Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush

237 Ill. App. 550, 1925 Ill. App. LEXIS 206
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJune 17, 1925
DocketGen. No. 29,774
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 237 Ill. App. 550 (Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush, 237 Ill. App. 550, 1925 Ill. App. LEXIS 206 (Ill. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.

On July 6, 1923, the complainant, Boylston Coal Company, a corporation, filed a bill of complaint in the superior court for an injunction to prevent the defendants, David T. Rautenbush and Harold J. Crowe (whose proper name was Bernard H. Brahm), partners doing business as the Supreme Coal Company, from wrongfully appropriating certain confidential information of the complainant as a mail order coal dealer, which had been obtained by Rautenbush while an employee of the complainant.

The bill also prayed for an accounting for unfair trade. Rautenbush filed an answer and an amended answer, and one Ortlund was subsequently made a party defendant, and an order entered that the answer of Rautenbush be adopted as the answer of all the defendants. There was a reference to a master in chancery, and an original and supplemental report by him. He recommended that the bill be dismissed for want of equity. Objections thereto were filed on behalf of the complainant and overruled, and in June, 1924, after exceptions to the master’s report had been heard, the chancellor approved the master’s report and entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint for want of equity. This appeal is therefrom.

The bill of complaint alleged that the complainant is a corporation, organized about April 1, 1922, under the laws of the State of Illinois; that the business conducted by the complainant had been conducted for more than eight years prior thereto under the name of the Bernice Coal Company, and on the above-mentioned date one Ruby Levy, who was the owner of the Bernice Coal Company, transferred to the complainant all the business, trade name, lists of customers, lists of agents, good-will and assets of the Bernice Coal Company; that the business of the Bernice Coal Company and, since the date of the transfer above mentioned, the business of the Boylston Coal Company consisted of a mail order business for the selling of coal in carload lots; that the complainant and its predecessor had developed a large and valuable business through a mail order method of selling coal; that in order to carry on said business, the complainant and its predecessor had obtained a large number of agents who resided in different parts of the Mississippi Valley; that the complainant and its predecessor had obtained and located agents at various points in said territory, through whom the sale of coal in carload lots was conducted in the manner of a mail order business; that the number of agents exceeded 8,000 and through those agents there had been developed a large and profitable business; that Bautenbush was employed by the Bernice Coal Company about April 1, 1921, and continued in the employment of that company and its successor until about May 23, 1923; that during the period of such employment he was in charge of the correspondence and advertising matter transmitted to various agents and customers of the complainant and its predecessor, and signed his correspondence as sales manager; that said Bautenbush had knowledge of the lists of agents and customers, and was cognizant of the method used in complainant’s business and the form of advertising and correspondence used by it and its predecessor; that on May 23,1923, Bautenbush left the employment of the complainant and with the defendant Crowe organized the Supreme Coal Company; that thereafter circulars and advertising matter were sent out to various people who had prior to that time dealt with the complainant; that the circulars and advertising matter of the Supreme Coal Company were similar to those used by the complainant; that Bautenbush took the lists of customers and agents from the complainant, and took, also, models of its correspondence and circulars, and after his association with the Supreme Coal Company, began and was doing business with former customers of the complainant upon the forms of correspondence and with, the circulars which he had taken and appropriated from the complainant; that by reason of the similarity of the price lists, correspondence and circulars sent out by the Supreme Coal Company, and the fact that many of its circulars were signed by Rautenbush, who had theretofore signed the correspondence of the complainant while in its employment, a large number of persons who were customers of the complainant were, and would be in the future, misled; that by reason of the acts complained of, complainant has been and will be exposed to great damages and loss of business; that the defendants Rautenbush and Crowe have made large profits, for which they should be required by a court of equity to account to complainant; that the acts of the defendants constitute a continuing trespass on the rights of business of the complainant, which are incapable of estimation in a court of law, and are irremediable in their nature.

The answer of Rautenbush and Crowe admits that the business of the complainant consisted of a mail order business for selling coal, and that it had acquired through Ruby Levy, by consulting telephone books and other lists, names of various people throughout the United States; that the names so acquired were not agents, and a very small percentage of them ever actually sold any coal; that many of the names on the lists held by the complainant were not the agents of the complainant exclusively, but names of people who buy and sell coal for various coal companies. Rautenbush denies that the complainant has any exclusive property in the services of such persons. He admits that he was employed from April 19, 1921, up to and including May 26, 1923, but claims that such employment was not the result of a written contract and was not for a feed or definite term. He also admits that he was sales manager during the last fifteen months of that time, and that as part of his duties as sales manager he dictated personally all of the correspondence to the salesmen of the complainant, and became personally acquainted with a large number of them. He denies that he furnished to the Supreme Coal Company a list or lists of the agents and customers of the complainant, or that he ever at any time took or appropriated any lists of customers or agents from correspondence and circulars, or that he at any time began doing business by means of such correspondence and circulars. He alleges that he procured and made up lists of his own by methods entirely distinct and different from those employed by the complainant, and denies that he has in any way interfered with or taken any unfair advantage of complainant in its business. He alleges that the defendant, the Supreme Coal Company, is engaged in the honest business of selling coal through the mail, and that its lists are bona fide, and were not acquired from the complainant, and did not include the names of any considerable number of people who had theretofore done business with the complainant, and that the names of such, if any there were, were not more than eight or ten, and were acquired legitimately, being his personal acquaintances ; that the lists of the defendant, the Supreme Coal Company, were not copied in whole or in part from a list or lists of the complainant.

The evidence shows, substantially, the following: Euby and Simon Levy, husband and wife, have been in the coal business for a good many years. They conducted it practically exclusively through the mails. They bought the coal from the mine operators who produced it, and sold it, practically, directly to the consumer. Their agents, or those to whom they sold the coal, were obtained in various ways, chiefly bv advertising and the mail.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
237 Ill. App. 550, 1925 Ill. App. LEXIS 206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boylston-coal-co-v-rautenbush-illappct-1925.