Boyd v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

149 S.W.2d 1053, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 238
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 31, 1941
DocketNo. 5284.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 149 S.W.2d 1053 (Boyd v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyd v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 149 S.W.2d 1053, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 238 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

JACKSON, Chief Justice.

This suit was instituted by the appellant, Ed Boyd, in the Forty-seventh District Court of Potter County against appellee, the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, hereinafter designated as the Rock Island, to recover the sum of $4,-720 for the death of Boyd’s son, Richard Murphy Boyd, hereinafter called Pete Boyd, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the employees of the Rock Island.

The appellant alleges that on September 24, 1939, Pete Boyd, his son, was on the track of the railway company, when a Rock Island train coming into Amarillo from the west struck and killed Pete; that the employees in charge of the train failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to blow the whistle or ring the bell, operated the train at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed, each of which acts constituted negligence and a proximate cause of the death of Pete Boyd.

In the alternative appellant pleaded that the employees of the Rock Island discovered his son upon the track and could have, by the exercise of ordinary care with the means at hand, avoided striking and killing his son and such negligence was a proximate cause of his death.

The allegations as to relationship, age, earning capacity and contribution to the *1054 support of the father by the son are sufficient.

The appellee answered by general demurrer, special exceptions, general denial and pleaded the contributory negligence of Pete Boyd in sitting on the railroad track.

The case was tried to a jury and at the close of the evidence, in obedience to a peremptory instruction, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee and from the judgment rendered thereon this appeal is prosecuted.

The record discloses that the Rock Island tracks enter Amarillo from an easterly direction, continue through the city and on in a westerly direction; that a dump or fill twenty or more feet in height has been constructed on which the Rock Island tracks are laid within the city limits; that there is a gap or opening in this fill spanned by a steel bridge and this gap under the bridge forms an underpass through which the Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Company operates its trains; that the bridge and fill constitute an overpass along which the Rock Island operates its'trains. It is about 2,000 feet west of this bridge to what is known as a grade crossing, though there are two highway underpasses west thereof. Pete Boyd was sitting facing north on the north rail of the Rock Island tracks some 40 or SO feet west of the west end of this steel bridge humped over and appeared to be holding his head in his hands. According to the witnesses who testified on the subject, he was first seen on the track about 7 A. M. on the morning of the 24th prior to being struck by the train about 8:40 A. M. The train was running in an easterly direction at a speed estimated by the trainmen to be approximately 30 miles per hour and by Willie Parker, a witness for appellant, at 45 or 50 miles per hour. The conductor said the whistle blew and the bell rang before the train struck the deceased and estimated that the brakes were applied while the part of the train on which he was riding, the coach behind the baggage car, was approximately 500 feet west of the bridge. The switchman testified that in his opinion the engine was within 250 feet of the deceased when he first discovered him and the engineer stated that in his judgment the engine was about 200 feet from where Pete Boyd was sitting when he first saw him. The fireman and engineer each testified to keeping a careful lookout but that the deceased was dressed in dark clothes, sitting in a position on the track between him and the banisters of the steel bridge which to some extent interfered with their view; that when they saw him the whistle was blown immediately and the emergency brakes applied but with the equipment on the train it would require from 650 to 700 feet to bring the train to a stop. Two disinterested witnesses, Mrs. Myrtle Watson and Mrs. Dodson, testified that the whistle of the 'engine was blown some distance before the train struck Pete Boyd but stated they were unable to estimate the distance. The testimony shows that a negro man went on the track where Pete Boyd was sitting and talked to him some time before the train came but what he said or the purport thereof the witness was not near enough to ascertain. Willie Parker testified that he saw Pete Boyd early that morning going up the dump, calléd him back and asked him if he were drunk and offered to take him home, but that the deceased told him he was not drunk, was going home and went on up the fill to the track. The witness was on his way to what he called the North Heights and was gone some twenty or thirty minutes, he says, and as he returned, while crossing the Fort Worth & Denver City tracks northwest of where the collision occurred, he looked and saw Pete Boyd jump up and try to run across the track as the train struck him; that he did not hear the bell ring nor hear the whistle of the engine blow until just as it hit the deceased. He said he was some three blocks from the collision but the map of the city introduced by appellant shows that if Parker were where he says when he saw the collision he was nearly 1,500 feet away and it would have required one and one-third' seconds, at least, under the weather conditions, for the sound of the whistle to reach him and since the train was traveling, according to this witness, at a speed of 45 or 50 miles per hour the train would, in the time required for the Sound to reach the witness, have gone approximately 88 feet. If traveling at a speed of 30 miles per hour, as said by the trainmen, it would have gone approximately 58 feet before hitting the deceased. The testimony, therefore, is uncon-troverted that the whistle was blown by the trainmen before the deceased was struck. The only controversy is the distance the train was from the deceased when the whistle was first blown.

*1055 Pete Boyd, who was thirty-five years of age,‘was at midnight preceding his death ordered to leave a beer joint. He said he was not drunk but left and the next time he was seen he was going upon the fill to the railway track where he sat until he was struck and killed about 8:40 A. M.

The testimony shows without dispute that the deceased was dressed in dark clothes, was sitting on the north rail of the Rock Island track; that he was bowed over apparently with his head in his hands; that he had been there something like an hour and a half before he was killed. If there is any explanation for his sitting on the track it must be gleaned from the testimony above related.

There is some controversy about whether there was a trail or a path over the fill at the west end of the bridge and whether or not there was a trail that extended along the rails westerly but, in our opinion, it is immaterial whether the deceased was a trespasser or a licensee. The evidence shows no reason or excuse, much less justification, for the deceased to sit on the rail of the track. He was there voluntarily and whether drunk, asleep or unconscious from some other cause, or intentionally remained in that position, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

In Cobb et al. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 670, 673, it is said:

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Bluebook (online)
149 S.W.2d 1053, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-chicago-r-i-p-ry-co-texapp-1941.