Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.
In this case we resolve the issue of whether, in light of the June 5, 1990, adoption of an initiative measure designated on the ballot as Proposition 115 and identified as the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,” an indicted defendant is entitled to or may receive a postindictment preliminary hearing in the courts of this state. (See also Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d, 160, 820 P.2d 262] [challenge to facial constitutionality of Prop. 115 provisions permitting hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings]; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304] [Izazaga; challenge to facial constitutionality of Prop. 115 reciprocal discovery provisions]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434] [challenge to retroactive application of Prop. 115]; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077] [Raven; single-subject and revision challenges to Prop. 115].)
As will appear, we conclude that a new constitutional provision enacted by Proposition 115 has abrogated the holding of Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916] (Hawkins) and that, as such, a defendant indicted in California is no longer entitled to, and indeed may not be afforded, a postindictment preliminary hearing or any other similar procedure.
I. Facts
On January 10, 1991, the People filed a grand jury indictment charging petitioner with two counts of selling heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352), and further alleging he had suffered a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(3)). The acts were alleged to have occurred on or about December 4, 1990, and December 7, 1990. At his arraignment, petitioner moved for a postindictment preliminary hearing, asserting that his equal protection rights had been violated under Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion.
[40]*40The Court of Appeal summarily denied petitioner’s application for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition and request for stay. We stayed all proceedings in the trial court and issued an alternative writ of mandate to consider the important constitutional and interpretive questions presented.
II. Background
The California Constitution expressly sanctions the prosecution of felony cases by grand jury indictment. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; see also Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584, 593.)1 In Hawkins, this court concluded there is a “considerable disparity in the procedural rights afforded defendants charged by the prosecutor by means of an information and defendants charged by the grand jury in an indictment. [Fn. omitted.]” (22 Cal.3d at p. 587.) We noted that although the Penal Code provided those defendants ultimately charged by information with a preliminary hearing presided over by “ ‘a neutral and legally knowledgeable magistrate, representation by retained or appointed counsel, the confrontation and cross-examination of hostile witnesses, and the opportunity to personally appear and affirmatively present exculpatory evidence [citations],’ ” the code failed to provide a similar “ ‘impressive array of procedural rights’ ” to defendants charged by indictment. (Ibid.) We held that, “an accused is denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article I, section 7, of the California Constitution when prosecution is by indictment and he [or she] is deprived of a preliminary hearing and the concomitant rights which attach when prosecution is by information.” (Id., at pp. 586-587.)2
We concluded in Hawkins that until the Legislature prescribed other appropriate procedures for defendants indicted by grand jury, the remedy for the equal protection violation was “simply to permit the indictment process to continue precisely as it [had], but to recognize the right of indicted defendants to demand a postindictment preliminary hearing prior to or at the time of entering a plea.” (Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 593-594.) If the defendant made a timely request for a preliminary hearing, the indictment would be refiled as a complaint, thereby triggering the provisions of the Penal Code providing for a preliminary hearing (Pen. Code, § 859 et seq.). (Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 594.)
Hawkins represented the state of the law in June 1990, when the voters enacted Proposition 115, thereby amending the California Constitution. [41]*41Proposition 115 added section 14.1 to article I of the California Constitution (article I, section 14.1), which expressly states: “If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment preliminary hearing.” The issue we address in this case is whether, following the enactment of Proposition 115, an indicted defendant is entitled to or may receive a postindictment preliminary hearing under the federal and state Constitutions.
III. Discussion
A. Federal Constitutional Issues
We first discuss the issues raised under the United States Constitution, namely, whether the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that an indicted defendant have the opportunity to receive a postindictment preliminary hearing and the concomitant rights that attach when prosecution is by information. We conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates no such procedure.
Federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have long held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to afford preliminary hearings to criminal defendants in the first instance. (See, e.g., Lem Woon v. Oregon (1913) 229 U.S. 586, 590 [57 L.Ed. 1340, 1342, 33 S.Ct. 783]; see also Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 118-119 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 67-68, 95 S.Ct. 854]; United States v. Farries (3d Cir. 1972) 459 F.2d 1057, 1061-1062; Rivera v. Government of Virgin Islands (3d Cir. 1967) 375 F.2d 988, 989-990; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 5(c), 18 U.S.C.)
