Boykin v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 15, 2022·No. 2:19-cv-00137·Unknown

Opinion

SAMUEL BOYKIN, No. 2:19-cv-00137-TLN-DB Plaintiff, v. ORDER OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Plaintiff Samuel Boykin (“Plaintiff”) was a former Maintenance Specialist for Valero Services, Inc. (“Valero”) who suffered a lumbar fracture as a result of a motor vehicle accident (“MVA”) in February 2014. In November 2016, Plaintiff applied for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits through his employer’s insurer, Unum Life Insurance Company of America (“Unum”). In June 2017, Unum denied Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff subsequently appealed Unum’s determination in December 2017, and Unum upheld its decision in April 2018. Plaintiff brought this action against Unum pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Cross-Motions for Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 52. (ECF Nos. 28, 29.) Both motions are fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 31, 32, 34, 35.) The Court has carefully considered the parties’ arguments and hereby finds, for the reasons set forth below, that Plaintiff is disabled from working in his regular occupation as defined in the applicable policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment is GRANTED and Unum’s Motion for Judgment is DENIED. I. FINDINGS OF FACT1 A. The Relevant Terms and Conditions of the Policy 1. Unum issued a group long term disability policy number 564565 001 (the “Policy”) to Valero with an effective date of January 1, 2001. (POL 22.) LTD benefits under the Policy are payable after an insured individual completes a 180-day Elimination Period, defined as “a period of continuous disability which must be satisfied before you are eligible to receive benefits . . . .” (Id. at 7, 37.) The Policy provides in relevant part as follows: HOW DOES UNUM DEFINE DISABILITY? You are disabled when Unum determines that: - you are limited from performing the material and substantial duties of your regular occupation due to your sickness or injury; and - you have a 20% or more loss in your indexed monthly earnings due to the same sickness or injury. After 24 months of payments, you are disabled when Unum determines that due to the same sickness or injury, you are unable to perform the duties of any gainful occupation for which you are reasonably fitted by education, training or experience. (Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).) The Policy also defines the terms below as follows. LIMITED means what you cannot or are unable to do. . . . . MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DUTIES means duties that: - are normally required for the performance of your regular occupation; and

1 The following findings of fact are taken mostly verbatim from Plaintiff’s and Unum’s motions for judgment. (ECF Nos. 28, 29.) The facts are undisputed except where noted by the Court.

2 Unum lodged the administrative record with the Court on January 27, 2020, documents are bates-stamped UA-POL-LTD-000001 through UA-POL-LTD-000051 and UA-CL-LTD- 000001 through UA-CL-LTD-002311. (ECF No. 24.) References to the Policy will be designated “POL” and references to the administrative record will be designated “AR.” - cannot be reasonably omitted or modified. . . . . REGULAR OCCUPATION means the occupation you are routinely performing when your disability begins. Unum will look at your occupation as it is normally performed in the national economy, instead of how the work tasks are performed for a specific employer or at a specific location. (Id. at 37–40 (emphasis in original).) B. Plaintiff’s Accident 1. On February 23, 2014, Plaintiff was involved in a MVA and injured. An initial x- ray on March 31, 2014 showed a spinal fracture, specifically an “anterior wedge compression fracture at L13 with approximately 50% height loss.” (AR 639.) A subsequent x-ray of the sacroiliac4 joint showed a “left L5 transverse process and indistinct cortical margins.” (Id. at 649.) The doctor could not “exclude destructive bone lesion.” (Id.) An MRI on June 30, 2014, confirmed the “anterior wedge deformity of the L1 vertebral body” with a chronic fracture. (Id. at 656.) In addition, “mild narrow edema5” with “[a]ssociated retropulsion6 and effacement of the adjacent anterior thecal” was observed. (Id.) There was also “degenerative joint disease [] along the spine,” “partial sacralization of the right side of L5,” and “[s]oft tissue edema.” (Id.) 2. These spinal injuries caused Plaintiff significant lower back pain. Immediately after the accident, Plaintiff reported pain at 10 on a scale of 1 to 10. In the next few weeks, the pain was 7 to 9 out of 10. Over the next few months, it subsided to 4 to 5 out of 10, which is where it persisted. (Id. at 1558.) The accident also caused Plaintiff a great deal of stress, which

3 The spine is divided into three sections: the cervical spine, which is the neck area; the thoracic spine, which is the mid-back; and the lumbar spine, which is the lower back. A fracture at “L1” indicates that the fracture occurred in the uppermost vertebrae of the lumbar spine. 4 The connection between the hips and the spine.

5 Edema is the abnormal accumulation of fluids. “Marrow edema” is where the fluid builds up in the bone marrow, usually in response to an injury. 6 A retropulsed fragment is where the fracture fragment is displaced into the spinal canal. led him to seek aid from a mental health professional.7 3. Plaintiff went off work due to his injuries, but returned to work in September 2014. Plaintiff contends his return to work was not due to a remission in his symptoms of severe pain as he still “had back pain the entire time.” (Id. at 196.) Rather, “[h]e was able to return to his job, in spite of his pain . . . because he had a supportive supervisor who accommodated his needs” (id. at 68) and “other employees would try to help him [with] heavy lifting” (id. at 196). Plaintiff asserts two things happened in 2015 to make it difficult for him to continue working. First, his supportive supervisor was replaced by a supervisor who was not sympathetic and was pressing him to go on disability. (Id. at 14.) Second, in July and August, Plaintiff experienced a significant increased in his symptoms of back pain. C. Plaintiff’s Medical History 1. Primary Physician: On July 22, 2015, Plaintiff consulted with his primary treating physician, Dr. Minerva Saqui, telling her that for the past few weeks he had been experiencing more significant pain in his lower back. (Id. at 1527.) Dr. Saqui could find no reason for the increased pain from his more recent back scans. (Id.) She suggested increased doses of Ibuprofen or Aleve.8 (Id.) By August 10, 2015, Plaintiff was still reporting that his back pain had gotten worse. (Id. at 1546.) He later informed Dr. Saqui that the pain was limiting his ability to sit or stand: “I currently can’t sit for more than about 2 hours (if I’m reclined), if I’m upright I’m lucky to sit for [about] 30 minutes. I can’t stand for more than [about] 1 hour, unless I’m walking then I’m good for more than [about] 2–3 hours.” (Id. at 1577.) ///

7 On March 31, 2014, Plaintiff consulted with Kaiser’s Yvette Flores, a psychological resident, complaining of “excessive worry, restlessness, muscle tension and lightheadedness.” (Id. at 786.) During a later August 3, 2016 consultation with LCSW Ted Sachs, Plaintiff had “daily flashback memories” of the accident, nightmares, anxiety, and had “difficulties falling and staying asleep due [to] the pain caused by the [accident], as well as the images/nightmares.” (Id. at 67.)

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Boykin v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

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