Bowen v. Sangeap

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bowen v. Sangeap

76 A.D.2d 988, 907 N.Y.S.2d 693

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 21, 2010

StatusPublished

This text of 76 A.D.2d 988 (Bowen v. Sangeap) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bowen v. Sangeap, 76 A.D.2d 988, 907 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cullen, J.), entered August 24, 2009, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

[989]*989Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendants met their prima facie burden by showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Rivera, J.P., Covello, Eng, Leventhal and Austin, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cullen, J.), entered August 24, 2009, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

[989]*989Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendants met their prima facie burden by showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Rivera, J.P., Covello, Eng, Leventhal and Austin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

76 A.D.2d 988, 907 N.Y.S.2d 693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowen-v-sangeap-nyappdiv-2010.

Opinion

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