Boyd v. Moran

857 So. 2d 1060, 2003 WL 22244978
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 17, 2003
Docket2003-CA-0361
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 857 So. 2d 1060 (Boyd v. Moran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyd v. Moran, 857 So. 2d 1060, 2003 WL 22244978 (La. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

857 So.2d 1060 (2003)

Gregory BOYD, Jr.
v.
Tracey Eady MORAN and the Fire & Casualty Insurance Company of Connecticut.

No. 2003-CA-0361.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

September 17, 2003.

*1061 H. Edward Sherman, Travis J. Causey, Jr., James E. Cazalot, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Edward J. Lassus, Jr., David J. Schexnaydre, Wade D. Rankin, Pajares & Schexnaydre, L.L.C., Covington, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, The Fire & Casualty Insurance Company of Connecticut.

(Court composed of Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY).

JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge.

The plaintiff, Gregory Boyd, seeks a review of the trial court's judgment granting a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant, The Fire & Casualty Insurance Company of Connecticut (F & CICC), and decreeing that any uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, whether statutory or contractual under the F & CICC policy, does not attach until the exhaustion of the self-insured retention (SIR) level of $100,000. The court further held that F & CICC is entitled to a credit against its UM coverage for workers' compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff by the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board (S & WB).

On November 11, 1998, the plaintiff was a passenger in a S & WB vehicle, which was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by Tracy Eady Moran. Ms. Moran was uninsured. As a result of the injuries Mr. Boyd sustained in the scope and course of his employment with the S & WB, he collected workers' compensation benefits and his medical expenses were paid. In a subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff sued Ms. Moran as the tortfeasor and F & CICC as the UM provider for the S & WB in Policy No. ASR001199.[1]

The issue before this court is whether the SIR endorsement applies to a compensation *1062 claimant seeking UM benefits. Hence, only questions of law are before this Court as the facts germane to the motion for summary judgment are not in dispute. Therefore, this Court will review this matter de novo.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181, 99-2257 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 230. Summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C. P. art. 966.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which may be decided by summary judgment. Levy v. Vincent, 01-0277, (La.App. 3rd Cir.7/18/01), 796 So.2d 34, 36. In reviewing questions of law, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and renders judgment on the record. Riverboat Gaming Commission v. Louisiana State Police Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Division, 95-2355, (La.App. 1st Cir.8/21/96), 694 So.2d 316, 319.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that the F & CICC UM policy does not attach until exhaustion of the SIR retention level of $100,000. He further argues that the trial court erred in granting F & CICC a credit against its UM motorist coverage for workers' compensation benefits paid by S & WB and/or its workers' compensation insurer, including indemnity and medical benefits paid to and/or on behalf of plaintiff arising out of the accident.

The defendant concedes that the policy in question, No. ASR001199, was purchased by authority of resolution R-129-98, adopted by the S & WB at its June 10, 1998, setting forth the intent of the S & WB to exclude UM coverage for the policy altogether. Nevertheless, the S & WB never endorsed the waiver on a form designated by the insurer, as required by law. F & CICC does not contest that the policy was therefore considered by law to have included UM coverage equal to the bodily injury limits. The defendant asserts that its insurance policy liability limits the UM coverage up to $1,000,000, which only exists in excess to the SIR amount which is $100,000; the $100,000, amount must be exhausted before the UM coverage is applicable.[2]

The trial court granted F & CICC's partial summary judgment decreeing that any UM coverage afforded by the policy "does not attach until exhaustion of the self-insured retention level of $100,000." The court further noted that F & CICC is entitled to credit against its UM coverage for workers' compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff by S & WB, including indemnity and medical expenses. The applicable statute for the UM coverage is found in La. R.S. 22: 1406(D).[3]

*1063 In the case sub judice the trial court granted the motion based on Tybussek v. Wong, 96-1981 (La.App. 4 Cir.1997), 690 So.2d 225, and ascertained that the S & WB was a self-insured entity that did not need to provide UM coverage to itself, albeit a self-insured entity was exempt from obtaining a formal certificate of self insurance as a political subdivision of the state. In Tybussek, the employee was an employee of the S & WB and was injured while occupying a vehicle owned by his employer. At the time of the accident the S & WB maintained insurance similar to that in the case at bar in that it was responsible for a SIR of $100,000. To cover the excess amount above the SIR, the S & WB purchased a policy with Carolina Casualty to provide $1,000,000 of liability coverage. The plaintiff in that case argued that the SIR limit set forth in the Carolina Casualty policy applied only to liability coverage and not the UM, which this Court rejected.

In Tybussek, we held that the S & WB was a self-insured entity that did not need to provide UM coverage to itself. Furthermore, pursuant to La. R.S. 32:1041, S & WB as a political subdivision of the state was exempt from obtaining a formal certification of self-insurance. The plaintiffs in Tybussek made a similar argument as Mr. Boyd does in this case, averring that the Carolina Casualty policy still provided coverage for damages within the SIR because there was no clear exclusion or waiver for that layer of liability. We stated in Tybussek that:

Plaintiffs argue that the policy does not contain "a clear and unmistakable exclusion" of UM coverage, thus requiring full coverage for UM benefits. What Plaintiffs fail to realize is that the Carolina Casualty Policy does, in fact, provide full UM coverage in the instant case.
Pursuant to the UM statute, La. R.S. 22:1406(d), every liability policy must *1064 contain UM benefits in the amount "not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy" unless the insured validly rejects UM coverage or selects lower limits. Here, under the Carolina Casualty Policy, UM coverage was neither rejected nor lower limits selected for the type of vehicle involved in Plaintiff's accident.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
857 So. 2d 1060, 2003 WL 22244978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-moran-lactapp-2003.