Bowman v. Sharp & Carman
This text of 6 Watts 324 (Bowman v. Sharp & Carman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
A bail bond was thought an unfit subject of compulsory arbitration in Roop v. Meek, 6 Serg. & Rawle 542, and Hersberger v. Venus, 3 Penns. Rep. 396, because it is a subject of discretionary relief to be administered only by the court; but in Kelley v. Stepney, 4 Watts 69, an insolvent’s bond was considered as an ordinary obligation to do a particular act, whose performance alone can exonerate the bail, who is rather a surety in the strict sense of the word: insomuch, that a surrender before the day does not discharge him. It is, therefore, on a footing with a recognizance of bail in error, which was deemed arbitrable in Stevenson v. Docherty, 3 Watts 176. Being thus determinable by a popular tribunal, the cause of action may be set out in a statement, without the technicality of a declaration.
Judgment affirmed.
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