Boylen v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Bur. of Motor Vehicles

2025 Ohio 5024

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 2025 CA 00069
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Boylen v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 2025-Ohio-5024.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ADAM D. BOYLEN, Case No. 2025 CA 00069

Plaintiff - Appellant Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CV 1979 OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, BUREAU OF MOTOR Judgment: Affirmed VEHICLES,

Defendant – Appellee Date of Judgment Entry: November 3, 2025

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: ADAM D. BOYLEN, Pro Se, for Plaintiff-Appellant; DAVE YOST, Attorney General of Ohio, BRITTANY N. COLLINS, Assistant Attorney General, Executive Agency Section, for Defendant-Appellee.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Adam D. Boylen, appeals the June 3, 2025, judgment of the

Stark County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”), which affirmed the Final Order issued

by the Ohio Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) which

disqualified the appellant’s commercial driver’s license (“CDL”). The appellee is the BMV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On March 19, 2013, the appellant was convicted of Operating a Motor

Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19

in the Massillon Municipal Court. As a result, the BMV issued an order disqualifying the

appellant’s CDL until February 15, 2014. The appellant did not appeal this decision. {¶3} On June 23, 2023, the Stark County Court of Common Pleas notified the

BMV that the appellant had been convicted of Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle in violation

of R.C. 2913.02. The BMV thereafter held a hearing regarding the appellant’s lifetime

disqualification from holding a CDL pursuant to R.C. 4506.16.

{¶4} At the hearing, the appellant did not dispute either conviction. Instead, he

argued that a criminal conviction under R.C. 4506.15 was required before the BMV could

impose sanctions pursuant to R.C. 4506.16. The BMV filed a report, to which the appellant

timely objected, asserting that R.C. 4506.16(D)(2) requires a person to be charged and

convicted under R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12). The BMV issued a Final Order, finding the

appellant’s interpretation of R.C. 4506.16 incorrect. In the Final Order, the BMV

concluded that R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12) lists specific prohibited conduct, and

determined that the appellant’s convictions fall within those provisions.

{¶5} The appellant timely appealed the BMV’s Final Order to the trial court. The

trial court found that the BMV’s Final Order was supported by reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence, and was in accordance with the law.

{¶6} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court and herein raises

the following two assignments of error:

{¶7} “I. A PERSON CANNOT BE ‘CONVICTED FOR A VIOLATION OF RC

4506.15’ WITHOUT BEING CHARED WITH THAT OFFENSE AND SUBSEQUENTLY

BEING FOUND GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE.”

{¶8} “II. ALLOWING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THROUGH THE BMV, TO

FIND THAT A PERSON HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE THAT THEY WERE NEVER CHARGED WITH OR FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATES SEPARATION OF

POWERS AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”

I.

{¶9} In the appellant’s first assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial

court erred in affirming the BMV’s Final Order disqualifying his CDL because he was

never convicted under R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12). We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} In an appeal of an administrative agency decision under R.C. 2506.01, our

review of the common pleas court’s judgment is limited to questions of law. Henley v.

Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2000-Ohio-493; R.C. 2506.04. We do not weigh the

evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the common pleas court. Id. Instead, our

role is limited to reviewing questions of law, employing a de novo standard, and

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the law. Id.

ANALYSIS

{¶11} When interpreting a statute, a court’s primary duty is to ascertain the intent

of the legislature. State ex rel. Horizon Science Academy of Lorain, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of

Edn., 2021-Ohio-1681, ¶14. The inquiry begins with the statute’s plain language. Id.

Where the language is ambiguous, the court must “interpret the statute to determine the

General Assembly's intent.” Tomasik v. Tomasik, 2006-Ohio-6109, ¶15. However, where

the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied without

interpretation. Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58 (1979).

{¶12} R.C. 4506.15 states, in pertinent part: (A) No person who holds a commercial driver’s license or commercial

driver’s license temporary instruction permit or who operates a motor

vehicle for which a commercial driver’s license or permit is required shall do

any of the following:

***

(6) Drive a motor vehicle in violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code

or a municipal OVI ordinance as defined in section 4511.181 of the Revised

Code;

(7) Use a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony[.]

{¶13} R.C. 4506.16 states, in pertinent part:

(D) The registrar of motor vehicles shall disqualify any holder of a

commercial driver’s license or commercial driver’s license temporary

instruction permit, or any operator of a commercial motor vehicle for which

a commercial driver’s license or permit is required, from operating a

commercial motor vehicle as follows:

(2) Upon a second conviction for a violation of any provision of divisions

(A)(2) to (12) of section 4506.15 of the Revised Code * * * arising from two

or more separate incidents, the person shall be disqualified for life or for any

other period of time as determined by the United States secretary of

transportation and designated by the director of public safety by rule[.]

{¶14} In the case sub judice, the appellant does not dispute that he has

convictions for OVI under R.C. 4511.19 and Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle under R.C. 2913.02, a felony. The appellant also does not dispute that this is prohibited conduct

described in R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12). Rather, he argues that disqualification under R.C.

