Bowman v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Gov't

168 So. 3d 608, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 0978, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 3027, 2014 WL 7278255
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 23, 2014
DocketNo. 2014 CA 0978
StatusPublished

This text of 168 So. 3d 608 (Bowman v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Gov't) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowman v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Gov't, 168 So. 3d 608, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 0978, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 3027, 2014 WL 7278255 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

GUIDRY, J.

| ^Claimant, James Bowman, III, appeals a judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) finding he failed to meet his burden of proof to relate-his disabling injury to his workplace accident. Finding no manifest error in the OWC judge’s conclusions, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 22, 2013, the claimant fell backwards to the ground while attempting to break up a fight between two male juvenile detainees1 at the Terrebonne Parish Juvenile Detention Center. At the time of the accident, the claimant was working in the course and scope of his-employment as a juvenile care associate. Several accident reports were completed for the incident. The claimant reported experiencing “some tightening” on his right side and “some discomfort” in his neck immediately following the incident. He was instructed by his supervisor, Lieutenant Renee Harris, to see Edward Davis, Jr., a paramedic who was on duty at the time of the incident. After seeing Mr. Davis, the claimant reported back to his post and completed working his shift for the night. The claimant continued to work without missing any days until July 2013.

On July 19, 2013, the claimant contacted Fay Giroir, the workers’ compensation [611]*611claims adjuster for the Department of Risk Management with the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, to inform her that he had been off work and that his absence from work may be due to the fall that occurred on April 22, 2013. After taking the claimant’s statement and investigating the matter, Ms. Giroir decided to deny the claim based on a “lack of documentation of an injury occurring on and related to the fall of April 22, 2013.”

The claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation with the OWC on ^August 27, 2013. Following a hearing before an OWC judge on March 14, 2014, the claimant’s disputed claim for compensation was dismissed with prejudice on May 19, 2014. The OWC judge found that the claimant did not meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his current medical condition was causally related to his April 22, 2013 workers’ compensation accident. Claimant devolutively appeals the dismissal of his disputed claim.

DISCUSSION

The only error that the claimant asserts on appeal is that the OWC judge erred in finding that the employer rebutted the presumption of causation and that the claimant’s medical condition was not' causally related to his April 22, 2013 accident.

An employee in a workers’ compensation action has the burden of establishing a causal link between the accident and the subsequent disabling condition. Starkey v. Livingston Parish Council, 12-1787, p. 6 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/6/13), 122 So.3d 570, 574. A claimant must establish a causal connection between the accident and the resulting disability by a preponderance of the evidence. Causation is not necessarily and exclusively a medical conclusion. It is usually the ultimate fact to be found by the fact finder based on all credible evidence. Carmena v. St. Anthony’s Home, 11-1181, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/2/12), 92 So.3d 539, 541.

An appellate court, in a workers’ compensation case, as in other cases, is bound by the manifest error rule and may not set aside the findings of fact unless they are clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Carmena, 11-1181 at pp. 4-5, 92 So.3d at 542. The fact-finder’s determinations as to whether the worker’s testimony is credible and whether the worker has discharged his burden of proof are, most certainly, factual determinations that should not be disturbed on ^appellate review unless clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C., 10-0245, pp. 5-6 (La.1/19/11), 56 So.3d 215, 219.

When an employee suffers from a preexisting medical condition, he may still prevail if he proves that the accident “aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce death or disability for which compensation is claimed.” Starkey, 12-1787 at p. 6, 122 So.3d at 574 (quoting Walton v. Normandy Village Homes Association, Inc., 475 So.2d 320, 324 (La.1985)). An otherwise healthy employee with a preexisting condition is entitled to benefits if he can prove that his work-related accident contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated his injury. An employee’s work-related accident is presumed to have caused his disability when he proves that before the accident, he had not manifested his disabling symptoms; that commencing with the accident, disabling symptoms appeared; and that there is either medical or circumstantial evidence indicating a reasonable possibility of a causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition. Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen v. Carl[612]*612ton, 12-0775, p. 9-10 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/21/12), 111 So.3d 1076, 1083.

However, as recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Walton, there are limitations to the invocation of the presumption:

A claimant’s disability is presumed to have resulted from an accident, however, if before the accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest themselves afterwards, providing either that there is sufficient medical evidence to show there to be a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition, or that the nature of the accident, when combined with the other facts of the case, raises a natural inference through human experience of such a causal connection.

Walton, 475 So.2d at 324 (citations omitted).

| BWhiIe it is undisputed that the claimant suffered an on-the-job injury, at issue is whether that injury caused the disability claimed. Immediately following the accident, the claimant reported some tightening on his right side and discomfort in his neck, but after being cleared by Mr. Davis, a paramedic, he completed his shift for the night. Accident reports completed by his supervisors indicate that the claimant sustained a “sprain/strain” injury to his neck and back. Thereafter, the claimant did not communicate any further complaints or problems of injury and continued working without missing any scheduled work days until July 2013.

On July 2, 2013, the claimant went to the Cardiovascular Institute of the South complaining of pain in his left leg while walking and reporting the onset of his complaint as being three weeks prior to his visit. On finding that the etiology of his left leg pain was “non-vaseular,” the claimant was advised to follow up with his primary care physician. On July 18, 2013, the claimant went to see Dr. Scott Haydel, his primary care physician. The claimant complained to Dr. Haydel of burning pain in his left leg, back pain, legs giving out, and trouble going from sitting to standing, starting approximately two months prior to the visit. Dr. Haydel ordered an MRI of the claimant’s lumbar spine based on a diagnosis of left lower extremity radiculo-pathy and further ordered the claimant to remain off work until further notice. The MRI revealed that the claimant had “[m]ultilevel degenerative disk disease changes of the lumbar spine ... with central canal stenosis at L3^1 and L4-5.” It was after his visit to Dr. Haydel that the claimant first notified the employer of a possible workers’ compensation claim related to the April 22, 2013 workplace accident.

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Related

Trent v. Triad Electric & Controls, Inc.
34 So. 3d 484 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2010)
Walton v. Normandy Village Homes Ass'n, Inc.
475 So. 2d 320 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1985)
Penton v. CITY OF HAMMOND POLICE DEPT.
991 So. 2d 91 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2008)
Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen v. Carlton
111 So. 3d 1076 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2012)
Starkey v. Livingston Parish Council
122 So. 3d 570 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2013)
Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C.
56 So. 3d 215 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2011)
Carmena v. St. Anthony's Home
92 So. 3d 539 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
168 So. 3d 608, 2014 La.App. 1 Cir. 0978, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 3027, 2014 WL 7278255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowman-v-terrebonne-parish-consolidated-govt-lactapp-2014.