Bozarth v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE

168 S.W.3d 78, 2005 Mo. App. LEXIS 1044, 2005 WL 1620512
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 12, 2005
DocketED 84813
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 168 S.W.3d 78 (Bozarth v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bozarth v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE, 168 S.W.3d 78, 2005 Mo. App. LEXIS 1044, 2005 WL 1620512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

NANNETTE A. BAKER, Judge.

Director of Revenue (“Director”) appeals from a judgment of the trial court reversing the driver’s license suspension of Linda S. Bozarth (“Bozarth”) from a charge of driving while intoxicated. We find no error and affirm.

Background

Bozarth was stopped on January 8, 2004, for driving with expired tags. She was pulled over by Sergeant Greg Leftwich (“Sgt. Leftwich”) of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Sgt. Leftwich testified that as he approached Bozarth, he observed signs of possible intoxication, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. After requesting that Bozarth step out of her vehicle, Sgt. Left-wich conducted four field sobriety tests: an alphabet test, a backwards counting test, a horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test and a portable breath test (“PBT”). Based on the results of these tests and his experience, Sgt. Leftwich arrested Bozarth for driving while intoxicated.

Sgt. Leftwich took Bozarth to the Marion County Sheriffs Department, read her the implied consent law and administered a breath test with a DataMaster instrument. Before administering the breath test, Sgt. Leftwich observed Bozarth for fifteen minutes. Bozarth removed her false teeth, did not smoke or vomit during that time, and did not put anything in her mouth. Sgt. Leftwich testified that on January 8, 2004 he held a valid Type III permit, which authorized him to operate the DataMaster instrument.

The first two times Sgt. Leftwich attempted to administer the breath test, the test produced invalid readings. Bozarth was unable to blow enough air into the machine to register a complete sample. On Bozarth’s third attempt, Sgt. Leftwich used the manual override feature, a no volume button (“NV button”) to obtain a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) reading. The reading was greater than .08%. Sgt. Leftwich testified that use of the NV button produces artificially lower results than a reading not using the override button.

*81 Bozarth’s driving privileges were suspended pursuant to Section 302.505, 1 for driving while intoxicated. Bozarth filed a Petition for Trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Marion County, and filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the breath test.

Standard of Review

When a trial court reinstates a driver’s driving license after it has been revoked or suspended, the appellate court will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law. Rundquist v. Dir. of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). We view the evidence and all necessary inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Hansen v. Dir. of Revenue, 22 S.W.3d 770, 772 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). In a driver’s license revocation proceeding, the trial court is accorded wide discretion on factual issues and the conclusions that follow. Id.

Discussion

Section 302.505.1, permits the department of revenue to suspend or revoke the driver’s license of any person arrested upon probable cause of driving while intoxicated. An aggrieved driver can seek a trial de novo. Verdoom v. Dir. of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Mo. banc 2003). At the trial, the director has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for suspension of a driver’s license by presenting evidence that at the time of the arrest: (1) there was probable cause for arresting driver for driving under the influence; and (2) that the alcohol concentration in driver’s blood was .08 percent or more. Vernon v. Dir. of Revenue, 142 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Mo.App. S.D.2004). The burden of proof is on the director of revenue to establish grounds for the suspension or revocation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

Once the director makes a prima facie showing of probable cause of driving while intoxicated, the driver is entitled to present rebuttal evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact regarding the validity of the blood alcohol test results. Ver-doom, 119 S.W.3d at 546. The rebuttal evidence should challenge the presumption of validity established by the director’s prima facie ease; but the driver’s burden is one of production — not persuasion. Id. The director retains the burden of proof throughout the proceeding. Id.

In her sole point on appeal, Director claims that the trial court erred in setting aside the suspension of Bozarth’s driving privileges. Director argues that she made a prima facie case, showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Sgt. Leftwieh had probable cause to arrest Bozarth for driving while intoxicated, and that at the time of arrest, Bozarth had a BAC of greater than .08%. Therefore, according to Director, the trial court erred when it entered judgment for Bozarth, finding that the Director did not meet her prima facie burden when she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bo-zarth’s BAC was more than .08%. Director also argues that Bozarth’s Motion in Li-mine did not preserve her objection to the results of the BAC for appeal.

Addressing the second prong of the requirements for a prima facie case, we consider the trial court’s decision not to allow the breath test to be admitted. Director cites Bradford v. Dir. of Revenue for the proposition that the arresting officer’s use of the manual override NV but *82 ton does not invalidate the BAC test, and thus, the trial court erred in excluding this evidence. 72 S.W.3d 611 (Mo.App. E.D. 2002). At first blush, Bradford appears to be similar to the case before us. However, in Bradford the driver did not object to the admission of the BAC test. Id. at 613. When a breathalyzer test is used to establish a driver’s blood alcohol content, foundational prerequisites to admission must be met. Dale v. Dir. of Revenue, 40 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Mo.App.E.D.2001). To lay this foundation, Director must establish three elements: 1) the test was performed by following approved techniques and methods of the Division of Health, 2) the operator held a valid permit, and 3) the equipment and devices were approved by the Division. Id. The foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection. Id. The requirement of proof of compliance with the regulation only becomes an issue, however, if a proper, timely objection is made to the admission of the blood alcohol analysis. Krieger v. Dir. of Revenue,

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Bluebook (online)
168 S.W.3d 78, 2005 Mo. App. LEXIS 1044, 2005 WL 1620512, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bozarth-v-director-of-revenue-state-moctapp-2005.