J-A15026-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
SHANNON C. BOWMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JON S. BOWMAN : No. 1263 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered August 14, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Domestic Relations at No(s): 00221 S 2016, 00661 S 2016, 2016-01738, PACSES No. 293115832
JON S. BOWMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHANNON C. BOWMAN : : Appellant : No. 1264 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered August 14, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Domestic Relations at No(s): 00661 S 2016, PACSES No. 070116084
JON S. BOWMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHANNON C. BOWMAN : : Appellant : No. 1271 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered August 14, 2023 J-A15026-24
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-01738, PACSES No 038115836
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2024
Shannon C. Bowman (“Wife”) appeals from the orders1 entered by the
Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) overruling her
exceptions to the support master’s report and recommendation and making
its December 15, 2021 orders final. Upon review, we affirm.
This Court has previously set forth a portion of the lengthy and tortured
history of this case:
The parties wed on October 12, 2013[,] and separated less than three years later on February 8, 2016. They had one child during the marriage[, born August 2014]. In March 2016, Husband filed for divorce thereby creating the divorce docket. In August 2016, Wife filed for child support, creating the child support docket. Also in August 2016, Husband filed for spousal support, creating the spousal support docket. The [trial] court issued a single support order. …
In 2017, Wife appealed the calculation of the support order to the Superior Court. See J.S.B. v. S.C.B., 2018 WL 4374650, 1464 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. 2018) (non-precedential decision). In that prior appeal, this Court affirmed the portion of the support order relating to child support, while quashing the portion relating to spousal support. …
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The order lists three separate dockets: 221 S 2016 (child support docket);
661 S 2016 (spousal support docket); and 16-01738 (divorce docket).
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In September 2018, immediately after the issuance of our prior memorandum, Wife filed with the trial court a petition for modification of the existing support order, seeking to terminate her spousal [support] obligation to Husband. That litigation began with a support conference …, then proceeded to a de novo hearing before the support master …, [and the support master issued a report and recommendation in March 2019. Relevant herein, the master specifically made calculations as to Husband’s salary starting in January 2019, which was lower than his 2018 salary because of an unconventional bonus structure. This report] culminated with exceptions to the trial court …. After further orders, … the trial court ultimately issued the order …, which … dismissed Wife’s exceptions[. The trial court denied Wife’s exception as to Husband’s 2019 income, finding it was supported by substantial evidence. The order set forth Husband’s obligation to pay Wife child support, and also determined that Wife had an obligation to pay Husband spousal support. As a result, Husband owed Wife less child support than he otherwise would have had to pay.]
Bowman v. Bowman, 798 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 462855, at **1-2 (Pa. Super.
Feb. 9, 2021) (non-precedential decision).
In the interim, on the divorce docket, the parties were unable to agree
to equitable distribution. As a result, the divorce master held hearings for the
equitable distribution of the parties’ property.2 The master issued a report
and recommendation on April 25, 2019. The master reiterated that Wife’s
child support award was offset by Husband’s spousal support award. Wife
filed nineteen exceptions to the divorce master’s report. The trial court denied
Wife’s exceptions and adopted the master’s recommendation by an order
dated December 11, 2019. This order became final when the trial court
2 This case involved different support and divorce masters.
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entered the divorce decree on March 12, 2020. Wife’s obligation to pay
spousal support terminated on this date. Wife filed an appeal, raising claims
regarding the equitable distribution award. As a result of the appeal, the trial
court ordered Wife to pay Husband alimony pendente lite (“APL”). This Court
ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order denying Wife’s exceptions to the
master’s report and recommendation dividing the marital estate. See
Bowman v. Bowman, 655 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 462029 (Pa. Super. Feb. 9,
2021) (non-precedential decision).
On March 16, 2020, Wife filed a petition for contempt, requesting
Husband provide her with his 2019 W-2 after receiving his bonus, as Husband
failed to timely inform her of his increased pay in 2017 and 2018. In
November 2020, the trial court denied the petition, and noted that the parties
must exchange their respective W-2 forms prior to February 28 of each year.