4506.16(D)(2) requires the prosecutor to charge and convict him under R.C.

4506.15(A)(2) to (12), not merely for conduct described within it.

{¶15} However, the Sixth District Court of Appeals recently addressed similar

language in Bowling v. Norman, 2024-Ohio-2658 (6th Dist.). R.C. 4506.15(D)(1) states:

(D) The registrar of motor vehicles shall disqualify any holder of a

commercial driver’s license or commercial driver’s license temporary

instruction permit, or any operator of a commercial motor vehicle for which

a commercial driver’s license or permit is required, from operating a

(1) Upon a first conviction for a violation of any provision of divisions

(A)(2) to (12) of section 4506.15 of the Revised Code or a similar law of

another state or a foreign jurisdiction, or upon a first suspension imposed

under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code or a similar law of another

state or foreign jurisdiction, one year[.]

In Bowling, the Sixth District found that R.C. 4506.15 and 4506.16 are clear and

unambiguous. Id. at ¶24. The Court explained that “R.C. 4506.16(D)(1) requires a

conviction for a violation of R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12)—not a conviction under R.C.

4506.15(A)(2) to (12).” Id. at ¶25. Therefore, it was not necessary that the CDL holder be

specifically charged and convicted under R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12) to trigger R.C.

4506.16. {¶16} Similarly, in the case sub judice, the appellant’s argument that

disqualification under R.C. 4506.16(D)(2) requires he be charged and convicted under

R.C. 4506.15 is not consistent with the language of the statute. Similar to Bowling, we

find R.C. 4506.16(D)(2) requires convictions for violations of R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12)—

not convictions under R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12). R.C. 4506.15(A)(6) and (7) prohibit a

CDL holder from driving a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19 and from using a

motor vehicle in the commission of a felony, respectively. The appellant does not dispute

that he was convicted of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19 and Grand Theft of a Motor

Vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a felony. Due to these convictions, R.C.

4506.16(D)(2) requires the registrar of the BMV to disqualify him from operating a

commercial motor vehicle for life or for another period of time as determined by the United

States Secretary of Transportation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err as a matter of

law when it affirmed the registrar’s Final Order disqualifying the appellant’s CDL.

{¶17} The appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶18} In the appellant’s second assignment of error, the appellant argues that

allowing the BMV to find that a person has been convicted of an offense they were never

charged with or found guilty of violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional. He

also mentions that he was not provided adequate notice that his convictions could result

in CDL disqualification. We disagree.

{¶19} “When considering the constitutionality of a statute, [a reviewing] court

‘presume[s] the constitutionality of the legislation, and the party challenging the validity of the statute bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute

is unconstitutional.’ ” Dayton v. State, 2017-Ohio-6909, ¶12, quoting Wilson v. Kasich,

2012-Ohio-5367, ¶18. The party challenging the statute has “a ‘heavy burden’ when

attempting to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.” Dayton at ¶12.

{¶20} The appellant raises an “as-applied” constitutional challenge, asserting that

the application of R.C. 4506.16 to his circumstances violates separation of powers

principles. When challenging the constitutionality of the application of a statute, the

challenging party “contends that the ‘application of the statute in the particular context in

which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional. The

practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional “as applied” is to prevent its future

application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.’ ” State v. Yajnik v.

Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 2004-Ohio-357, ¶14, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. Of

Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1992), 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

{¶21} The appellant contends the trial court’s decision allows the BMV to “deem

into existence a conviction” under R.C. 4506.15 since he was never charged or convicted

under R.C. 4506.15. However, as explained above, R.C. 4506.15(D)(2) requires

convictions for violations of R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12)—not convictions under R.C.

4506.15(A)(2) to (12). Bowling at ¶25. The appellant was convicted of violating R.C.

4511.19 and R.C. 2913.02, a felony while using a motor vehicle. Both of these convictions

are described in the prohibitions listed in R.C. 4506.15(A)(2) to (12). This obviates the

appellant’s concern that the BMV may “deem into existence a conviction.” Id. Accordingly, the appellant has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is

unconstitutional.

{¶22} The appellant also briefly alludes that he lacked adequate notice that his

convictions could result in the disqualification of his CDL, depriving him of due process.

The party claiming a due process violation bears the burden of showing that the process

provided was inadequate. Here, R.C. 4506.16(D) provides clear statutory notice that two

qualifying convictions result in lifetime disqualification. “The general rule that ignorance

of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the

American legal system.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112

L.Ed.2d 617 (1991); State v. Wheatley, 2018-Ohio-464, ¶36. Furthermore, the appellant

availed himself of a hearing with the BMV and appealed to both the trial court and this

Court. Accordingly, the appellant has failed to establish a due process violation.

{¶23} The appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶24} Based upon the foregoing, the decision by Stark County Court of Common

Pleas is hereby affirmed.

{¶25} Costs to the appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.