Bowens v. Howled

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided February 3, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-01540·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

AARON C. BOWENS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 19-C-1540

OFFICER HOWELED, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Aaron C. Bowens, who is currently housed at the Milwaukee County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on October 21, 2019, alleging that his civil rights were violated. On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and attached a proposed amended complaint. The court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint. This matter comes before the court for screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Also pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $26.49. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, Plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court accepts the factual allegations as true and liberally construes them in

the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, the complaint’s allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Plaintiff alleges that on September 21, 2019, a seemingly mentally unstable inmate was placed into Cell 28. On September 22, 2019, the inmate was standing under the television in the dayroom with a hand next to his ear appearing to be having a conversation with someone on an imaginary telephone. At one point, the inmate approached Plaintiff, who was sitting in a chair, and stated that his father had just informed him on his imaginary telephone that Plaintiff was responsible for the murder of his grandmother and brother. Plaintiff was taken aback by the allegation and stated that he had done no such thing and there must be some mistake. The inmate responded that he was absolutely certain Plaintiff was the one who had murdered his grandmother and brother and invited Plaintiff to enter the housing pod gym to fight.

Plaintiff declined the inmate’s invitation to fight. The inmate seemed agitated and explained that, if Plaintiff did not get up and follow him into the gym, he was going to beat Plaintiff where he sat. Defendant Howeled was standing approximately 15 to 20 feet away from the interaction and asked the inmate to step into the hallway so they could talk. The inmate told Howeled to stop talking and call his ride because he was about to beat Plaintiff up. The inmate then took his shirt off and instructed Plaintiff to stand up so he could beat him up. The inmate paused briefly to listen to his imaginary telephone, then exclaimed loudly, “I’m gonna kill him” and advanced toward Plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted to get up to move away, but the inmate grabbed Plaintiff by the neck and forced him back down in the chair. Plaintiff then proceeded to defend himself against the

inmate’s physical assault. Plaintiff claims that, while he was being physically assaulted by the inmate, Defendant Howeled failed to intervene. Even when he witnessed the unmistakable signs of aggression being displayed by the inmate preceding his assault on Plaintiff, Defendant Howeled did not radio for assistance, instruct the inmate to lock in his cell, or prevent an escalation of the hostile situation. Plaintiff asserts that instead, Defendant Howeled allowed the inmate’s aggression to progress until culminating into the assault. Plaintiff alleges that, eventually, Officer Oliaz radioed for additional officers who, upon their arrival, had to deploy a taser against the inmate to subdue him and gain his compliance. Following the assault, Plaintiff was assessed by medical staff. Plaintiff had a busted lip and reported neck and back pain as well as a severe headache. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dobson failed to conduct a meaningful review of Plaintiff’s grievance appeal. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Plaintiff claims Defendant Howeled failed to protect him from the inmate’s attack. The

Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and imposes a duty on jail officials to ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and to take reasonable measures to guarantee an inmate’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Jail officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence caused by other inmates when they are aware that the inmate faced “a substantial risk of serious harm” and “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; see also Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2004). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that, even though Defendant Howeled saw unmistakable signs of aggression being displayed by the inmate preceding his assault on Plaintiff, he did not take any action to mitigate the risk.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink
126 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)