On March 12, 2021, Wife filed a petition for modification of support, arguing
that Husband’s 2020 pay should be retroactively calculated for the entire year
and her APL/spousal support to Husband should be terminated. On June 11,
2021, Wife filed a petition for immediate termination of her obligation to
support Husband. Wife argued that because of the short duration of the
marriage (twenty-eight months), the parties had separated over sixty-four
months prior to the filing of the petition, and Husband could support himself,
her support obligation should be terminated effective January 2019 based
upon the short duration of the marriage. Wife further averred that Husband
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should pay the full adjusted guideline amount in child support. On October
28, 2021, the support master held a hearing on Wife’s petitions.3
On December 15, 2021, the support master issued a report and
recommendation. Therein, the master established a child support obligation
for Husband and noted that Wife’s spousal support obligation was used as an
offset to Husband’s child support obligations between July 26, 2019, and
March 12, 2020. Notably, the master did not recalculate Wife’s support from
January 2019 to July 2019, despite Wife’s claim related to Husband’s increased
pay. The master further stated that Wife’s spousal support obligation
converted to APL on March 13, 2020, and Wife’s APL obligation terminated on
February 9, 2021, when this Court issued its decision regarding the equitable
distribution award. Of particular relevance to the matter before this Court,
the master rejected Wife’s challenge to Husband’s entitlement to APL based
on the length of the marriage as compared to the length he received support,
noting that Husband’s continued receipt of support was a direct result of Wife’s
choice to appeal the equitable distribution award.
Additionally, the support master found that Husband moved into his
paramour’s home in October 2019. The master noted that Husband was
3 In the interim, the trial court held a custody trial in November 2021, which
resulted in an amended custody order. Wife appealed this order, challenging the payment for therapy for the parties’ child. This Court affirmed the trial court’s order. See Bowman v. Bowman, 447 MDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Nov. 29, 2022) (non-precedential decision).
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previously paying rent of $925 and approximately $600 in utilities; however,
upon moving into his paramour’s home, he was no longer paying for housing
and only paid utilities at the new home. As a result, the master awarded Wife
a twenty percent downward adjustment to her spousal support obligation from
October 1, 2019.
On December 15, 2021, the trial court entered separate orders at the
three dockets adopting the master’s report and recommendation. First, the
trial court entered an order finding Husband’s child support obligation to be
$627.00 per month. Next, the trial court entered an order under the spousal
support docket that Wife’s spousal support obligations were used as offsets to
Husband’s child support obligations between July 26, 2019, and March 12,
2020, and Wife’s spousal support obligation converted to APL on March 13,
2020. Finally, the trial court entered an order on the divorce docket, stating
that between March 13, 2020 and February 9, 2021, Wife’s APL obligations
were used as offsets against Husband’s child support obligations, and Wife’s
APL obligation terminated on February 9, 2021.
On January 4, 2022, Wife filed exceptions to the support master’s report
and recommendation. Wife argued that the master abused his discretion in
finding that Husband was entitled to APL for a longer period than they were
married; in his calculation of child support, spousal support and APL; in his
calculation of Husband’s responsibility for their child’s preschool costs; in his
failure to recalculate Husband’s support between January 2019 and July 2019
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due to his misrepresentations of his income; and deciding arrearages.
Husband filed a response. On August 22, 2022, the trial court overruled Wife’s
exceptions. Notably, regarding Wife’s claims related to recalculating
Husband’s support between January and July 2019, because of an increase in
Husband’s income, the trial court noted that very little evidence was presented
to the master and found there was no substantial change in the facts or
evidence to provide relief. The trial court, however, remanded the issue of
the duration of the award of APL and spousal support to the master.
Specifically, the trial court found that it had referred the issue to the support
master, and the issue bounced back and forth between the support master
and the divorce master, but had not been fully litigated.
The support master held a hearing on January 21, 2023, after which it
denied Wife’s claim that her spousal support obligation to Husband should
have ended effective January 2019. Wife again filed exceptions to the support
master’s report and recommendations. The trial court entered separate
orders at each docket overruling Wife’s exceptions and affirming the support
master’s recommendation, and ruled that the December 15, 2021 orders were
final orders. Wife filed timely, separate appeals from each order, which this
Court consolidated sua sponte, raising the following issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err by concluding that [Wife] was afforded the opportunity for the support awards to be credited in equitable distribution?
