Boyd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society

263 N.W. 780, 274 Mich. 1, 1935 Mich. LEXIS 756
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 10, 1935
DocketDocket No. 32, Calendar No. 38,520.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 263 N.W. 780 (Boyd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 263 N.W. 780, 274 Mich. 1, 1935 Mich. LEXIS 756 (Mich. 1935).

Opinion

North, J.

From tbe latter part of 1930 until about September 1, 1932, plaintiff, Albert C. Boyd, was employed by tbe United States Rubber Company. He was then laid off on account of slack work. He again worked for the same employer for a period of three days about tbe middle of December, 1932; but tbe work be was then required to do was too bard for him and bis employment ceased. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of tbe United States, defendant herein, was the insurer under a group policy covering certain employees of tbe United States Rubber Company. On April 1, 1931, defendant issued to plaintiff an individual certificate of insurance under tbe master policy. Tbe mate *3 rial portions of plaintiff’s certificate are printed in tire margin hereof. * The instant suit is one in assumpsit based on a claimed breach of the contract of insurance. Plaintiff alleges that during his employment with the United States Rubber Company he developed tuberculosis of the lungs and that as a result thereof and before he attained the age of 60 years he became totally and permanently disabled while his individual certificate of insurance was in force, and that he is entitled to recover under the total and permanent disability provision of the policy. In its defense the insurance company asserts that the policy had lapsed prior to the time plaintiff became totally and permanently disabled; and further that plaintiff did not furnish proof of his total and permanent disability as required by the terms of the policy, and that furnishing such proof is a condition precedent to liability. Relative to the latter defense, plaintiff asserts that such proofs were waived by the defendant insurance company. This appeal is from a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered in the circuit court after trial without a jury.

*4 The group insurance policy provided that the employer might elect that all employees who, while insured, were temporarily laid off or given leave of absence or temporarily disabled, might be considered for the purposes of the insurance contract as still being employed by the company holding the group policy. Evidently acting under this provision, plaintiff continued to pay the premiums on his insurance and the same were accepted for the months of September, October and November, 1932. Hence, as admitted by defendant, plaintiff’s insurance was in force to and including November 30, 1932.

As noted above, plaintiff took his certificate of insurance April 1, 1931. He was normally healthy, so far as the testimony discloses, until June 21, 1932, when he was overcome by being exposed to aniline dye fumes while working in one of his employer’s oil tanks. This necessitated plaintiff’s being sent to a hospital where he remained a week and was away from his employment for a month. From that time on plaintiff consulted various physicians and on March 7, 1933, he was advised that he had tuberculosis. Thereupon he entered a hospital and later was transferred to the Leland Farm Sanatorium, in which institution he was still a patient at the time of the trial, and unquestionably he was then totally and permanently disabled. It is plaintiff’s contention that his injury of June 21, 1932, so affected his lungs that tuberculosis set in at once; and that he became totally and permanently disabled prior to the time his policy lapsed. As noted above, defendant contends plaintiff did not become totally and permanently disabled prior to the expiration of the certificate issued to him. The trial judge decided this issue of fact in favor of plaintiff; and on appeal *5 the question is presented whether such finding is sustained by the testimony. We quote it somewhat at length. Plaintiff’s testimony contains the following :

“Previous to June, 1932,1 had never been treated for tuberculosis. I was never sick. * * * At the time I went into the red oil tank I weighed around 140 or 150. I now weigh 134, having gained 16 pounds in the last two months. I do not recall, but I think that I weighed about 125 in December, 1932. I started losing, weight in June, 1932, right after I got poisoned. I think I was down about 15 or 20 pounds by December of that year. * * * The last day I worked was in December, 1932. # * * My physical condition was such that I could not handle the work. I cannot do any work at the present time. I can hardly walk across the street. * * * In November I told him (Mr. Brennan, employer’s compensation and insurance representative) that I wasn’t doing no good, I needed some treatment, but I didn’t get it. * * * Well, I was just laid off (December, 1932).
“Q. (Direct examination) In November of 1932 were you able to do some work, or were you able to do the same work that you had been hired to do at the United States Rubber Company?
“A. No, sir.
“Q.. What was your condition?
“A. Very poor.
“Q. Were you weak?
“A. Rundown.”

Dr. Albert Krohn was sworn as a witness in behalf of plaintiff. He testified:

“Mr. Boyd, when he entered our hospital in March of 1933, was suffering from tuberculosis. It was moderately advanced. * * * My diagnosis was that it was tuberculosis of the upper and middle third of the right lung * * * . The case was *6 chronic rather than acnte. His condition had in all probability preceded my seeing him from 5 to 15 years. I don’t know whether I could definitely tell. A man in his condition could do manual labor. * * * Oh, he could do manual work. * * * A lot of cases of hi s type that are walking on the street, and working today. They do not know that they have tuberculosis. Now, those things do endanger their life. * # * One could have a hemorrhage any time in a condition of that sort. * * * His is a scarring-case, and you do not get infiltration on the other side. It remains on one side. That type usually clears up. * * * Mr. Boyd’s weight was 122 pounds when he entered our hospital. It was 114 when he left. He gained weight when he first came in, his weight going up to 128, and then it went down. His low point was 104. The time covered was from April until August (1933). It (gas poisoning) might be a superinducing- cause of active tuberculosis if a man was subjected to some irritation in the pulmonary cavity. * * * One lung was normal, i. e. negative, when he entered my hospital.
“Q. (Cross-examination) In your opinion, in March, 1933, when you first saw Mr. Boyd, was he then totally and permanently disabled? * * *
“A. No, he was totally but not permanently.”

Dr. Carl C. Birkelo, another witness produced by plaintiff, testified that he was a specialist ■ in roentgenology and upon examining X-ray plates of plaintiff’s lungs made in March, 1933, he stated:

“The plates show tuberculosis. * * * I cannot tell from an examination of these plates whether the man had had.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
263 N.W. 780, 274 Mich. 1, 1935 Mich. LEXIS 756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-equitable-life-assurance-society-mich-1935.