Boyden v. Michaud

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedSeptember 30, 2008
DocketKENcv-07-276and331
StatusUnpublished

This text of Boyden v. Michaud (Boyden v. Michaud) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyden v. Michaud, (Me. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-07-276 and CV-07-331 _ ! I If ", r,'"' c~· l. ~/' L

STEVEN F. BOYDEN

Plaintiff

v. DECISION AND ORDER

RONALD N. MICHAUD,

and

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PORTLAND,

Defendants

WILLAIM J. PICHER,

v.

REV. MSGR. J. JOSEPH FORD, REV. JAMES M. MORRISON, REV. MSGR. RENE T. MATHIEU SR. RITA-MAE BISSONNETTE, and JOHN DOE,

In front of the court in the Boyden case are two M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) motions for

judgment on the pleadings brought by The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland (the

Bishop) and plaintiff's motion to strike the Bishop's second motion for judgment on the

pleadings. In front of the court in the Picher case is defendants, Ford, Morrison,

Mathieu and Bissonnette's M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Because the Picher motion for judgment on the pleadings raises identical legal issues to 2

the Bishop's second motion for judgment on the pleadings in Boyden, the court discusses

them together.

Facts

A. Boyden v. Michaud

Plaintiff alleges defendant Michaud molested him between 1983 and 1985 while

Michaud was a priest and plaintiff was a member of Michaud's parish. Plaintiff was

born December 4, 1969.

B. Picher v. Ford, et al.

Plaintiff was molested by Raymond P. Melville between 1986 and 1989 while

Melville was a priest at the St. Mary's School and plaintiff was a student. Plaintiff was

born January 29, 1974. Plaintiff originally sued Melville and the Bishop in Ken Doc. CV­

07-57. Melville was defaulted for failure to respond. The Bishop filed a motion for

summary judgment in that case based on a charitable immunity defense, which was

granted by the court on December 10, 2007, final judgment being entered January 24,

2008. The current action is brought against defendants who were employees of the

Bishop with supervisory roles with relation to Melville.

Standard of Review:

"A defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a

defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." MacKerron v. MacKerron, 571

A.2d 810, 813 (1990), citing 1 FIELD, McKuSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE, § 12.14

at 253 (2d ed. 1970). See also, Burke v. Hamilton Beach Division, Etc., 424 A.2d 145, 148

(Me. 1981). Both a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for

judgment on the pleadings "test[] the legal sufficiency of the complaint." MacKerron,571

A.2d at 813. See also, 1 FIELD, McKuSICK & WROTH, § 12.11 at 248. 3

Discussion

A. Defendant, the Bishop's, first motion for judgment on the pleadings in Boyden

In 1985, the Maine legislature enacted 14 M.R.S.A. § 752-C, effective September

19, 1985, providing:

Actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act, as defined in Title 17-A, chapter 11, with a person under the age of majority shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues.

In 1989, the legislature amended § 752-C, effective September 30, 1989, adding a

discovery period:

Actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act, as defined in Title 17-A, chapter 11, with a person under the age of majority shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 3 years of the time the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm, whichever occurs later.

In 1991, § 752-C was again amended:

Actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act, as defined in Title 17-A, chapter 11, with a person under the age of majority sl:ttiR must be commenced within e 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within J Qyears of the time the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm, whichever occurs later.

As to the application of these changes the amendments provided:

Sec. 2. Application. This Act applies to the following actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act with a person under the age of majority:

1. All actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act occurring after the effective date of this Act; and 2. All actions for which the claim has not yet been barred by the previous statute of limitations in force on the effective date of this Act.

In 1993, the legislature did nothing to change the statute of limitations period,

but did change"sexual intercourse, as defined in Ti tle 17-A, chapter 11" to "sexual

intercourse, as defined in Title 17- A, section 556, subsection 1- B." 4

Finally in 1999, effective August 11,2000, the legislature removed the statute of

limitations, such that today 14 M.R.S.A. § 752-C reads:

§ 752-C. Sexual acts towards minors

1. No limitation. Actions based upon sexual acts toward minors may be commenced at any time. 2. Sexual acts toward minors defined. As used in this section, "sexual acts toward minors" means the following acts that are committed against or engaged in with a person under the age of majority; A. Sexual act, as defined in Title 17-A, section 251, subsection I, paragraph C; or B. Sexual contact, as defined in Title 17-A, section 251, subsection I, paragraph D. Sec. 2. Application. This Act applies to the following actions based upon a sexual act or sexual contact occurring on or after the effective date of this Act; and 1. All actions based on a sexual act or sexual contact occurring on or after the effective date of this Act; and 2. All actions for which the claim has not yet been barred by the previous statute of limitations in force on the effective date of this Act.

Also quite important to determination of whether plaintiff's claims are time

barred is 14 M.R.S.A. § 853, "If a person entitled to bring any action under

section[] ... 752-C .. .is a minor...when the cause of action accrues, the action may be

brought within the times limited herein after the disability is removed." Plaintiff

turned 18 on December 4, 1987. CPl.'s Cmpl.

Based on the statutory scheme above, defendant's argument is that the six year

limitations period in existence at the time of the abuse was tolled by § 853 until plaintiff

reached the age of 18, it began to run at that point but was extended to 12 years by the

1991 amendment and thus ran 12 years after plaintiff's 18th birthday on December 4,

1999. The elimination of the statutory period did not become effective until August II,

2000, at which point the statutory period of limitations for plaintiff's claim had elapsed.

Thus, defendant argues, the elimination of a statute of limitations period was not 5

applicable to plaintiff's claim. This analysis is the same offered by the Federal District

Court in Guptill v. Martin, 228 F.R.D. 62, 64-65 (D. Me. 2005).

Plaintiff argues that the statute was effectively tolled for several reasons. 1 First of

which is the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act. The Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act

(SCRA), 50 USc. App. § 526(a) provides:

(a) Tolling of statutes of limitations during military service.

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