Bowen v. Fred Meyer Stores

123 P.3d 367, 202 Or. App. 558, 2005 Ore. App. LEXIS 1504
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedNovember 16, 2005
Docket03-01249; A126344
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 123 P.3d 367 (Bowen v. Fred Meyer Stores) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowen v. Fred Meyer Stores, 123 P.3d 367, 202 Or. App. 558, 2005 Ore. App. LEXIS 1504 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

*560 HASELTON, P. J.

Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, determining that she failed to establish the compensability of her left shoulder impingement and the arthroscopic surgery that she had to correct the problem. We review legal issues for errors of law and factual issues for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(a), (c). Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990). We conclude that the board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

Claimant, who works for employer as a cashier, began to experience left shoulder and arm pain, for which she sought medical treatment. The condition was initially diagnosed as “probably impingement/subacromial bursitis secondary to overuse.” Claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim, and employer accepted the claim as a nondisabling shoulder strain.

Claimant continued to experience symptoms. Dr. Walther, claimant’s treating physician, diagnosed chronic tendinitis and shoulder impingement due to repetitive use of the shoulder at work. She noted that an MRI “did show a type III acromion, which is a congenital condition but is not the cause of the condition. It may contribute, but the need for treatment (i.e., surgery) is the work related injury.” 1 Walther ultimately performed surgery on claimant’s shoulder, and found adhesions of the capsule in the glenohumeral joint and impingement in the subacromial area. She shaved a hook projection from claimant’s acromion to relieve the impingement.

*561 Walther subsequently concurred in a statement from the insurer that the removal of the hook projection of the acromion had resulted in a “type I” acromion and that claimant would be able to return to her work without further recurrence of the impingement. Walther expressed the opinion that repetitive work activities were the major contributing cause of the development of the impingement. She considered, but did not attribute any significance to, preexisting conditions or abnormalities. In response to inquiries by employer’s insurer, Walther “agreed” that, in a conference with the insurer’s attorney, “[w]e discussed the impact of the Type II/III acromion and the work activities. You noted again that the work activities were the major cause of the development of the impingement. However, you indicated that during surgery [claimant’s] acromion was shaved so that she essentially had a Type I acromion once surgery was completed.”

Dr. Yodlowski examined claimant on behalf of employer. In Yodlowski’s view, claimant had experienced an acute episode of tendinitis due to overuse activities at work, but that condition had resolved. Yodlowski believed that claimant’s shoulder impingement was due to age-related degeneration and her congenital type III acromion. Employer denied claimant’s claim for the surgery, and claimant requested a hearing.

Claimant relied on Walther’s opinion in support of the compensability of her condition as an occupational disease. In upholding employer’s denial of the shoulder impingement and corrective surgery, the administrative law judge and, ultimately, the board, identified what they perceived to be an inconsistency in Walther’s opinion: As the board explained it, on the one hand, Walther had expressed the view that no preexisting condition or congenital abnormality had contributed to claimant’s impingement; on the other hand, Walther had concurred in the insurer’s statement that the shaving of the hook from claimant’s type III acromion had given claimant a type I acromion, so as to allow claimant to return to work without further recurrence of the impingement. In the board’s view, Walther’s description of the effect of the surgical treatment of the shoulder was an implicit acknowledgment that the type III acromion had contributed to *562 claimant’s impingement condition. Consequently, the board believed that it was necessary for Walther to further explain her conclusion that no preexisting or congenital abnormality had contributed to the cause of the impingement. The board concluded that, in the absence of such an explanation, Walther’s opinion was not persuasive and, accordingly, claimant had failed to satisfy her burden of proof.

In her petition for judicial review, claimant continues to assert that Walther’s opinion supports the compensability of the claim. In particular, claimant contends that even assuming, as the board reasoned, that there was a failure on Walther’s part to explain the contribution of claimant’s type III acromion to claimant’s shoulder impingement, that failure does not affect the persuasiveness of Walther’s opinion. That is so, claimant asserts, because the type III acromion is not a “preexisting condition” as defined in ORS 656.005(24) and, thus, is not the type of condition that must be considered when weighing factors that contribute to the cause of an occupational disease.

Employer counters that, if the evidence shows that the type III acromion contributed to the cause of the impingement, it is properly treated as a contributing cause, whether or not it is a “preexisting condition,” per se. Thus, employer asserts, the board correctly determined that Walther’s failure to address the relative contribution of the type III acromion rendered her opinion not persuasive.

To establish compensability of her claim for an occupational disease, claimant must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of her left shoulder condition. ORS 656.802 provides, in part:

“(l)(a) As used in this chapter, ‘occupational disease’ means any disease or infection arising out of and in the course of employment caused by substances or activities to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period of regular actual employment therein, and which requires medical services or results in disability or death, including:
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*563 “(C) Any series of traumatic events or occurrences which requires medical services or results in physical disability or death.
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“(2)(a) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the disease.
* * * *
“(e) Preexisting conditions shall be deemed causes in determining major contributing cause under this section.”

For purposes of an occupational disease, ORS

Related

Lowells v. SAIF Corp.
396 P.3d 241 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2017)
Vigor Industrial, LLC v. Ayres
310 P.3d 674 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2013)
Multnomah County v. Obie
142 P.3d 496 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
123 P.3d 367, 202 Or. App. 558, 2005 Ore. App. LEXIS 1504, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowen-v-fred-meyer-stores-orctapp-2005.