Bowen v. Bowen

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Bowen v. Bowen

937 So. 2d 741, 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 14670, 2006 WL 2519607

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedSeptember 1, 2006

DocketNo. 4D05-3118

StatusPublished

This text of 937 So. 2d 741 (Bowen v. Bowen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bowen v. Bowen, 937 So. 2d 741, 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 14670, 2006 WL 2519607 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

STONE, J.

The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, arguing that the trial court made insufficient findings to support the $1,300 per month imputed income to the wife. See Vitek v. Vitek, 661 So.2d 965, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (stating that the imputation of income is “improper in the absence of specific findings of fact supporting it”); Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We affirm.

In Burkhardt v. Bass, 711 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), we recognized that “there is no statutory requirement that mandates any specific set of written findings before a trial court imputes income.” It is sufficient that the trial court make the required findings of voluntary underemployment and income to be imputed, and the order and record enable the appellate court to determine the basis for the trial court’s decision. Id. Beyond that, the issue is whether there is competent, substantial evidence which supports and correlates with the judgment. Id.

Here, there is competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the amount imputed based on the wife’s earnings history. The wife acknowledged on cross-examination that her earlier testimony as to the $10 per hour she previously made may have been an approximation and that she might, in fact, have earned $12 per hour, as the husband asserted. There was also testimony as to the hours she could work per week. The $1,300 per month accords with maximum figures acknowledged by the wife and is well within her earnings history. Further, the trial court made specific findings of fact that she had voluntarily left her last job and made no attempt to regain employment, although she had the continuing ability to earn.

As to all other issues raised, we also find no reversible error or abuse of discretion.

STEVENSON, C.J. and BATEMAN, THOMAS H., Ill, Associate Judge, concur.

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STONE, J.

The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, arguing that the trial court made insufficient findings to support the $1,300 per month imputed income to the wife. See Vitek v. Vitek, 661 So.2d 965, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (stating that the imputation of income is “improper in the absence of specific findings of fact supporting it”); Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We affirm.

In Burkhardt v. Bass, 711 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), we recognized that “there is no statutory requirement that mandates any specific set of written findings before a trial court imputes income.” It is sufficient that the trial court make the required findings of voluntary underemployment and income to be imputed, and the order and record enable the appellate court to determine the basis for the trial court’s decision. Id. Beyond that, the issue is whether there is competent, substantial evidence which supports and correlates with the judgment. Id.

Here, there is competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the amount imputed based on the wife’s earnings history. The wife acknowledged on cross-examination that her earlier testimony as to the $10 per hour she previously made may have been an approximation and that she might, in fact, have earned $12 per hour, as the husband asserted. There was also testimony as to the hours she could work per week. The $1,300 per month accords with maximum figures acknowledged by the wife and is well within her earnings history. Further, the trial court made specific findings of fact that she had voluntarily left her last job and made no attempt to regain employment, although she had the continuing ability to earn.

As to all other issues raised, we also find no reversible error or abuse of discretion.

STEVENSON, C.J. and BATEMAN, THOMAS H., Ill, Associate Judge, concur.

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Bluebook (online)

937 So. 2d 741, 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 14670, 2006 WL 2519607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowen-v-bowen-fladistctapp-2006.

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