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2. Did the lower court err by concluding that Wife bore responsibility for the length of the divorce when it was actually Husband who delayed the proceedings for thirty months?
3. Did the lower court err when it did not deviate or terminate the spousal support and/or [APL] award(s) based on the short length of the marriage?
4. Did the lower court err when it refused to apply a deviation based on the circumstances of the [p]arties?
5. Did the lower court err by awarding APL?
6. Did the lower court err and/or commit an abuse of discretion by failing to retroactively recalculate support from January 2019 through July 2019[?]
Wife’s Brief at 4-5.
Our standard of review for challenges to support orders is as follows:
We review support orders for abuse of discretion. We cannot reverse the trial court’s support determination unless it is unsustainable on any valid ground. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record.
S.M.C. v. C.A.W., 221 A.3d 1214, 1217 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Further, “a master’s report and recommendation,
although only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on
the question of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the
opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.”
Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455-56 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted).
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As Wife’s first three claims are interrelated, we will address them
together. She contends that the trial court abused its discretion in directing
her to pay APL and spousal support to Husband for fifty-nine months despite
the parties being married only twenty-eight months. Wife’s Brief at 15, 17,
20. According to Wife, although she attempted to raise this issue during the
equitable distribution litigation, this Court directed her to raise it during
support litigation, wherein the trial court found that the duration of the
marriage and support award was credited in the equitable distribution award.
Id. at 15-17. Wife thus argues that she did not waive her claim because she
could not raise it during her equitable distribution litigation. Id. at 17.
Wife further claims that the support action had no impact on the divorce
hearings or decision, and that it was Husband’s actions, not her litigation, that
lengthened the divorce timeline. Id. at 18-19, 20, 21-22. Wife argues that
her filings and appeals were merely protecting her rights. Id. at 17-18.
Wife also argues that the support master and trial court failed to
properly consider the explanatory comment to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-1(c)(2),
which provides that courts must consider the duration of a marriage in
determining the duration of spousal support or APL. Id. at 21, 24. Wife
highlights that the trial court erroneously indicated that the spousal support
began in August 2016, when it began in March 2016. Id. at 23-24. She
further notes that the support master erroneously considered spousal support
and APL separately in finding that neither one independently is much longer
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than the duration of the marriage. Id. at 23. She contends that her support
obligations should have ended in January 2019. Id. at 25.
The Divorce Code provides, “[i]n proper cases, upon petition, the court
may allow a spouse reasonable alimony pendente lite, spousal support and
reasonable counsel fees and expenses.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3702. Relevantly, “[i]n
determining a spousal support or alimony pendente lite obligation's duration,
the trier-of-fact shall consider the marriage’s duration, i.e., the date of
marriage to the date of final separation.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-1(c)(2); see
also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(b)(8) (in deciding whether to deviate from spousal
support or an APL obligation, courts must consider “the duration of the
marriage from the date of marriage to the date of final separation”). To
explain the consideration of the length of the marriage for spousal support/APL
purposes, the explanatory comment of Rule 1910.16-1 states:
The primary purpose of this provision is to prevent the unfairness that arises in a short-term marriage when the obligor is required to pay support over a substantially longer period of time than the parties were married and there is little or no opportunity for credit for these payments at the time of equitable distribution.
Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1910.16-1, cmt. G.
The trial court observed that the duration of the marriage was
considered by the divorce and support masters numerous times before the
support master entered the December 15, 2021 report and recommendation.
See Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 5-10. The trial court found that the
period of spousal support (until the entry of the divorce decree)—forty-eight
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months4—and the period of APL (from the period of Wife’s appeal of the
equitable distribution award until this Court decision)—eleven months—was
“not substantially longer than that of the parties’ marriage so as to implicate
the purpose of the applicable deviation factor.” Trial Court Opinion,
8/14/2023, at 10 (footnote omitted). Further, the master specifically noted
that Wife prolonged the payment spousal support and APL to Husband by her
repeated and near constant filings in this case:
Wife had filed exceptions to every report and recommendation in this support action. Each time Wife filed exceptions, the red [sic] result was that [the trial c]ourt dismissed all exceptions. Every time [the trial c]ourt dismissed Wife’s exceptions, Wife filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Similarly, Wife had filed exceptions to the divorce hearing officer’s report and recommendation in the parties’ divorce action. In contrast, Husband has filed some petitions in this case, but Husband never sought de novo review, had never filed exceptions to a report and recommendation, and had never filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
Further, the parties had significant assets to apportion during equitable distribution. … Wife’s attorney spent very little time during the equitable distribution hearings developing a record regarding this length-of[-]marriage issue. Nonetheless, the divorce hearing officer mentioned Wife’s spousal support obligation in his report, and ultimately awarded Wife’s 60% of all marital assets.
Report and Recommendation, 2/27/2023, at 2-3.
4 While Wife argues the trial court had the erroneous date of the beginning of
the spousal support as August 2016 in its opinion denying Wife’s exceptions, the master correctly states that the spousal support began in March 2016. See Report and Recommendation, 2/24/2023, at 2. We do not find the trial court’s mistake in this regard to constitute reversible error.
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Wife does not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to end her spousal support obligation in January 2019 based upon
the length of the marriage. While Wife is permitted to pursue her rights, she
cites no authority to support her claim that a trial court cannot extend spousal
support or APL following its consideration of the length of the marriage based
upon delays caused by Wife in deciding the equitable distribution of the
parties’ property, which resulted in a 60/40 split of assets in Wife’s favor. To
the contrary, the law is clear that a dependent party is entitled to APL during
the pendency of appeals related to matter of equitable distribution. Schenk
v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 647 (Pa. Super. 2005) .
As the master found Wife to have “caused a material portion of the delay
in processing the simultaneous support and divorce litigations,” Report and
Recommendation, 2/27/2023, at 6, Wife has not established unfairness in the
trial court’s award. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-1, cmt. G (noting the “primary
purpose of this provision is to prevent the unfairness …”).5 Moreover, Rule
1910.16-1(c) simply requires the factfinder to consider the duration of the
marriage, not adjust spousal support and APL to the precise length of the
marriage in every case where the marriage is of short duration. Wife therefore
5 We note that while APL may be denied or terminated during the appeal where
the receiving party acquires assets or income to equalize the financial ability of the parties to pursue the action, see Brody v. Brody, 758 A.2d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2000), Wife has not established this occurred in the instant case.
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has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to end
the spousal support and APL effective January 2019.
In her fourth claim, Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to deviate from the support and APL guidelines based upon the facts
of this case. Wife’s Brief at 26, 31, 32.6 She asserts that the awards to
Husband in this case did not just equalize the parties’ resources, they enriched
Husband. Id. at 27, 29. Wife contends that she brought more money into
the marriage, she owned a home prior to the marriage, and Husband
contributed very little to the marital estate. Id. at 27-28. She further notes
that Husband used his income to eliminate approximately $30,000 of his
premarital debt after the parties were married. Id. at 28. It is Wife’s position
that Husband receiving spousal support and APL put her in a worse financial
position than he was in. Id. at 29. Wife claims that despite the 20 percent
deviation on her payments to Husband because he was living fulltime with his
girlfriend, Husband still had an advantage over her by $1270. Id. at 31-32.
Wife also claims that the trial court’s decision to deviate only 20 percent (as
opposed to a higher number) was error because “Husband living in his
paramour’s house lessened his expenses and provided him a greater amount
6 Alternatively, Wife again claims that the trial court should have terminated APL and spousal support in January 2019. Wife’s Brief at 32. As we have already found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to terminate her support obligation in January 2019, we do not address this contention here.
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of disposable income to support his [c]hild.” Id. at 31. Wife argues that
because Husband was not paying rent at his paramour’s home, his total
income with his new paramour was significantly higher than her own. Id. at
31-32.
