Boyd v. Allergan PLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedApril 10, 2023
Docket6:22-cv-01808
StatusUnknown

This text of Boyd v. Allergan PLC (Boyd v. Allergan PLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyd v. Allergan PLC, (D. Or. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ASHLEY RAE BOYD, an individual,

Plaintiff, Case No. 6:22-cv-01808-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

ALLERGAN PLC, a foreign corporation, ALLERGAN, INC., a foreign corporation, ALLERGAN USA, INC. F/K/A INAMED CORPORATION F/K/A MCGHAN MEDICAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation,

Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge: Plaintiff Ashley Boyd claims that Defendant Allergan USA, Inc. designed, produced, and sold breast implants that failed to meet the requirements for the device set forth by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). As a result, she suffered injuries. Plaintiff brings state-law claims for negligence, negligence per se, and products liability. Because Plaintiff fails to articulate a plausible claim the Defendant failed to meet the federal requirements for the device or deviated from the device’s pre- market approval, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Plaintiff received McGhan® Style 20 Silicone-Filled breast implants in 2006. Def.’s Notice of Removal Ex. A, ¶ 27, ECF No. 1-1. McGhan designed, produced, and sold plastic and reconstructive surgery products in the United States and Canada. Id. ¶ 6. McGhan changed its name to Inamed Corporation in 1986, and Defendant bought Inamed Corporation in March of 2006. Id. ¶ 7. One of Plaintiff’s implants ruptured, resulting in both of her implants being surgically removed. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s breast implants gave her Lupus and damaged

her right eye. Id. ¶ 82.1 STANDARDS To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact

as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burget v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). But the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). / / / / / / / / / / / /

1 Plaintiff does not specify in her complaint when she had the implants removed, nor when she discovered the listed injuries. DISCUSSION I. Medical Device Amendment & Preemption The breast implants designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant are Class III medical devices, which received pre-market authorization (“PMA”) from the FDA. Def.’s Notice of Removal Ex. A, ¶ 22. The Medical Device Amendment (“MDA”) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic

Act gives the FDA oversight over new medical devices. Id. ¶ 16. The MDA splits medical devices into three categories. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a). Class III medical devices, the class of medical devices at issue here, are “purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii). The MDA expressly preempts state regulation of Class III medical devices because of the oversight provided, and requirements imposed, by the FDA. Weber v. Allergan, Inc., 940 F.3d 1106, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2019). FDA requirements for a particular Class III medical device are “established by the FDA's pre-market approval.” Weber, 940 F.3d at 1111. The express preemption

provision of the MDA states that: no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-- (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). In other words, the MDA expressly preempts “state law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a Class III medical device that had received pre-market approval from the FDA.” Weber, 940 F.3d at 1111 (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321-25 (2008)). However, the MDA “does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. Ultimately, to survive preemption, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant deviated from a particular pre-market approval or other FDA requirement applicable to the Class III medical device.” Weber, 940 F.3d at 1112. II. State-law claims

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim that Defendant violated a federal requirement. Most of Plaintiff’s complaint contains conclusory statements rather than factual allegations. For example, Plaintiff alleges that the implants were “defective, dangerous and adulterated upon manufacture as they were contaminated and were manufactured with nonconforming materials and uncertified components in violation of the PMA specifications and regulatory requirements, resulting in product failure and serious injury to Plaintiff.” Def.’s Notice of Removal Ex. A, ¶ 53. Plaintiff, however, failed to provide basic facts such as the source of contamination, or what specific nonconforming materials Defendant manufactured its breast implants with. Plaintiff also failed to allege which PMA specification or regulatory requirement

Defendant allegedly violated. The mere allegation that Defendant “violated FDA regulations” fails to state a plausible claim. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (D. Minn. 2009) (aff’d 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff recites similar conclusions, listing FDA requirements and claiming Defendant violated them, throughout her complaint without providing a factual basis for such conclusions. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must establish the basis for their claim and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And, in order “to survive MDA preemption, a plaintiff cannot simply demonstrate a defect or a malfunction and rely ‘on res ipsa loquitur to suggest only that the thing speaks for itself.’” Weber, 940 F.3d at 1112 (cleaned up) (quoting Funk v.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
552 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
In Re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads
623 F.3d 1200 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Ronald Funk v. Stryker Corporation
631 F.3d 777 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
Nicole Weber v. Allergan, Inc.
940 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

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Boyd v. Allergan PLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-allergan-plc-ord-2023.