Boyd, et al v Wells Fargo

2018 DNH 102

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 17, 2018
• Docket: 18-cv-253-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Leah Boyd and Glenda Castleberry

v. Civil No. 18-cv-253-JL Opinion No. 2018 DNH 102 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

SUMMARY ORDER

This is Leah Boyd’s third action challenging the

foreclosure on a home in Somersworth, New Hampshire.1 Boyd and

her mother, Glenda Castleberry, proceeding pro se, sued the

mortgage-holder and servicer of the mortgage secured by her

home, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in Strafford County Superior

Court. The defendant removed the action to this court, see 28

U.S.C. § 1441, which has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(diversity). The defendant then moved to dismiss Boyd’s

complaint. Boyd filed no objection. The court dismisses Boyd’s

complaint as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion and for

failure to state a claim for relief, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6).

1 See Boyd v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 DNH 156 (dismissing Boyd’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief against Wells Fargo); Castleberry v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2017 DNH 240 (same). The court set forth the facts germane to Boyd’s claims,

drawn from her complaints and construed in her favor, see

Martino v. Forward Air, Inc., 609 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010), in

its previous two orders.2 It does not repeat them here. Boyd

pleads no new facts in her most recent complaint. Instead, Boyd

merely repeats claims already raised before, and dismissed by,

this court.

Claim preclusion. The doctrine of claim preclusion (also

called res judicata) bars a party from relitigating claims that

were or could have been addressed in a prior action, and applies

when: “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits of an

earlier action, and (2) there is identity of the parties and

(3) identity of the claims in both suits.” Reppert v. Marvin

Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2004). All three

elements are satisfied here.

The parties in this action are identical to the parties in

Castleberry: Boyd and Castleberry, the plaintiffs in this

action, brought that suit against Wells Fargo, the defendant in

this action. Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240. The claims in this

action are also identical to the claims raised in Boyd’s 2017

action:

2 See Boyd, 2016 DNH 156, 1-3; Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 2-4.

2  Boyd alludes to loan modification discussions with

Wells Fargo. The court previously construed these

allegations as a claim for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See

Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 5-6. Because the

plaintiffs concede default, and because “New Hampshire

imposes no duty to forebear from foreclosure in the

face of default,” Frangos v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

No. 13-CV-472-PB, 2014 WL 3699490, at *4 (D.N.H.

July 24, 2014), the court dismissed that claim.

Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 6.

 Boyd also requests time to gather the paperwork

necessary to demonstrate that her interest in the

property is clear of Wells Fargo’s mortgage interest.

As the court has previously explained in dismissing

her prior complaints, she took any interest in the

property subject to the mortgage. Id. at 6-7.

Accordingly, the court dismissed this claim, which the

court construed as one to quiet title to the property.

Id. at 7.

Finally, the court dismissed these claims, with prejudice,

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after giving the

plaintiffs additional time to respond to Wells Fargo’s motion

and to substantiate their claims, and after holding oral

3 argument, which Boyd attended. Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240.

Dismissal for failure to state a claim operates as a final

adjudication on the merits for claim preclusion purposes. See

Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 388 (1st Cir.

1994). Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Boyd

and Castleberry from relitigating these claims.

Failure to state a claim for relief. Even were Boyd’s

claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing and to quiet title not barred by the doctrine of claim

preclusion, she has yet again failed to state a claim for relief

for the reasons explained this court’s order in Castleberry,

2017 DNH 240.

She has also failed to state a claim for tortious

interference with contractual relations.3 Boyd alleges in this

action that Wells Fargo has notified her tenants about upcoming

foreclosure proceedings, causing her tenants to cease paying

rent. “To establish liability for tortious interference with

3 In Castleberry, Boyd included that allegation in her objection to the motion to dismiss, not in the complaint itself. The court interpreted it as a claim for tortious interference with contract and afforded Boyd an opportunity to substantiate it. Castleberry, 2017 DNH 240, 8-9. When Boyd failed to supplement her objection with substantiating facts or evidence, the court dismissed this claim. Id. at 8. It explicitly did not address the claim’s merits, however. Id. at 8 n.14. As a result, the dismissal in Castleberry did not operate as a final adjudication on the merits of this claim for claim preclusion purposes.

4 contractual relations, a plaintiff must show that: ‘(1) the

plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party;

(2) the defendant knew of this relationship; (3) the defendant

intentionally and improperly interfered with this relationship;

and (4) the plaintiff was damaged by such interference.” City

of Keene v. Cleaveland, 167 N.H. 731, 738 (2015) (quoting Hughes

v. N.H. Div. of Aeronautics, 152 N.H. 30, 40–41 (2005)). “Mere

interference, in itself, is legally insufficient to state a

claim. Rather, ‘[o]nly improper interference is deemed tortious

in New Hampshire.’” Kilty v. Worth Dev. Corp., 184 F. App’x 17,

19 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Roberts v. Gen. Motors Corp., 138

N.H. 532, 540 (1994)).

Boyd and Castleberry have not alleged any improper

interference by Wells Fargo. They allege only that Wells Fargo

notified their tenants about upcoming foreclosure proceedings --

notifications that Wells Fargo is obligated to provide under

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 479:25. Under these circumstances,

notifications mandated by New Hampshire law do not constitute

improper interference. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed

to state a claim for tortious interference with contractual

relations.

Conclusion. Boyd’s claims are barred by the doctrine of

claim preclusion. To the extent they are not, for the reasons

explained herein and in this court’s order in Castleberry, 2017

5 DNH 240, they must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for

relief. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint4 is

therefore GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly

and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge

Dated: May 17, 2018

cc: Leah A. Boyd, pro se Glenda Castleberry, pro se David D. Christensen, Esq.

4 Document no. 5.