Bowers v. Hanks

111 S.E. 38, 152 Ga. 659, 1922 Ga. LEXIS 249
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 16, 1922
DocketNo. 2515
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 111 S.E. 38 (Bowers v. Hanks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowers v. Hanks, 111 S.E. 38, 152 Ga. 659, 1922 Ga. LEXIS 249 (Ga. 1922).

Opinion

Hines, J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.)

1. Article 2, section 1, paragraph 1, of the constitution of this State declares that “Each county shall be a body corporate, with such powers and limitations as may be prescribed by law.'’ Civil Code, § 6594. Under this provision of our constitution counties possess no powers not conferred upon them either expressly or by fair implication from the statutes applicable to them. When they undertake through their constituted authorities to exercise the power of taxation in any given manner, a clear and manifest legal right to do so must appear. Maxwell v. Cumming, 58 Ga. 384; Kennedy v. Seamans, 60 Ga. 612; Albany Bottling Works v.Watson, 103 Ga. 503 (30 S. E. 270); Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669 (30 S. E. 880); DeVaughn v. Booten, 146 Ga. 836 (92 S. E. 629). ’

Has the legislature granted to the County of Floyd the authority to employ and pay a county demonstration agent? Our attention has not been called to any statute of this State conferring this power generally upon the counties thereof; but it is insisted that the act creating the. board of commissioners of roads and revenues for the County of Floyd confers statutory power upon said board to employ and pay such an agent from the funds of the county raised' by public taxation. No such express power is given this board by the act of the legislature creating the same; but.it is insisted that this board can exercise, in addition to the specific authority granted .in the act of its creation, such other powers as were granted by the then. Code of this State to justices of the inferior court. Section 5 of this act declares that “said board of commissioners shall have the same powers in appointing,road, commissioners and enforcing the road laws' as justices of the in[661]*661ferior court bad by the Code of this State prior to the ratification of the late State Constitution, and shall exercise such other powers as are granted by the Code of the State to said justices.” Ga. Laws 1871-2, p. 226 et seq. TJnder the then Code of this State the justices of the inferior court of the several counties had authority, upon the recommendation of the grand jury, to levy a tax upon the State tax, for educational purposes, of such per cent, as said jury may recommend. Code of 1867, § 1281. If the grand jury at the time they should recommend the general county tax failed to take any action in reference to this tax, then such justices might, in their discretion, levy a tax for such purpose, not to exceed twenty-five per cent, upon the State tax. Code of 1867, § 1282. The educational fund of each county was under the management of a board of education consisting of the justices of the inferior court, the ordinary, and some other qualified citizen to be selected by the judge of the superior court presiding in such county. Code of 1867, § 1285. If the board of education failed to devise any plan of education, the laws in force prior to December 13, 1859, were continued in force. Code of 1867, § 1294.

It is insisted that the act creating the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of Floyd County, is preserved by article 12, section 1, paragraph 4, of the constitution of 1877, which provides: " Local and private acts passed for the benefit of counties, cities, towns, corporations, and private persons, not inconsistent with the supreme law, nor with this Constitution, and which have not expired nor been repealed, shall have the force of statute law, subject to judicial decision as to their validity when passed, and to any limitations imposed by their own terms,” and that this board can still exercise all the powers with reference to county matters, including educational matters, that the justices of tbe inferior court possessed. This provision of the constitution gives to this local act the force of statute law, and preserves to this board all powers which the justices of the inferior court had under the Code of 1867. Under this code the justices of the inferior court had authority, upon the recommendation of the grand jury, to levy a tax upon the State tax, for educational purposes, of such per cent, as said jury might recommend; and in case the jury failed to act, then the justices could levy a tax for such [662]*662purpose, not to exceed twenty-five per cent, upon the State tax. Code of 1867, §§ 1281, 1282. But this power, possessed by the justices of the inferior court, and given to the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of Floyd County by the act creating it, does not confer upon this board the power to declare what kinds of education shall be provided. The p'an and system of county education was to be fixed by the then county board of education, or, on their default in this matter, the plan and system provided by law prior, to December 13, 1859, prevailed.

The justices of the inferior court were without power tv) declare and define educational purposes; but could only levy a tax to carry out such purposes when defined and fixed by the proper authorities. At the date of Irwin’s Code the educational system of Georgia consisted of the University of Georgia, the Georgia Military Academy, the Academy for the Blind, the Academy for the Deaf and Dumb, county academies, and common schools. Code of 1867, §§ 1197 et seq. There was a board of education for each county, made up of justices of the inferior court, the ordinary, and some other qualified citizen selected by the judge of the superior court presiding in the county. Code of 1867. § 1285. This board adopted annually the school system. Code of 1867, § 1286. If this board failed to devise any plan of education, the system provided by law prior to December 13, 1859, was continued in force. Code of 1867, § 1294.

So the system of county education was then fixed by the county board of education; and the justices of the inferior court as such did not have the power to adopt the county system of education. As members of the county board the justices of the inferior court in that capacity could have predominant influence: But they exercised this influence, not as justices of the inferior court, but as members of the county board of education.

So the justices of the inferior court were without power to fix the curriculum in the county schools; but when the same was adopted by the county board of education, they could levy the tax for the support of the county schools under the provisions of law above referred to.

Under-the present code county taxes can be levied “to pay charges for educational purposes, to be levied only in strict compliance with the law.” Civil Code, § 513, par. 8, This provision [663]*663does not confer power on the county authorities to levy a school tax ad libitum. This provision of. law manifestly refers to statutes which authorize the levy, and on which such levy must depend. Richter v. Bacon, 145 Ga. 408 (89 S. E. 361).

The county boards of. health now have supervision over all matters relating to health and sanitation in their respective counties, where the operation of the act of August 11, 1914 (Ga. Laws 1914, p. 124), has been recommended by two successive grand juries.

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Bluebook (online)
111 S.E. 38, 152 Ga. 659, 1922 Ga. LEXIS 249, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowers-v-hanks-ga-1922.