At the outset, we observe that this Court previously rejected Wife’s claim
that the trial court failed to consider her contributions toward paying
Husband’s premarital debt:
[T]he parties left to themselves their premarital responsibilities. As noted above, the master determined that Husband repaid his debts using his own funds from an account that was not comingled with the parties’ marital assets. The master noted that, for the most part, the parties chose to maintain separate accounts in their individual names, with each contributing to a joint account from which they utilized for their joint expenses (such as utilities, groceries, taxes, the mortgage – and later – child expenses).
… Wife did not contribute to the repayment of Husband’s premarital debt, much less incur debt herself to unburden Husband. We note, however, that the master acknowledged Wife contributed more toward the parties’ joint expenses, in large part because she earned considerably more income than Husband. Still, we find no error. To the extent that Husband was able to pay down much of his premarital debt during the course of the brief marriage, the same was reflected in the master’s equitable distribution scheme whereby Wife received 60% of the assets. And although the master determined the total marital debt was relatively miniscule ($604.16), the master recommended that Wife only be responsible for only 40% of the marital debt. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to adopt the master’s report.
Bowman, 2021 WL 462029, at *7. Wife seeks to rehash her prior argument
in this appeal, and in essence asks this panel to overrule another panel of this
Court. This we cannot do. See Commonwealth v. Taggart, 997 A.2d 1189,
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1201 n.16 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“one three-judge panel of this Court cannot
overrule another”).
Regarding Wife’s remaining deviation claims, we begin by noting that
the following factors must be considered in determining whether to deviate
from the statutory child support, spousal support, or APL obligation:
(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations;
(2) a party’s other support obligations;
(3) other household income;
(4) the child’s age;
(5) the parties’ relative assets and liabilities;
(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;
(7) the parties’ and the child’s standard of living;
(8) in a spousal support or alimony pendente lite case, the duration of the marriage from the date of marriage to the date of final separation; and
(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, including the child’s best interest.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(b). “The trier of fact is to consider all the relevant
factors in determining whether a deviation is warranted; any one factor is not
necessarily determinative.” Suzanne D. v. Stephen W., 65 A.3d 965, 972-
73 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Deviation will be permitted only where special needs
and/or circumstances are present such as to render an award in the amount
of the guideline figure unjust or inappropriate.” Ileiwat v. Labadi, 233 A.3d
853, 861 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
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Here, the master recognized that Husband moved into his paramour’s
home in October 2019. Master’s Report and Recommendation, 12/15/2021,
at 13. The master noted that Husband’s paramour had a salary of $72,568,
and that Husband benefited financially from the move because he no longer
had to make rental payments. Id. at 13-14. The master further observed,
however, that Husband was paying utilities at his paramour’s home, totaling
$600 per month. See id. at 14; see also id. at 16 (noting that Wife and
Husband had similar monthly utilities costs). Further, finding that the
difference in net income between the parties was $1781.02 per month in
2019, and that Husband had no housing liability while Wife had a mortgage
payment of $1400 per month, the master concluded that reducing Wife’s net
income by the entire mortgage amount would be unjust and inappropriate
because it does not recognize the difference in the parties’ basic expenses.
See id. at 16. Therefore, the master recommended a downward adjustment
of 20 percent for Wife’s spousal support, which reduced her obligation from
$712 per month to $570 per month. Id. at 17, 21-22.
The trial court adopted the master’s recommendation and addressed
Wife’s claim of error as follows:
Wife’s [sic] was granted a 20% downward deviation to her APL obligation based on Husband’s living arrangements [with his paramour], beginning in October 2019. Wife has previously requested a termination in her support obligation to Husband in seven prior petitions.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 1994)[,] that “[d]eviation will be
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permitted only where special needs and/or circumstances are present such as to render an award in the amount of the guidance figure unjust or inappropriate.” Here, [the trial court finds] there are no special needs or new circumstances present to justify a deviation in support awards beyond the 20% downward deviation in Wife’s APL obligation that has already been granted.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/2022, at 5 (footnote omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, as Wife does not
cite to any special circumstances that would require further deviation. See
Ileiwat, 233 A.3d at 861. Moreover, although Wife claims that the 20 percent
downward deviation was not adequate, she fails to support her claim with any
evidence of record aside from Husband’s lack of a rental payment. To that
end, Wife fails to present any calculation or citation to the record that the
deviation granted to her did not account for Husband’s reduced cost of living
and the parties’ specific circumstances. Likewise, Wife does not support her
claims that her payment of spousal support and APL placed Husband in a
superior income level compared to her own with any evidence of record.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude Wife’s fourth claim is without merit.
In her fifth claim, Wife contends that the trial court erred in awarding
APL to Husband between March 2020 and February 2021. Wife’s Brief at 32.
Wife argues that in January 2019, the divorce hearings had concluded, and
that the remaining time until the entry of the divorce decree was waiting for
court rulings. Id. at 33-34. According to Wife, because there was little active
litigation, the parties were on equal footing after January 2019. Id. at 34.
Wife claims that the payment of APL put Husband in a position of financial
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advantage over her in the amount of $1270 per month. Id. Wife asserts that
the master found that Husband was entitled to further support because she
had filed an appeal, and that such a finding contradicts the Divorce Code in
that support awards must be non-confiscatory and APL is to provide financial
resources to parties who require it. Id. at 35-36.
By way of background:
[APL] is an order for temporary support granted to a spouse during the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding. [APL] is designed to help the dependent spouse maintain the standard of living enjoyed while living with the independent spouse. Also, and perhaps more importantly, [APL] is based on the need of one party to have equal financial resources to pursue a divorce proceeding when, in theory, the other party has major assets which are the financial sinews of domestic warfare. [APL] is thus not dependent on the status of the party as being a spouse or being remarried but is based, rather, on the state of the litigation.... [T]he purpose of [APL] is to provide the dependent spouse equal standing during the course of the divorce proceeding .... [APL] focuses on the ability of the individual who receives the [APL] during the course of the litigation to defend her/himself, and the only issue is whether the amount is reasonable for the purpose, which turns on the economic resources available to the spouse.
Schenk, 880 A.2d at 644–45 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
While APL typically ends at the award of the divorce decree, which also should be the point at which equitable distribution has been determined, if an appeal is pending on matters of equitable distribution, despite the entry of the decree, APL will continue throughout the appeal process and any remand until a final Order has been entered.
Id. at 647 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Although APL does not
continue automatically throughout a discretionary appeal, “public policy
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requires that the dependent party be entitled to support during the pendency
of appeals as of right.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
Here, Husband was entitled to spousal support until the entry of the
divorce decree pursuant to guideline calculations. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-4
(providing formula for support calculation). Additionally, Wife does not
dispute that, at the time the divorce decree was entered, her appeal on
matters of equitable distribution was pending before this Court. Therefore,
Husband was entitled to receive APL until the resolution of the equitable
distribution claims on appeal. See Schenk, 880 A.2d at 647 (noting that wife
was entitled to APL during the pendency of the appeal on the equitable
distribution matters, and upon this Court’s resolution of the appeal APL would
cease). Further, the calculation and analysis of APL is the “same as the
calculation and analysis of spousal support.” Master’s Report and
Recommendation, 12/15/2021, at 21. Wife has not cited to any evidence to
support her contention that Husband had a financial advantage over her as a
result of the APL payments. See Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1910.16-1(d) (“If the trier-
of-fact determines that a party has a duty to pay support, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the guideline-calculated support obligation is the correct
support obligation.”). Wife has not established any change in circumstances
aside from Husband moving into his paramour’s home, and the trial court
accounted for this change by deviating her APL obligation downward twenty
percent. Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to find that the trial court
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abused its discretion in awarding Husband APL. See Schenk, 880 A.2d at
647.
In her final claim, Wife argues that the trial court erred in its
determination of the parties’ support obligations from January 2019 to July
2019 because it failed to properly calculate Husband’s income. Wife’s Brief at
36. Wife asserts that Husband misrepresented his bonus pay and that the
trial court used Husband’s speculative testimony about his 2019 pay rather
than the pay listed in Husband’s 2018 W-2 form. Id. at 37-38. Wife contends
that her contempt filing to obtain Husband’s 2019 W-2 was merely a means
of forcing Husband to reveal his income, but without this information, she
could not file a modification petition. Id. at 38. Wife seeks to have the case
remanded for a recalculation of the support awards. Id. at 39.
