Bowlin, Nicole D. v. Servall Pest Control

2020 TN WC 63
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJuly 1, 2020
Docket2017-07-0224
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 63 (Bowlin, Nicole D. v. Servall Pest Control) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowlin, Nicole D. v. Servall Pest Control, 2020 TN WC 63 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT JACKSON

NICOLE D. BOWLIN, ) Docket No. 2017-07-0224 Employee, ) v. ) SERVALL PEST CONTROL, ) State File No. 76010-2016 Employer, ) and ) ACCIDENT FUND INS. CO., ) Judge Allen Phillips Carrier. )

COMPENSATION ORDER

This case came before the Court by telephone on June 19, 2020, for a Compensation Hearing to determine whether Servall must pay an attorney’s fee on disputed medical benefits. The Court declines to order Servall to pay a fee for the following reasons.

History of Claim

After an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered an Expedited Hearing Order for Medical Benefits in which it held Ms. Bowlin would likely prevail in establishing a compensable injury. It ordered Servall to provide Ms. Bowlin medical treatment and to pay medical bills of $89,377.37. The Court also awarded Ms. Bowlin a twenty-percent attorney fee of those bills under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a)(1) (2019).

Servall appealed, and the Appeals Board affirmed the Court’s holding that Ms. Bowlin would likely prevail on compensability. Bowlin v. Servall. LLC, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *12 (Feb. 18, 2018). However, the Board vacated the fee award, holding that, “[t]here is nothing about the circumstances of this case that would remove it from the rule requiring highly unusual circumstances to warrant an award of attorney’s fees at an interlocutory stage of the case.” Id. at *15, citing Thompson v. Comcast Corp., 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at*29 (Jan. 30, 2018). Thus, the Board

1 found it was “premature” for the Court to award attorney’s fees on the disputed medical bills at the Expedited Hearing. Id. at *15.

In June 2020, the parties settled the case but informed the Court that Servall did not agree to pay attorney’s fees on the medical bills. So, the Court set a Compensation Hearing to resolve the issue and consider the terms of the settlement. The Court also asked the parties to brief the attorney’s fee issue.

At the Compensation Hearing, the Court found the settlement secured Ms. Bowlin substantially the benefits to which she was entitled under law. The parties also stipulated that Servall had paid the contested medical bills under the Fee Schedule.

As to the fee dispute, Servall questioned the Court’s authority to award attorney’s fees on medical bills. Alternatively, it argued that if the Court were to award a fee, then it should be twenty percent of the amount Servall paid under the Fee Schedule and not twenty percent of the full amount.

Ms. Bowlin argued that Langford v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tenn. 1993) allows attorney’s fees on a “recovery or award” of contested medical expenses. Further, in Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., No. 01S01-9707-CV-0014, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Worker’s Comp. Panel Jan. 26, 1998), the Panel held an attorney’s fee on contested medical bills should be based on the total amount awarded at trial rather than on a reduced amount later agreed to by a provider. Thus, she requested the Court order Servall to pay a twenty percent fee based on the full amount of the medical bills.

The parties agreed the full amount of the medical bills was $89,337.37 and that Servall paid $24,382.08 under the Fee Schedule.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A), Servall must pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses to treat Ms. Bowlin’s injury. As relevant here, the Fee Schedule provisions state, “[e]xcept when a waiver is granted by the Bureau, in no event shall reimbursement [for medical expenses] be in excess of these Fee Schedule Rules that are in force on the date of service [.]” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-18-.02(2)(b)(4) (September, 2019). Reimbursement in excess of the Fee Schedule subjects the employer or carrier to civil penalties. Id.

Here, Servall paid Ms. Bowlin’s medical bills under the Fee Schedule. The law does not require it to pay attorney’s fees based on a percentage of the award. Instead, Tennessee

2 Code Annotated section 50-6-226(a) provides that attorney’s fees are “to be paid by the party employing the attorney.”

In Wilkes v. Resource Auth. of Sumner Cty., 932 S.W.2d 458, 464 (Tenn. 1996), the Tennessee Supreme Court held the employee’s attorney was entitled to a fee for recovery of medical expenses but said the fee must come out of the expenses and not from the employer. The Court called the result “not attractive,” but held it was “not at liberty to rewrite Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-226(a) to provide for attorney’s fees in addition to the ‘amount of the recovery or award.’ Such a change would require legislative action.” The Court also recognized “the practical impact of [its] holding is that the employee will not receive one hundred percent of [the medical bills].”

A Panel reached the same conclusion in Brown v. State, No. 01S01-9502-BC- 000201995, Tenn. LEXIS 712 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 22, 1995), where it stated:

When an employer or its insurer fails or refuses to promptly provide medical and hospital care, as required, it is an offense against the purpose of the Act. In this case, the employer denied any liability until the injured worker employed an attorney and filed a complaint, though it apparently had every reasonable opportunity and the means to comply with the requirements of the law.

Nevertheless, the commissioner was correct in denying the claimant’s application for an order requiring the employer to pay his attorney's fee for collecting medical expenses. . . . Regrettably, the claimant must pay that fee out of his recovery of disability benefits.

Id. at *10-11.

Wilkes and Brown control here. Though Servall paid the medical bills only after a Court order, and her attorney is entitled to a fee for obtaining that recovery, the Court cannot compel Servall to pay the fee. Under section 50-6-226(a), any fees on contested medicals must be paid by the party employing the attorney out of her recovery.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court denies Ms. Bowlin’s request for attorney’s fees on the contested medical benefits.

2. The Court incorporates by reference the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

3 3. Servall shall pay the $150.00 filing fee to the Court Clerk under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.06 within five business days of this order becoming final, and for which execution might issue if necessary.

4. Servall filed a Statistical Data Form (SD-2) with the Settlement Agreement.

5. Absent an appeal, this order shall become final thirty days after entry.

ENTERED July 16, 2020.

_____________________________________ Judge Allen Phillips Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

APPENDIX

Exhibits: 1. Ms. Bowlin’s Counsel’s Application for Attorney’s Fees

Technical record: 1. Expedited Hearing Order 2. Appeals Board Opinion 3. Order Granting Employer’s Motion to Enforce Payment of Medical Expenses 4. Order Setting Compensation Hearing 5. Employee’s Brief for Attorney’s Fees 6. Employer’s Brief in Opposition to Attorney’s Fees

4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Compensation Hearing Order was sent as indicated on July 16, 2020.

Name Via Email Service Sent To:

Monica R. Rejaei, X mrejaei@nstlaw.com Attorney for Employee Gordon C. Aulgur, X Gordon.Aulgur@accidentfund.com Attorney for Employer

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Related

Langford v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
854 S.W.2d 100 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
Wilkes v. Resource Authority of Sumner County
932 S.W.2d 458 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowlin-nicole-d-v-servall-pest-control-tennworkcompcl-2020.