IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-10190 Summary Calendar _____________________
DAVID CHASE BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GLORIA WEST, Individually and in her Official Capacity as District Clerk of Knox County, Texas,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (7-94-CV-046-X) _________________________________________________________________ (July 20, 1995)
Before KING, JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David C. Boyd, a Texas state prisoner proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Gloria West, the district clerk of Knox
County, Texas, in both her individual and official capacities,
for alleged infringement of his constitutional right to access to
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published. the courts. The district court dismissed Boyd's suit as legally
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Boyd alleges that his right of access to the courts was
infringed because West "refused to process [his first habeas
corpus] application, and either personally destroyed or caused to
be destroyed the said application." Furthermore, Boyd alleged
that West "refused to process or cause the processing of [Boyd's]
said (second) [habeas corpus] application, by refusing to cause a
copy of the [second] application to be served upon the District
Attorney for Knox County, Texas, and/or has caused an inordinate
delay in causing such processing." Both parties moved for
summary judgment. In support of her motion for summary judgment,
West filed an affidavit in which she stated that Boyd's first
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was the "first Post-Trial
Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus that had been filed in
Knox County since I took over as District Clerk in 1979," and
that she "did not know what to do with the Application rather
than to file it." She further averred that she called the "Court
Coordinator for the Judge of the 50th Judicial District," who
advised her to send the application to the District Attorney's
office and to the state district judge but that "[a]t no time did
[the court coordinator] or anyone else instruct me that after a
certain passage of time, the Writ should be filed in the Court of
Criminal Appeals in Austin, Texas."
2 On January 30, 1995, the district court sua sponte
dismissed, without prejudice, Boyd's complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Boyd filed a timely appeal to
this court.
II. ANALYSIS
A § 1983 plaintiff who proceeds in forma pauperis is subject
to dismissal if his complaint is "frivolous" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Under § 1915(d), a complaint is
frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact."
Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is legally
frivolous if it is premised on an "indisputably meritless legal
theory . . . ." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Thus, a complaint that
raises an arguable question of law may not be dismissed under §
1915(d). Id. at 328.
We review a § 1915(d) dismissal for an abuse of discretion
because a determination of frivolousness-- whether legal or
factual-- is a discretionary one. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734;
Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992). In reviewing
for an abuse of discretion, we consider whether (1) the plaintiff
is proceeding pro se, (2) the court inappropriately resolved
genuine issues of disputed fact, (3) the court applied erroneous
legal conclusions, (4) the court has provided an adequate
statement of reasons for dismissal which facilitates intelligent
3 appellate review, and (5) the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734.
In the case at hand, the district court concluded that "the
[p]laintiff's § 1983 Complaint does not give rise to a legally
sufficient cause of action at this point in time because it
implicates and calls into question the fact of his confinement."
In support of this conclusion, the district court cited Heck v.
Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), which held that, in order
to maintain a § 1983 cause of action based upon "harm caused by
actions whose lawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid," the plaintiff must first demonstrate that his
conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at
2372.
Boyd's complaint alleged that West violated his
constitutional right of access to the courts by deliberately
delaying the processing of his first and second petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus. We have held that such deliberate delay
may constitute a constitutional deprivation. Jackson v.
Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986). The district
court, however, determined that Heck mandated dismissal because
"[p]laintiff's § 1983 claim . . . implicates the fact of his
confinement since a necessary threshold determination for the
Court would be whether Plaintiff was prejudiced in any legal
4 proceeding by Defendant's failure to properly process his writs,
i.e., whether there was any injury from the alleged deprivation
of constitutional rights."
Boyd argues that the district court's conclusion is
erroneous because his § 1983 complaint against West does not
question the fact or duration of his continued confinement. He
asserts that even if he was successful in his § 1983 suit, it
would not affect his underlying conviction but would merely
provide him with monetary and injunctive relief for West's
failure to process his first and second writs of habeas corpus in
a reasonably expeditious manner.
We need not decide this issue at this time. Even assuming
arguendo that Heck does not mandate dismissal of Boyd's claim,
Boyd's claim is legally frivolous because Boyd has failed to
allege sufficient injury or prejudice flowing from West's
actions.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-10190 Summary Calendar _____________________
DAVID CHASE BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GLORIA WEST, Individually and in her Official Capacity as District Clerk of Knox County, Texas,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (7-94-CV-046-X) _________________________________________________________________ (July 20, 1995)
Before KING, JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David C. Boyd, a Texas state prisoner proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Gloria West, the district clerk of Knox
County, Texas, in both her individual and official capacities,
for alleged infringement of his constitutional right to access to
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published. the courts. The district court dismissed Boyd's suit as legally
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Boyd alleges that his right of access to the courts was
infringed because West "refused to process [his first habeas
corpus] application, and either personally destroyed or caused to
be destroyed the said application." Furthermore, Boyd alleged
that West "refused to process or cause the processing of [Boyd's]
said (second) [habeas corpus] application, by refusing to cause a
copy of the [second] application to be served upon the District
Attorney for Knox County, Texas, and/or has caused an inordinate
delay in causing such processing." Both parties moved for
summary judgment. In support of her motion for summary judgment,
West filed an affidavit in which she stated that Boyd's first
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was the "first Post-Trial
Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus that had been filed in
Knox County since I took over as District Clerk in 1979," and
that she "did not know what to do with the Application rather
than to file it." She further averred that she called the "Court
Coordinator for the Judge of the 50th Judicial District," who
advised her to send the application to the District Attorney's
office and to the state district judge but that "[a]t no time did
[the court coordinator] or anyone else instruct me that after a
certain passage of time, the Writ should be filed in the Court of
Criminal Appeals in Austin, Texas."
