Boyeff v. Savard

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Boyeff v. Savard

136 So. 2d 260

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJanuary 4, 1962

DocketNo. 61-244

StatusPublished

This text of 136 So. 2d 260 (Boyeff v. Savard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Boyeff v. Savard, 136 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff sued the partners of a brokerage firm. This firm had acted as his agent in a stock transaction. He charged that the brokers had improperly forced him to cover an order to sell a certain amount of stock which he did not own. He now appeals from a final judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict for the defendants.

The principal contention here is that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit tendered proof that the defendant brokers had established a custom of dealing with the plaintiff whereby defendants did not require prompt payment of deficiencies of margin. Without passing upon the legal sufficiency of the claim for preferential treatment, we hold that the tender fell far short of proving a prior course of conduct. Inasmuch as the tendered testimony would not have established a prima facie case for the claimed estoppel, it cannot now be said to have been harmful error to refuse the tender. See Hopkins v. McClure, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 656; Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff sued the partners of a brokerage firm. This firm had acted as his agent in a stock transaction. He charged that the brokers had improperly forced him to cover an order to sell a certain amount of stock which he did not own. He now appeals from a final judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict for the defendants.

The principal contention here is that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit tendered proof that the defendant brokers had established a custom of dealing with the plaintiff whereby defendants did not require prompt payment of deficiencies of margin. Without passing upon the legal sufficiency of the claim for preferential treatment, we hold that the tender fell far short of proving a prior course of conduct. Inasmuch as the tendered testimony would not have established a prima facie case for the claimed estoppel, it cannot now be said to have been harmful error to refuse the tender. See Hopkins v. McClure, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 656; Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

136 So. 2d 260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyeff-v-savard-fladistctapp-1962.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack