Bowman v. Sharp & Carman

6 Watts 324
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided July 15, 1837·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Per Curiam.

A bail bond was thought an unfit subject of compulsory arbitration in Roop v. Meek, 6 Serg. & Rawle 542, and Hersberger v. Venus, 3 Penns. Rep. 396, because it is a subject of discretionary relief to be administered only by the court; but in Kelley v. Stepney, 4 Watts 69, an insolvent’s bond was considered as an ordinary obligation to do a particular act, whose performance alone can exonerate the bail, who is rather a surety in the strict sense of the word: insomuch, that a surrender before the day does not discharge him. It is, therefore, on a footing with a recognizance of bail in error, which was deemed arbitrable in Stevenson v. Docherty, 3 Watts 176. Being thus determinable by a popular tribunal, the cause of action may be set out in a statement, without the technicality of a declaration.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bowman v. Sharp & Carman, 6 Watts 324 (Pa. 1837).

6 Watts 324 (Bowman v. Sharp & Carman) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Pettit v. Wingate
25 Pa. 74 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1855)