Bowman v. Novad Management Consulting, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-3063
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEYUBBA BOWMAN; RASHON No. 24-3063 BOWMAN, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-10363-RGK-RAO Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

NOVAD MANAGEMENT CONSULTING, LLC, an Oklahoma Limited Liability Corporation; ISN CORPORATION, a Maryland Corporation; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; DOES, 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2026**

Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Keyubba and Rashon Bowman appeal pro se from the district court’s order

dismissing their action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, and state law alleging that defendants failed to

uphold an agreement to forgive a subordinate loan secured against the Bowmans’

real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an

abuse of discretion the denial of a default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d

1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Bowmans’

motion for default judgment against defendant Novad based on the Eitel factors.

See id. at 1471-72 (setting forth factors that courts may consider in determining

whether to enter default judgment, including the merits of plaintiff’s underlying

claims and the sufficiency of the complaint).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Bowmans’

motion for a continuance because its determination that the Bowmans failed to

demonstrate resulting prejudice was not arbitrary or unreasonable. See Bearchild v.

Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting forth standard of review

and explaining that the movant must show prejudice resulting from the denial of a

continuance).

2 24-3063 We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3063