Bowman v. McKleroy & Bradford

14 La. Ann. 587
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 15, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 14 La. Ann. 587 (Bowman v. McKleroy & Bradford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowman v. McKleroy & Bradford, 14 La. Ann. 587 (La. 1859).

Opinions

Cole, J.

In December, 1855, James R. Bisland, one of the defendants, resided on the Mississippi river, a few miles above Natchez, in the State of Mississippi.

He was then the owner of fifty-eight slaves, who figure in this suit, and which appear to have then constituted the whole of his property.

These slaves were heavily mortgaged in the State of Mississippi to various creditors.

On. the night of the 17th of December, 1855, Bisland, without the knowledge or consent of his creditors, placed all these slaves on a passing steamer, landed them the next day more than a hundred miles below, on the Louisiana side, in the parish of Point Ooupée, at the plantation of his brother-in-law, R. W. Mc-Rae, and immediately made a pretended sale of them to James M. Motlow, the overseer of his brother-in-law, McRae.

The notes given by Motlow to J. R. Bisland, for the pretended price, were transferred by said Bisland to McRae, and by him to McKleroy & Bradford. These slaves were sold in 1856, by Motlow to Elam Bowman.

The first of the series of notes of Motlow to J. R. Bisland, having matured, McKleroy <fi Bradford obtained from the District Judge in Point Ooupée, an order of seizure and sale against these negroes, who were then in the parish of Tensas, in the possession of Bowman.

The sale was enjoined by Bowman in the District Court of Tensas.

The various creditors of J. R. Bisland intervened in that court, claiming to enforce their liens, and making J. R. Bisland and Motlow parties.

The District Court decided the sale from Bisland to Motlow to be fraudulent, null and void, as to the creditors, and gave judgment to each for the amount of his claim against J. R. Bisland; ordered a sale of the slaves, and proceeded to fix the rank in which the creditors should be paid, giving to McKleroy & Bradford only such surplus as might remain after paying the creditors of J. R. Bis-[588]*588land, and placing George S. Sawyer last in the rank of the mortgage creditors aforesaid.

McKleroy & Bradford and Sawyer, have appealed.

We consider the plea to the jurisdiction to have been waived, and proceed to determine the rights of the different parties.

We are of opinion that the sale of J. R. Bisland to Motlow, of the slaves in litigation, was fraudulent and simulated ; that no consideration passed for the same from Motlow; and that it was not really intended to be a sale so as to vest in Motlow a bona fide title to the negroes.

An important question now arises as to the respective rank of the mortgage creditors of J. R. Bisland and of McKleroy & Bradford.

The notes received by J. R. Bisland from Motlow, were transferred by Bisland to McRae, about the 2d of January, 1857, and by the latter to McKleroy & Bradford, about the 5th of January, 1857.

The creditors of J. R. Bisland, who are parties to this suit, hold mortgage claims against him upon these slaves, which originated prior to his sale to Mot-low.

It is contended that McKleroy & Bradford, being the holders of the notes of Motlow, before maturity, are entitled to be paid the amount of the mortgage upon those negroes, securing them, in preference to the creditors of Bisland, who held mortgages originating before the execution of the notes by Motlow.

It appears that McKleroy é Bradford must have had notice before taking the notes of claims against these negropr — About-April, 1856, Motlow published a notice in the New Orleans Picayune'where McKleroy <fi Bradford carried on their business, and in the Point Ooupée Echo, stating that the consideration of the notes had failed, and warning all persons not to trade for them.

Suits were also ponding, previous to their getting the notes, in the parish of Point Ooupée, and there were in the mortgage office of Point Ooupée mortgages recorded against these negroes, and it was in this parish whore the sale of the slaves to Motlow was passed. If they intended to depend upon the mortgage, and not upon the makers and endorsers, to guaranty the payment of the notes, ordinary prudence would have made them examine the mortgage office of Point Coupée to see whether Bisland, before selling to Motlow, had not covered the slaves with liens. C. C. 2428.

But oven if McKleroy <& Bradford are holders of the notes for a valuable consideration before maturity, and without notice, they cannot avail themselves of the mortgage which is accessory to the notes, independently of the rights of creditors holding mortgages anterior to the execution of the mortgage securing (heir notes.

Their action upon the mortgage is one in rem, and is distinct in its nature from their personal action against the maker and endorsers.

The negotiability of notes has been created to facilitate commerce; the protection of the holder before maturity and without notice against the equities existing between the maker and payee, or other parties, is an exception to the gen - eral rule, that a person cannot transfer a greater right than he possesses, and the negotiability of notes, and the rules appertaining thereto, must not be extended so as to effect more injury than good.

Mortgages are real rights, and are governed by certain rules as to rank from the time of their recording, and also from other causes.

[589]*589The mere securing' of a negotiable note by mortgage, cannot give to the mortgage a rank superior to one recorded before it.

If one mortgages property, not liis own, and without any authority, to guaranty a negotiable note, the mortgage is without effect.

A party taking a negotiable note secured by mortgage, must incur the risk that there may be other parties who may successfully oppose his mortgage.

The mortgage is a privilege upon real property. Before the property can be held liable to secure a note, it must appear that the mortgagor was the owner of the property, or had the legal right to give the mortgage ; and if he had the right, still the mortgage may be defeated as to its effect, by the existence of tacit or conventional mortgages, superior to it in rank.

If the mortgagor were the pretended owner of the property by a simulated sale, the negotiability of the note cannot give force to the act of mortgage, and thus transform a simulated sale into a real one.

The negotiability of notes cannot destroy the rights of third persons to real property, who are not parties to the note, and perhaps know nothing of its existence.

It is true that the transfer of a note, carries with it its accessories, and the mortgage is an accessory, but the mortgage is conveyed only so far as the person giving it was entitled to create it.

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Bluebook (online)
14 La. Ann. 587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowman-v-mckleroy-bradford-la-1859.