Bowman v. Melton

5 Ky. 151
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJuly 1, 1810
StatusPublished

This text of 5 Ky. 151 (Bowman v. Melton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowman v. Melton, 5 Ky. 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1810).

Opinion

OPINION of the Court, by

Judge Wallace.

ín this suit Melton bolds the elder legal title to the land in contest; which he ought not to he compelled to relinquish, until Bowman, who was the complainant in the court below, establishes a superior equitable title thereto. Bowman claims under the following certificate from the commissioners and entry with the surveyor :

“ April 20, 1780, Daniel Gillaspy, &c. this day claimed a pre-emption of lDOO acres of land, See. on account of marking and improving the same, &c. lying on a branch of Licking, that runs in on the south side of í ■ inkson’s fork of Licking, near Hinkson’s improvement, about 14 or 15 miles up the said creek, to include his improvement,” &c.
“ December 6th, 1782, John Craig and Robert Johnson, assignees, &c. enter 1000 acres of land on a preemption warrant, on Daniel Gillaspy’s improvement, on Hinkson’s fork, a branch of Licking, running in on the south side, near Hinkson’s improvement, and about 13 or 14 miles up the branch, to begin on a southwestern branch thereof on the west. The said Daniel has a cabin standing about three-fourths of a mile from the mouth, 40 poles above the cabin, thence to run such courses and distances as to include the quantity in a square figure, with the branch running through the middle thereof, including his improvement.”

It is proper here to premise, that as to every preemption right obtained for marking and improving the land, the entry with the surveyor will bind the owner, or he will have the advantage of it, as the case may require, for the reasons assigned in the cases M'Clenahan vs. Litton, (Hugh. 181) Bryan and Owings vs. Wallace, &c. (Hugh. 209, 210) which have heretofore been decided by this court. So that the certificate cannot be admitted to aid or explain the entry with the surveyor, or otherwise be of any advantage, only to support the dignity of the cljdm. And in this respect Gillaspy’s certificate is not material in the present suit, because Melton’s entry is younger than the one which has just fecea reoiled. Indeed it would be hard, that eeitifi-[152]*152cates of {his kind should have any other effect than the one which has just been mentioned ; inasmuch as they were not of record with the surveyor, nor otherwise ac* cessible to other locators, whilst any vacant lands remained to be elite red, without travelling to the register’s office at Richmond in Virginia. Therefore, the court must proceed to consider the entry in question without regarding the certificated

It ought to be presumed that Licking (a large and extensive watercourse) and all its principal prongs were very notorious when this entrv was made : and it it abundant!}' proven that Hinkson’s fork of Licking was then well known by that name.

It is further proven that Ruddle’s Station was situated on the north bank of Hinkson’s fork ; and that John Hinkson had an improvement on its south bank, and nearly opposite to the station ; and that they were both known to the generality of those who were conversant in that quarter of the country at the time, and long before this entry was made. But Ruddle’s Station is not called for in the entry ; which was necessary to identify the improvement which was intended. And by the clause in the entry, “ on Hinkson’s fork, a branch of Licking, running in on the south side near Hinkson’s improvement,” ii is contended that other locators would have conceived that an improvement near the mouth of Hinkston’s fork, belonging to some person named Hink-son, was meant; and moreover, by the call, “ about 13 or 14 miles up the branch,” would have been understood that Giliaspy’s improvement was*about that distance up Hinkson’s fork, a branch of main Licking.

But, on the reverse, it is Contended that, from th? testimony in the cause, it satisfactorily appears, that during the period in which this entry was mads, the inhabitants of Bryan’s Station, and others who resided the most contiguous, and were the most conversant with Ruddle’s Station, frequently called it Licking Station ; and Hinkson’s fork, which passed by it, they called Licking; and it is further proven that there is a Smaller watercourse which empties into Hinkson’s on the southwardly side, about 400 poles above John Hink-son’s improvement, the mouth of which is nigher that. Improvement than the mouth of any other stream of con» si&rabie size, aad which, behw its three forks, wM [153]*153then well known by the ríame of Hinkson’s Mill creek, and that one of those forks was called TownseriS’s run ur creek; and that it ought to be presumed that this was tl»e main or principal fork, because it appears that ■⅛ name of this fork has latterly been extended to the whole stream.

It seems to the court highly probable that the composer ot this entry, by the expression Licking meant Hink-son’s fork, and by the expression H ink son’s fork he meant the watercourse which has generally been distinguished by the name of Townsend’s run. But to say die least, it must be conceded that when two or more names are given to any object, an uncertainty is produced which will lead to deception in describing it by either of those names, unless accompanied by some explanation. And in the clause of this entry now under consideration, there are two instances of this kind, which must be fatal to the entry, unless it contain some explanatory call to remove the uncertainty.

The next clause of the entry is, about thirteen or fourteen miles up the branch, to begin on a southwestern branch thereof on the west. This clause does not contain any thing to remove the uncertainties which have been mentioned, but it produces other uncertainties. More especially, it does not express whether the distance along the meanders of the watercourse, or the distance on a direct line, or the reputed distance was meant. It indeed is not very probable that the distance along the meanders of the watercourse was intended, because it is believed that it never was usual to travel with the meanders of a small stream to ascertain the distance from «tie object to another; nor is it probable ■that the distance on a direct line was intended, because it would extend beyond the heads of that watercourse. But it is rather to be presumed that reputed distance was meant. A witness deposes that in the years 1773 and 1776, it was reputed to be 12 or 14 miles from Giilaspy’s improvement to the mouth of the watercourse ; but that at a subsequent period, he did not think it so far by some miles. The presumption is strong, that in 1775 or 1776 there was no path or trace leading from the. one place to the other. But it is proven that for two or three years before this entry was anide, there was a trace from Ruddle’s Sation to Lex-[154]*154Ingtote, which went up this creek ; but there is no proof as to the reputed distance along this trace. In this respect, therefore, other locators were left in the greatest uncertainty. It appears that the distance along the meanders of the watercourse from its mouth to the place shewn for Gillaspy’s improvement is only between 11 and 12, and an a direct course but a little more than 7 miles j so that it is not probable that the distance along the trace was estimated at more than 9 or 10 miles. And if subsequent locators had ascertained the distance of 13 or 14 miles called for in this clause of the entry, in either or all of those ways, they would have been led far beyond the southwestern branch, on which this improvement was situated.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 Ky. 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowman-v-melton-kyctapp-1810.