1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 RICHARD DEAN BOYD and VALERIE BOYD, as husband and NO. 2:24-CV-0140-TOR 8 wife, Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 MOTION TO DISMISS v. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM 10 LUIS MORENO aka MOSHE BEN 11 MOR and KELLI JO MORENO, as husband and wife, 12 Defendants. 13
14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ 15 Counterclaim (ECF No. 20). This matter was submitted for consideration without 16 oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully 17 informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Defendants’ Counterclaim (ECF No. 20) is DENIED. 19 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 This counterclaim for unjust enrichment arises out of a claim for fraud,
3 breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. In its 4 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted leave to 5 Defendants to amend their Counterclaim and incorporates by reference the
6 background laid out therein. ECF No. 18. 7 In their Amended Counterclaim, Defendants bolster their allegations that 8 they enjoyed a sort of “running total” business relationship with Plaintiffs, 9 whereby they would exchange favors with the knowledge that it would be repaid in
10 kind in a later project. ECF No. 19 at 19, 20 ¶¶ 3.3, 3.6. Defendants omit all dates 11 from the Amended Counterclaim, except that Mr. Moreno and Mr. Boyd entered 12 into an agreement sometime in 2019 whereby Mr. Boyd would build a laundromat
13 for Defendants, in exchange for a downpayment of $268,000. Id. at 20, ¶ 3.5. At 14 some point in the future, unspecified in the Amended Counterclaim, it became 15 clear that the laundromat was not going to be built.1 Id., ¶ 3.8. Defendants now 16 allege that Mr. Boyd agreed to apply the downpayment and gold purchased for him
17 by Mr. Moreno to a “future project that they would work on together.” Id., ¶ 3.9. 18
1 In its previous Order, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Boyd sold 19 his distributorship on March 1, 2019. ECF No. 18 at 9. 20 1 Defendants assert that this agreement was passable because “[g]iven their history 2 of business relationships, and the probability of future work together, this
3 arrangement was consistent with their commercial relationship.” Id. The parties 4 did not engage in a business endeavor together again until the El Salvador venture, 5 which Defendants assert they allowed Mr. Boyd to participate in as part of the
6 bargain to recoup the laundromat downpayment and purchased gold. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 7 3.10‒3.11. However, according to Defendants, Mr. Boyd never contributed his fair 8 share to the arrangement. Id. at 22, ¶ 3.14. 9 Plaintiffs renew their Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim, arguing
10 that the amendment is still deficient in demonstrating a connection between the 11 defunct laundromat endeavor, the purchase of gold, and the at issue El Salvador- 12 based car resale business. ECF No. 20 at 4.
13 DISCUSSION 14 As was previously discussed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 15 provides that a defendant may move to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a 16 claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 12(b)(6) motion will be denied if the
17 plaintiff alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 18 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 19 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A motion to
20 dismiss for failure to state a claim “tests the legal sufficiency” of the plaintiff’s 1 claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). While the plaintiff’s 2 “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most
3 favorable to the plaintiff” the plaintiff cannot rely on “conclusory allegations of 4 law and unwarranted inferences . . . to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state 5 a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation
6 and brackets omitted). That is, the plaintiff must provide “more than labels and 7 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 8 555. Instead, a plaintiff must show “factual content that allows the court to draw 9 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. A claim may be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt 11 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 12 entitle him to relief.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732.
13 Once again, the crux of this dispute is whether Defendants’ Counterclaim for 14 unjust enrichment is time barred by the three-year statute of limitation under RCW 15 4.16.080(3). A party claiming unjust enrichment must show (1) the opposing party 16 received a benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the claiming party’s expense, and
17 (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the opposing party to retain the benefit 18 without payment. Young v. Young, 164 Wash. 2d 477, 484–85 (2008). The 19 statutory period begins to run when a complaining party, using reasonable
20 diligence, should have discovered the cause of action. Hart v. Clark County, 52 1 Wash.App. 113, 117 (1988). “The discovery rule does not require knowledge of 2 the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts
3 necessary to establish the elements of the claim.” Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. 4 No. 403, 117 Wash.2d 805, 814 (1991). Enrichment itself is not the test for when 5 the claim becomes ripe, but rather when the complainant discovers, or should have
6 discovered, that the enrichment was unjust. See Lagow v. Hagens Berman Sobol 7 Shapiro LLP, 28 Wash.App. 2d 1055 (2023) (“[C]ase law interpreting the 8 discovery rule suggests that such a claim would actually begin to mature when a 9 claim of unjust enrichment was ‘susceptible of proof.’ ”); see also Parman v. Est.