Nor is the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws violated by a system in which defendants prosecuted by indictment are not afforded a preliminary hearing and the concomitant rights that attach when prosecution is by information. Nearly every state and federal court that has considered this federal equal protection issue has come to the same conclusion. (See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane (N.D.Ill. 1989) 707 F.Supp. 368; United States v. Simon (E.D.Pa. 1981) 510 F.Supp. 232; State v. Clark (1981) 291 Ore. 231 [630 P. 2d 810], cert. den. 454 U.S. 1084 [70 L.Ed.2d 619, 102 S.Ct. 640]; State v. Robinson (Del. 1980) 417 A.2d 953; United States v. Shober (E.D.Pa. 1979) 489 F.Supp. 393; People v. Franklin (1979) 80 Ill.App.3d 128 [35 Ill. Dec. 121, 398 N.E.2d 1071]; Seim v. State (1979) 95 Nev. 89 [590 P. 2d 1152]; State v. Reiman (S.D. 1979) 284 N.W.2d 860; Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden (1974) 366 Mass. 525 [320 N.E.2d 877]; Chung v. Ogata (Hawaii 1972) 495 P.2d 26; Commonwealth v. McCloskey (1971) 443 Pa. 117 [277 A.2d 764], cert. den. [42]*42404 U.S. 1000 [30 L.Ed.2d 552, 92 S.Ct. 559]. But see People v. Duncan (1972) 388 Mich. 489 [201 N.W.2d 629] [providing all felony defendants preliminary hearings under court’s inherent supervisory power in area of criminal procedure].)
In analyzing a claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review. (Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 335 [31 L.Ed.2d 274, 280, 92 S.Ct. 995].) The proper standard of review, as developed by the high court, depends upon the classification involved in, and interests affected by, the challenged law. (Ibid.) The challenged law will be subject to strict scrutiny only if it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class (see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 87 S.Ct. 1817]) or impinges on a fundamental right (see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. 330).
The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether “[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” (San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 28 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 39-40, 93 S.Ct. 1278].) Clearly, the system of prosecution contemplated by article I, sections 14 and 14.1 of the California Constitution does not single out a suspect class within the meaning of this definition. (See United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane, supra, 707 F.Supp. at p. 373.)
Nor does the denial of the preliminary hearing procedure implicate a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. (See United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane, supra, 707 F.Supp. 368; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103; Lem Woon v. Oregon, supra, 229 U.S. 586.) To the contrary, the use of the grand jury indictment without a preliminary hearing in cases involving serious punishment was the rule at common law. (See Smith v. United States (1959) 360 U.S. 1, 9 [3 L.Ed.2d 1041, 1047-1048, 79 S.Ct. 991].) Moreover, the process of grand jury indictment is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in certain prosecutions in federal courts, showing “the high place [the system of grand jury indictment] held as an instrument of justice.” (Costello v. United States (1956) 350 U.S. 359, 362 [100 L.Ed. 397, 401-402, 76 S.Ct. 406].) It would be anomalous for this court to construe this constitutionally sanctioned felony charging procedure as somehow the very mechanism that denies defendants fundamental rights under the United States Constitution. (See United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane, supra, 707 F.Supp. 368, 373.)
[43]*43Therefore, because the state’s denial of preliminary hearings to indicted defendants neither works to the disadvantage of a suspect class nor encroaches on a fundamental right, the People need only assert a rational basis for the enactment of article I, section 14.1, in seeking to establish its constitutionality. “In cases where a classification burdens neither a suspect group nor a fundamental interest, ‘courts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws.’ ” (Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) 501 U.S. _, _ [115 L.Ed.2d 410, 430, 111 S.Ct. 2395], quoting Vance v. Bradley (1979) 440 U.S. 93, 97 [59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176, 99 S.Ct. 939]; see also Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19, 26 [104 L.Ed.2d 18, 26-27, 109 S.Ct. 1591.)