When the issue pertaining to Husband’s 2019 income was initially
raised before the court, the trial court found that Husband’s 2019 was, in fact,
less than his 2018 income and that “substantial evidence was presented at
the hearing to show that 2018 was an anomalous year in terms of []Husband’s
employment income.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/2020, at 19. As it relates to
Wife’s most recent attempt to have the trial court recalculate Husband’s 2019
income, based on his 2019 W-2, the trial court observed that “[t]he [s]upport
[m]aster found that little evidence was presented on this issue during the
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[s]upport hearing on October 28, 2021.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2023, at
7.7
Addressing Wife’s claim in 2019—that Husband’s 2019 income should
be the same as his 2018 income—the support master found:
[Husband] still works for the same employer, DHL Supply Chain (DHL). His current salary is $74,883 per year. However, in 2018 [Husband’s] W-2 wages totaled $85,538. [Husband] claims that discrepancy of over $10,000 is the result of new policies at DHL regarding bonus structures. In December 2017, DHL decided to increase base pay for many of their employees, while at the same time reducing the expected bonus pay. DHL’s intention was that for most employees the combined total of base pay plus bonus pay would be very similar, with only the proportions being different. However, this caused a one-year anomaly in reported W-2 earnings because in 2018 [Husband] was already receiving the increased base pay, but the bonus pay he received in 2018 was based on the pay structure as it existed in 2017. in short, for that one year [Husband] got the best of both worlds — an increase in his base pay and a large bonus structure.
[Husband] estimated his 2018 bonus (which he will receive in 2019) as possibly being as low as $1000. l find that estimate to be suspiciously low. The paperwork that DHL gave to their employees in 2017 detailed the maximum target bonus under the new structure, which it set at 7.5% of the employee's salary. Thus, [Husband’s] maximum bonus should be very close to $5,616. [Husband] credibly testified that he knows his scores for 2018, and he knows those scores will not give him a maximum bonus. Thus, imputing the full $5,616 to [Husband] would almost certainly set [Husband’s] income too high; but I think that imputing only $1,000 would likely set [Husband’s] income too low. For purposes of support, I recommend erring on the side of caution and estimating [Husband’s] bonus at $4,000 in 2019, ____________________________________________
7 The trial court noted that this issue should have been handled in Wife’s contempt petition filed in March 2020. However, our review of this petition demonstrates that Wife sought Husband’s W-2 forms in a timely manner, and that Wife is not attempting to relitigate the issue before this Court. See Petition for Contempt, 3/16/2020.
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meaning his total annual gross income available for support this year will be $78,883.
However, that does not address the higher pay that [Husband] received in 2018. [Wife] filed her first petition in May 2017. Between that filing date and December 31, 2017, there is no indication [Husband’s] income differed materially from the income that had been used previously. Thus, during that time there was no material change in circumstances, so the previous obligation should remain in place. In contrast, between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, it is clear that [Husband’s] support obligation must be based on the actual income he earned that year. With annual gross income of $85,538, in 2018 [Husband’s] net income available for support was $5,278.63 per month. Then, from January 1, 2019, and forward his obligation should be based on the $78,883 per year in anticipated earnings. At that level of annual income, [Husband’s] net income available for support is $4,921.81 per month.
Master’s Report and Recommendation, 3/29/2019, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted);
The master’s recommendation was supported by the competent
evidence of record. See N.T., 1/23/2019, at 26-28 (wherein Husband testified
to the change in bonus structure at his job and the change in his pay
structure). As Wife does not cite to any new evidence establishing a changed
circumstances relating to the calculation of Husband’s income from January to
July 2019, we reject her claim. Wife seeks to rehash her argument that the
trial court speculated as to Husband’s income; based upon the record before
this Court, we find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Wife’s final claim is
without merit.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/13/2024
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