10 of Parman, 2024 WL 1734727, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2024) 11 (“Conferring a benefit alone does not trigger a cause of action for unjust 12 enrichment—retention of the benefit must be unjust in the circumstances.”).
13 Neither party seems to dispute the first two factors, as it is established that 14 Mr. Boyd received the $268,000 as a downpayment for the laundromat from 15 Plaintiffs and 30 ounces of gold that he requested Mr. Moreno purchase for him. 16 However, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ enrichment was not unjust until Mr.
17 Boyd refused to contribute to the El Salvador business in 2022 or 2023, as the 18 benefit conferred upon him had been redefined in light of the breakdown of the 19 laundromat deal. ECF No. 21 at 14. Essentially a restructure of the same
20 argument, Defendants posit that the downpayment and gold were part of the “same 1 transaction,” as the used car business given the redefined roles as being 2 compensation for “possible” future business ventures, and the claim is therefore
3 timely. Id. at 15.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 RICHARD DEAN BOYD and VALERIE BOYD, as husband and NO. 2:24-CV-0140-TOR 8 wife, Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 MOTION TO DISMISS v. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM 10 LUIS MORENO aka MOSHE BEN 11 MOR and KELLI JO MORENO, as husband and wife, 12 Defendants. 13
14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ 15 Counterclaim (ECF No. 20). This matter was submitted for consideration without 16 oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully 17 informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Defendants’ Counterclaim (ECF No. 20) is DENIED. 19 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 This counterclaim for unjust enrichment arises out of a claim for fraud,
3 breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. In its 4 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted leave to 5 Defendants to amend their Counterclaim and incorporates by reference the
6 background laid out therein. ECF No. 18. 7 In their Amended Counterclaim, Defendants bolster their allegations that 8 they enjoyed a sort of “running total” business relationship with Plaintiffs, 9 whereby they would exchange favors with the knowledge that it would be repaid in
10 kind in a later project. ECF No. 19 at 19, 20 ¶¶ 3.3, 3.6. Defendants omit all dates 11 from the Amended Counterclaim, except that Mr. Moreno and Mr. Boyd entered 12 into an agreement sometime in 2019 whereby Mr. Boyd would build a laundromat
13 for Defendants, in exchange for a downpayment of $268,000. Id. at 20, ¶ 3.5. At 14 some point in the future, unspecified in the Amended Counterclaim, it became 15 clear that the laundromat was not going to be built.1 Id., ¶ 3.8. Defendants now 16 allege that Mr. Boyd agreed to apply the downpayment and gold purchased for him
17 by Mr. Moreno to a “future project that they would work on together.” Id., ¶ 3.9. 18
1 In its previous Order, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Boyd sold 19 his distributorship on March 1, 2019. ECF No. 18 at 9. 20 1 Defendants assert that this agreement was passable because “[g]iven their history 2 of business relationships, and the probability of future work together, this
3 arrangement was consistent with their commercial relationship.” Id. The parties 4 did not engage in a business endeavor together again until the El Salvador venture, 5 which Defendants assert they allowed Mr. Boyd to participate in as part of the
6 bargain to recoup the laundromat downpayment and purchased gold. Id. at 21, ¶¶ 7 3.10‒3.11. However, according to Defendants, Mr. Boyd never contributed his fair 8 share to the arrangement. Id. at 22, ¶ 3.14. 9 Plaintiffs renew their Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim, arguing
10 that the amendment is still deficient in demonstrating a connection between the 11 defunct laundromat endeavor, the purchase of gold, and the at issue El Salvador- 12 based car resale business. ECF No. 20 at 4.