Article I, section 14.1, passes federal constitutional muster when scrutinized under the rational basis test. We perceive an abundance of legitimate justifications for the state’s discretionary use of the indictment procedure to initiate felony prosecutions. Among those justifications are the state’s interests in “obtaining a pretrial determination of probable cause without unnecessarily taxing the state’s resources” (United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane, supra, 707 F.Supp. at p. 373) and creating “a system in which justice is swift and fair” (Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (c), Gen. Elec. (June 5, 1990)). The elimination of the requirement of postindictment preliminary hearings clearly serves these goals.3
These legitimate state interests, rationally related to the system of indictment by grand jury without a preliminary hearing, compel our conclusion that the alternative charging procedure contemplated by article I, sections 14 [44]*44and 14.1 of the California Constitution does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (See United States ex rel. Kline v. Lane, supra, 707 F.Supp. 368; United States v. Simon, supra, 510 F.Supp. 232; State v. Clark, supra, 630 P.2d 810; State v. Robinson, supra, 417 A.2d 953; United States v. Shober, supra, 489 F.Supp. 393; People v. Franklin, supra, 398 N.E.2d 1071; Seim v. State, supra, 590 P.2d 1152; State v. Reiman, supra, 284 N.W.2d 860; Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden, supra, 320 N.E.2d 877; Chung v. Ogata, supra, 495 P.2d 26; Commonwealth v. McCloskey, supra, 277 A.2d 764.) We next consider whether a state constitutional right to a postindictment preliminary hearing has survived the passage of article I, section 14.1.
B. State Constitutional Issues
Petitioner’s assertion of a state constitutional right to a postindictment preliminary hearing is based solely on the equal protection rationale of our decision in Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584. He maintains the Hawkins holding is divisible into two parts: (1) the finding of an equal protection violation, and (2) the remedy created by the court in response to that violation. According to petitioner, article I, section 14.1 was directed solely at the remedy created in Hawkins, not the underlying finding of an equal protection violation. He claims the sole effect of article I, section 14.1, if valid, is to eliminate the postindictment preliminary hearing as a proper remedy for the equal protection violation that we found in Hawkins.
We disagree that the enactment of article I, section 14.1, had such a limited effect. The only reasonable interpretation of Proposition 115 is that article I, section 14.1 was purposefully intended to abrogate the equal protection analysis underlying the substantive holding of Hawkins.
The express mandate of article I, section 14.1—that “[i]f a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment preliminary hearing”—is inherently inconsistent with this court’s interpretation of the scope of the state equal protection clause in Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584, 587. (Cf. Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371 [Prop. 115’s “reciprocal discovery” provisions embodied in Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c) inherently inconsistent with this court’s previous cases prohibiting all prosecutorial discovery under the state self-incrimination clause].) According to its plain, ordinary meaning, article I, section 14.1 bars from the indictment process the very same procedure this court adopted in Hawkins', namely, the postindictment preliminary hearing. The inconsistency between the new constitutional provision and this court’s previous interpretation of an indicted defendant’s rights under the state equal protection clause is inescapable. Thus, in resolving this inconsistency we must apply well settled principles of constitutional interpretation. (Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371.)
[45]*45“[W]hen constitutional provisions can reasonably be construed so as to avoid conflict, such a construction should be adopted. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 596 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187]; see also Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) As a means of avoiding conflict, a recent, specific provision is deemed to carve out an exception to and thereby limit an older, general provision. (See, e.g., People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 181 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 596; People v. Western Airlines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 637 [268 P.2d 723].)” (Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371.)
