Blanc
68 So. 2d 156 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1953)
McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Construction Co.
57 So. 2d 405 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1952)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 So. 2d 517, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 511, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bozeman-v-mcdonald-lactapp-1949.