Bowie v. State
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Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARK C. BOWIE, § § Defendant Below, § No. 244, 2015 Appellant, § § v. § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, STATE OF DELAWARE, § in and for Kent County Plaintiff Below, § Cr. ID No. 0705016049 Appellee. § §
Submitted: June 8, 20151 Decided: July 14, 2015
Before HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
This 14th day of July 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court
that:
(1) The appellant, Mark C. Bowie, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his sixth motion for modification of sentence. The State of
Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
1 The motion to affirm was filed on May 26, 2015, but the record was filed on June 8, 2015. manifest on the face of Bowie’s opening brief that this appeal is without merit.2
We agree and affirm.
(2) In June 2007, Bowie pled guilty to Rape in the Second Degree.
Bowie was sentenced to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, suspended
after ten years for six months of Level IV Halfway House or Home Confinement,
followed by eighteen months of Level III probation. Bowie did not appeal the
Superior Court’s judgment.
(3) On May 1, 2015, Bowie filed his sixth motion for modification of
sentence. Bowie sought transfer of his probation sentence to Maine where his
family lived and modification of his Level IV Halfway House time to Level IV
Home Confinement. Bowie contended that modification of his Level IV time was
necessary because the Department of Veterans Affairs had determined he was
100% disabled and it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment for him to
work due to pins in his shoulder. Bowie attached a letter from the Department of
Veterans Affairs reflecting the disability decision.
(4) The Superior Court denied Bowie’s motion for modification of
sentence because it was filed more than ninety days after sentencing, Bowie had
not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, and the motion was repetitive. This
appeal followed.
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).
2 (5) On appeal, Bowie argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his
motion to modify his Level IV Halfway House time to Level IV Home
Confinement. Bowie contends that work release through his Level IV Halfway
House time constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the Department of
Veterans Affairs has determined that he is 100% disabled and he has pins in his
shoulder. Because Bowie’s opening brief does not contain any argument regarding
transfer of his probation to Maine, that claim is deemed to be waived.3
(6) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for
modification of sentence for abuse of discretion.4 Under Superior Court Criminal
Rule 35(b), the Superior Court will consider a motion for reduction or modification
of sentence filed more than ninety days after sentencing only in extraordinary
circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217. Superior Court Criminal Rule
35(b) also provides that the Superior Court will not consider repetitive requests for
sentence modification.
(7) The Superior Court did not err in denying Bowie’s motion for
sentence modification. Bowie filed the motion more than ninety days after
imposition of his sentence and has not shown extraordinary circumstances
warranting modification of his sentence. There is no indication Bowie has begun
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 4 Wallace v. State, 2014 WL 707168, at *1 (Del. Feb. 17, 2014).
3 serving his Level IV time or is being required to perform work that he is physically
incapable of performing. Bowie’s motion for sentence modification was also
repetitive and the Department of Correction has not filed an application pursuant to
11 Del. C. § 4217.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice
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