13 DISCUSSION 14 As was previously discussed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 15 provides that a defendant may move to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a 16 claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 12(b)(6) motion will be denied if the
17 plaintiff alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 18 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 19 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A motion to
20 dismiss for failure to state a claim “tests the legal sufficiency” of the plaintiff’s 1 claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). While the plaintiff’s 2 “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most
3 favorable to the plaintiff” the plaintiff cannot rely on “conclusory allegations of 4 law and unwarranted inferences . . . to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state 5 a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation
6 and brackets omitted). That is, the plaintiff must provide “more than labels and 7 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 8 555. Instead, a plaintiff must show “factual content that allows the court to draw 9 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. A claim may be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt 11 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 12 entitle him to relief.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732.
13 Once again, the crux of this dispute is whether Defendants’ Counterclaim for 14 unjust enrichment is time barred by the three-year statute of limitation under RCW 15 4.16.080(3). A party claiming unjust enrichment must show (1) the opposing party 16 received a benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the claiming party’s expense, and
17 (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the opposing party to retain the benefit 18 without payment. Young v. Young, 164 Wash. 2d 477, 484–85 (2008). The 19 statutory period begins to run when a complaining party, using reasonable
20 diligence, should have discovered the cause of action. Hart v. Clark County, 52 1 Wash.App. 113, 117 (1988). “The discovery rule does not require knowledge of 2 the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts
3 necessary to establish the elements of the claim.” Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. 4 No. 403, 117 Wash.2d 805, 814 (1991). Enrichment itself is not the test for when 5 the claim becomes ripe, but rather when the complainant discovers, or should have
6 discovered, that the enrichment was unjust. See Lagow v. Hagens Berman Sobol 7 Shapiro LLP, 28 Wash.App. 2d 1055 (2023) (“[C]ase law interpreting the 8 discovery rule suggests that such a claim would actually begin to mature when a 9 claim of unjust enrichment was ‘susceptible of proof.’ ”); see also Parman v. Est.
10 of Parman, 2024 WL 1734727, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2024) 11 (“Conferring a benefit alone does not trigger a cause of action for unjust 12 enrichment—retention of the benefit must be unjust in the circumstances.”).
13 Neither party seems to dispute the first two factors, as it is established that 14 Mr. Boyd received the $268,000 as a downpayment for the laundromat from 15 Plaintiffs and 30 ounces of gold that he requested Mr. Moreno purchase for him. 16 However, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ enrichment was not unjust until Mr.
17 Boyd refused to contribute to the El Salvador business in 2022 or 2023, as the 18 benefit conferred upon him had been redefined in light of the breakdown of the 19 laundromat deal. ECF No. 21 at 14. Essentially a restructure of the same
20 argument, Defendants posit that the downpayment and gold were part of the “same 1 transaction,” as the used car business given the redefined roles as being 2 compensation for “possible” future business ventures, and the claim is therefore
3 timely. Id. at 15. Given the nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court finds it 4 plausible that the enrichment became unjust during the El Salvador business 5 venture. While Plaintiffs are correct that Defendants could have brought suit for
6 the downpayment on the laundromat when it became clear it wasn’t going to be 7 built, the Court must accept as true the allegation that the parties redefined the 8 nature of the downpayment and the purchase of gold to use for a “possible,” future 9 business dealing. In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d at 1403. Under the
10 construction as pled, the agreement may have never come into fruition. Indeed, in 11 taking the allegations in the Counterclaim as true, the opportunity to collect on the 12 enrichment did not manifest itself until somewhere between two and three years
13 later. However, if the parties chose to apply the funding toward a potential project 14 far flung into the future given their alleged past dealings, then Plaintiffs’ retention 15 would not become unjust until that point in time. As such, the Court declines to 16 dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim at this time.
17 // 18 // 19 //
20 // ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim (ECF No. 20) is 3|| DENIED. 4 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish 5|| copies to counsel. 6 DATED January 7, 2025. CO a): ets 0. Kies 8 Oe Ke THOMAS O. RICE <> United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANTS’