BOYD v. MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF)

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 8, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01161
StatusUnknown

This text of BOYD v. MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF) (BOYD v. MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BOYD v. MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF), (S.D. Ind. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

VINCENT W. BOYD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:25-cv-01161-JPH-MKK ) MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF), ) COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

I. Filing Fee Plaintiff Vincent Boyd filed his complaint without paying the $405 filing fee or demonstrating that he lacks the financial ability to do so. He indicated in his complaint that he requested in forma pauperis status, but he did not attach the required supporting documentation. Dkt. 1 at 5. Mr. Boyd SHALL either pay the $405 filing fee or seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis by August 8, 2025. The Clerk shall include a form motion to proceed in forma pauperis with Mr. Boyd's copy of this Order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Screening standard The Court has the inherent authority to screen Mr. Boyd's complaint. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[D]istrict courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status."). The Court may dismiss claims within a complaint that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the

same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal, [the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). B. The complaint Mr. Boyd alleges that an employee of Marion County Community Corrections did not allow him to attend choir rehearsal at his church because he had "too much freedom." Dkt. 1 at 2. That employee's supervisor informed Mr. Boyd that this decision was permissible. Id. After the supervisor learned that Mr. Boyd filed "this paperwork," he retaliated against Mr. Boyd by making him "serv[e] 14 days." Id. C. Discussion of claims The Court construes Mr. Boyd's complaint as alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeking monetary damages. Mr. Boyd names only Marion County Community Corrections, the county's probation services provider, as a defendant. Dkt. 1 at 1–2. However, there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029

(7th Cir. 2018). A municipality or municipal entity can only be liable under § 1983 if there is a widespread policy or practice that caused a constitutional injury, and Mr. Boyd has not alleged any such custom here. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Therefore, Mr. Boyd's claim against Marion County Community Corrections cannot proceed. Additionally, it is unclear from Mr. Boyd's complaint what relief he seeks beyond monetary damages, but to the extent he requests interference with an ongoing term of probation, this Court would be unable to do so. See Sprint

Comms., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (noting that the Younger abstention doctrine "preclude[s] federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions"); Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding interference with probation officer's "continuing acts of supervision" implicates Younger abstention doctrine, noting that if probationer "has a problem with how his probation officer is treating him, he may easily lodge his objections in the state court overseeing his probation"). D. Conclusion

Mr. Boyd's complaint must be dismissed for the reasons in this Order. Mr. Boyd shall have through August 8, 2025 to file an amended complaint. Because an amended complaint completely replaces previous pleadings, it must be a complete statement of his claims. See Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture."). The clerk is directed to send a form complaint with Mr. Boyd's copy of the Order. SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/8/2025 anus Pat tanlor— James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana

Distribution: VINCENT W. BOYD 9234 Dansk Ridge Ct. Apt. A Indianapolis, IN 46250

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Charles Beal, Jr. v. James Beller
847 F.3d 897 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Edward Tobey v. Brenda Chibucos
890 F.3d 634 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Kirk Horshaw v. Mark Casper
910 F.3d 1027 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs
134 S. Ct. 584 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
BOYD v. MARION COUNTY (SHERIFF), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-marion-county-sheriff-insd-2025.