To the extent Hawkins mandates that an indicted defendant be afforded a postindictment preliminary hearing, the voters’ adoption of article I, section 14.1 must be seen as abrogating that holding, and limiting the scope of the state constitutional right of equal protection (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) as it relates to the constitutionally mandated indictment process. (Cf. Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371; People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 170, 181.) Similarly, article I, section 14.1, also limits and thereby precludes a challenge based on the due process clause contained in article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, an issue not reached by the court in Hawkins. (See Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584, 586.)4
This interpretation gives full effect to the intent of the electorate in passing Proposition 115 and article I, section 14.1. The manifest intent behind the measure was to prohibit preliminary hearings in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment. The voters’ intent is clear from the words of article I, section 14.1. Moreover, this prohibition comports with the general intent of the voters “to create a system in which justice is swift and fair. . . .” (Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (c).) Proposition 115 plainly contemplated the abrogation of Hawkins as well as other past decisions of this court. (See, e.g., Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 372.) The preamble to Proposition 115 states that “comprehensive reforms are needed in order to restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system” (Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (a)), and that “we the people further find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions. . . .” (Prop. [46]*46115, § 1, subd. (b).) As we stated in Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, Proposition 115 adopted “various changes in procedural or substantive law previously mandated by this court. For example, the restriction on postindictment preliminary hearings seems directed toward our holding in Hawkins . . . .” (52 Cal.3d at p. 348.)
We therefore conclude that article I, section 14.1, as enacted by the voters of California, has abrogated the holding of Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d 584, such that an indicted defendant is no longer deemed denied the equal protection of the laws under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, by virtue of the defendant’s failure to receive a postindictment preliminary hearing.
Having rejected petitioner’s argument that article I, section 14.1 was directed solely at the remedy created in Hawkins and not its underlying equal protection analysis, we must likewise reject his invitation to this court to fashion an alternative remedy to redress the equal protection violation he perceives as having survived the enactment of article I, section 14.1.
Petitioner contends we could fashion a “quasi-preliminary hearing” for indicted defendants. According to petitioner, the quasi-preliminary hearing would be held before a neutral judicial officer, the defendant would be represented by counsel and permitted to present exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutor would bear the burden of establishing probable cause to bind the defendant over for the alleged offense.
We conclude that mandating such a “quasi-preliminary hearing” following indictment by grand jury would be unconstitutional under article I, section 14.1. Our primary task in interpreting constitutional provisions adopted by initiative is to determine and give effect to the intent of the voters. (See Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538 [58 P.2d 1278].) To do so, a constitutional provision should not be construed so as to undermine its validity. (ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1985) 37 Cal.3d 859, 865 [210 Cal.Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811] [ITT World Communications].) Article I, section 14.1 prohibits “postindictment preliminary hearing[s].” This prohibition necessarily includes postindictment yHtisi-preliminary hearings, as well as all other procedures that closely resemble preliminary hearings, irrespective of the legal nomenclature under which such procedures are cloaked. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the language of article I, section 14.1, and thereby subvert the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 115. (See ITT World Communications, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 865.)
Petitioner also asserts that this court could remedy the perceived equal protection violation by simply striking down all grand jury indictments. This [47]*47would force prosecutors to refile all indictments as complaints and would effectively eliminate the grand jury system as a means of charging defendants in the courts of this state.
The conclusion we have reached respecting the scope of article I, section 14.1, obviates the necessity to further consider this proposal. We note, however, that it is entirely unjustifiable; striking down all grand jury indictments was patently not the intent of the voters in adopting Proposition 115. (See Kaiser v. Hopkins, supra, 6 Cal.2d 537, 538.) If the voters intended to eliminate grand jury indictments through the adoption of article I, section 14.1, it would be illogical to include in that very provision language that contemplates the continued vitality of the grand jury indictment process in the courts of this state (“If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment preliminary hearing.”). Moreover, a constitutional provision generally should not be construed to impliedly repeal another constitutional provision. (ITT World Communications, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 865.) Striking all grand jury indictments as unconstitutional would render without effect article I, section 14 (ante, at p. 40, fn. 1)—the provision of the state Constitution that explicitly sanctions prosecution of felony cases by grand jury indictment. (See Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 593.)5
Petitioner’s reliance on In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744] (Lance W.) is also misplaced. In Lance W, we were called on to determine the effect of a new constitutional provision enacted by Proposition 8, providing that “ ‘relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding ....’” (Lance W, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 879.) We held the new constitutional provision did not affect the substantive scope of the state Constitution’s search and seizure prohibitions, but merely abrogated the “judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled.” (Id., at pp. 886-887, italics in original.) Petitioner asserts article I, section 14.1 similarly eliminated only the remedy announced in Hawkins, not the underlying constitutional violation.
Here, however, the manifest intent of the voters in enacting article I, section 14.1 was to abrogate the Hawkins court’s finding of an equal [48]*48protection violation when indicted defendants are denied a preliminary hearing. The Hawkins remedy serves no purpose other than to vindicate the indicted defendant’s equal protection rights as perceived in that opinion. In short, the right and remedy in Hawkins are not severable, and Lance W. is therefore inapposite.
Last, petitioner claims the equal protection analysis of Hawkins survives Proposition 115 in light of our decision in Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336. Section 3 of Proposition 115 sought to amend article I, section 24 of the California Constitution by adding language that certain enumerated state constitutional rights of criminal defendants, including the right to equal protection of the laws, shall be construed consistently with the federal Constitution. (See Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, 350.) Section 3 of Proposition 115 further provided that the state Constitution could not be construed to afford criminal or juvenile defendants greater rights than those afforded by the federal Constitution. (Ibid.) In Raven, we held that section 3 of Proposition 115 represented an invalid revision of the California Constitution. We struck and severed the invalid section from the remainder of the initiative measure, thereby acknowledging the continued independent vitality of the state constitutional rights enumerated therein. (52 Cal.3d at pp. 351, 355-356.)
Relying on Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, petitioner argues that article I, section 14.1 is also invalid because it is “functionally dependent” on severed section 3 of Proposition 115. He claims section 3 of Proposition 115 attempted to limit the scope of the state equal protection clause as interpreted in Hawkins, whereas article I, section 14.1 merely attempts to eliminate the remedy created in Hawkins in response to the equal protection violation.
Petitioner’s reliance on Raven to resurrect the holding of Hawkins is unavailing. In determining the intent of the voters in adopting a constitutional provision by initiative, the court must first look to the words of the constitutional provision at issue and need look no further if the answer is clear and unambiguous in the natural and ordinary meaning of its words. (See Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735; see also ITT World Communications, supra, 37 Cal.3d 859, 865.) Article I, section 14.1 is clear and unambiguous: “If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no postindictment preliminary hearing.” The natural and ordinary meaning of the provision is obvious: it prohibits preliminary hearings following grand jury indictment. With the addition of article I, section 14.1 to the state Constitution, neither the Legislature nor the courts, unless compelled by the United States Constitution, may mandate preliminary hearings in felony [49]*49matters prosecuted by indictment. (See People v. Municipal Court (Runyan) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 523, 528 [143 Cal.Rptr. 609, 574 P.2d 425, 2 A.L.R.4th 681].)
We find nothing in the structure or wording of article I, section 14.1 that manifests an intent on the part of the voters to render it “functionally dependent” on the invalidated section 3 of Proposition 115. To the contrary, Proposition 115 contains a severance clause that states: “If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the measure which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this measure are severable.” (Prop. 115, § 29, italics added.) The intent behind the severance clause is clear. In Raven we stated, “[t]he remaining provisions of Proposition 115 clearly can be ‘given effect’ without regard to the validity or operation of” invalidated section 3 of Proposition 115. (Raven, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 355.) Article I, section 14.1 has not been invalidated by our holding in Raven.
IV. Disposition
We conclude that under the federal and state Constitutions, following the enactment of Proposition 115 by the voters of California, an indicted defendant is not entitled to, and indeed may not receive, a postindictment preliminary hearing or any other similar procedure in the courts of this state.
Accordingly, the alternative writ of mandate issued by this court on May 1, 1991, is discharged, and the peremptory writ is denied. The order of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Panelli, J., Kennard, J., Arabian, J„ Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred.