Boyer v. City of Santa Barbara

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-5393
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRUCE BOYER; DAVID WAYNE No. 24-5393 GRIGGS; KIMBERLY COLLEEN D.C. No. GRIGGS; JONATHAN BOYER, 2:23-cv-06828-TJH-MAA Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

CITY OF SANTA BARBARA; SANTA BARBARA POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR GUN VIOLENCE SOLUTIONS, successor in interest of The Coalition Against Gun Violence,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

DOES,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted June 2, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: HURWITZ, MILLER, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs Bruce Boyer, David Wayne Griggs, Kimberly Colleen Griggs, and

Jonathan Boyer appeal the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action challenging the constitutionality of events allegedly occurring at a “gun

buyback” event in Santa Barbara. We vacate the district court’s order and remand

for further proceedings.

1. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district

court’s order dismissing “this case”—and not merely the complaint—without

prejudice is a final, appealable order. See De Tie v. Orange Cnty., 152 F.3d 1109,

1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The dismissal of an action, even when it is without

prejudice, is a final order.”); Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir.

2001).

2. The district court erred in dismissing the action without acknowledging

Plaintiffs’ request to amend their First Amended Complaint if the court determined

that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In

dismissing Plaintiffs’ action, the district court implicitly denied leave to amend the

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 First Amended Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (allowing a party to “amend

its pleading once as a matter of course” but requiring “the opposing party’s written

consent or the court’s leave” in “all other cases”); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (explaining that when an order dismisses

a complaint without prejudice and without expressly granting leave to amend, “we

may have to determine from the whole record . . . whether it was contemplated that

the whole action was dismissed on the merits”). “We review denial of leave to

amend for an abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 953 F.3d

567, 573 (9th Cir. 2020). The district court did not address Plaintiffs’ amendment

request, let alone explain its implicit denial of the request. This was an abuse of

discretion. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“[O]utright refusal to

grant the leave [to amend] without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is

not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion . . . .”); see also

Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per

curiam) (“A simple denial of leave to amend without any explanation by the

district court is subject to reversal.”). We vacate and remand so that the district

court can address the amendment request.

VACATED and REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs and fees on appeal.