2 On January 30, 1995, the district court sua sponte
dismissed, without prejudice, Boyd's complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Boyd filed a timely appeal to
this court.
II. ANALYSIS
A § 1983 plaintiff who proceeds in forma pauperis is subject
to dismissal if his complaint is "frivolous" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Under § 1915(d), a complaint is
frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact."
Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is legally
frivolous if it is premised on an "indisputably meritless legal
theory . . . ." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Thus, a complaint that
raises an arguable question of law may not be dismissed under §
1915(d). Id. at 328.
We review a § 1915(d) dismissal for an abuse of discretion
because a determination of frivolousness-- whether legal or
factual-- is a discretionary one. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734;
Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992). In reviewing
for an abuse of discretion, we consider whether (1) the plaintiff
is proceeding pro se, (2) the court inappropriately resolved
genuine issues of disputed fact, (3) the court applied erroneous
legal conclusions, (4) the court has provided an adequate
statement of reasons for dismissal which facilitates intelligent
3 appellate review, and (5) the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734.
In the case at hand, the district court concluded that "the
[p]laintiff's § 1983 Complaint does not give rise to a legally
sufficient cause of action at this point in time because it
implicates and calls into question the fact of his confinement."
In support of this conclusion, the district court cited Heck v.
Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), which held that, in order
to maintain a § 1983 cause of action based upon "harm caused by
actions whose lawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid," the plaintiff must first demonstrate that his
conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by
a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at
2372.
Boyd's complaint alleged that West violated his
constitutional right of access to the courts by deliberately
delaying the processing of his first and second petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus. We have held that such deliberate delay
may constitute a constitutional deprivation. Jackson v.
Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986). The district
court, however, determined that Heck mandated dismissal because
"[p]laintiff's § 1983 claim . . . implicates the fact of his
confinement since a necessary threshold determination for the
Court would be whether Plaintiff was prejudiced in any legal
4 proceeding by Defendant's failure to properly process his writs,
i.e., whether there was any injury from the alleged deprivation
of constitutional rights."
Boyd argues that the district court's conclusion is
erroneous because his § 1983 complaint against West does not
question the fact or duration of his continued confinement. He
asserts that even if he was successful in his § 1983 suit, it
would not affect his underlying conviction but would merely
provide him with monetary and injunctive relief for West's
failure to process his first and second writs of habeas corpus in
a reasonably expeditious manner.
We need not decide this issue at this time. Even assuming
arguendo that Heck does not mandate dismissal of Boyd's claim,
Boyd's claim is legally frivolous because Boyd has failed to
allege sufficient injury or prejudice flowing from West's
actions. We have specifically held that a delay in processing a
prisoner's mail will not offend the Constitution if the prisoner
cannot show that the delay resulted in legal prejudice to the
prisoner. Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir.
1988). In Richardson, a prisoner filed a § 1983 suit alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional right to access
to the courts by intentionally or negligently destroying or
losing two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 121.
We concluded that "the isolated incident complained of by
Richardson does not give rise to a constitutional violation
because the prison's error was noted in time to permit appellant
5 to re-prepare and timely file his writ application." Id. at 122.
Thus, Richardson's access to the courts was not impeded. Id.
In the case at hand, Boyd admits that he asked West to
withdraw his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
November 3, 1993. Thus, Boyd clearly cannot show any prejudice
from the delayed processing of his first petition. With regard
to Boyd's second petition, West's uncontested affidavit states
that it was received by West on January 18, 1994. The affidavit
further states that West forwarded the second petition to the
Knox County District Attorney's office the same day as it was
received and that it was forwarded to the Court of Criminal
Appeals on June 30, 1994.1
In short, Boyd's second writ was not forwarded to the Court
of Criminal Appeals for approximately six months. While a delay
in processing of this duration bespeaks neither competence or
professionalism, under the facts of this case the delay does not
give rise to a cognizable constitutional injury because Boyd has
proffered no evidence that the delay has prejudiced his ability
to fully pursue his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. Moreover, while the delay in this case is significantly
longer than the delay in Richardson -- approximately six months
here versus approximately two weeks in Richardson -- this does
not alter our conclusion. The essence of our holding in
Richardson, which is limited to the narrow issue of the
1 Because Boyd's second petition has now been appropriately processed by West, Boyd's request for injunctive relief is moot.
6 constitutional right of access to the courts, is that there is no
cognizable constitutional claim of denial of access to the courts
if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defendant's actions
impeded his ability to pursue his legal rights, at least where
those actions have not resulted in significant delay.2 In this
case, the evidence indicates that Boyd's second petition was
forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals approximately six
months after it was received by West and is currently pending in
the Texas state courts. Accordingly, Boyd's complaint raises no
arguable legal basis for recovery, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327,
and the district court did not err in dismissing Boyd's complaint
as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
2 As Boyd does not raise the issue on appeal, we express no opinion as to whether a protracted delay in the processing of legal papers by a court clerk could state a cognizable claim for the denial of due process even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff has successfully refiled his suit without legal prejudice.