Boware v. Levi Strauss Distribution Center

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided November 16, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00579·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA * * * Diane Boware, Case No. 2:23-cv-00579-GMN-VCF Plaintiff, Order v. Levi Strauss Distribution Center; et al., Defendants. Before the Court is Defendant Levi Strauss & Co.’s motion to seal (ECF No. 24). Because the Court1 finds that Defendant has demonstrated compelling reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to seal. I. Legal Standard. There is a strong presumption of public access to judicial records. Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). A party seeking to file documents under seal bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). The standard applicable to a motion to seal turns on whether the underlying materials are submitted in conjunction with a dispositive or a non-dispositive motion. Whether a motion is “dispositive” turns on “whether the motion at issue is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 The undersigned magistrate judge conducted the early neutral evaluation in this case, at which early neutral evaluation the parties reached their settlement. (ECF No. 12). Because the instant motion to seal seeks to seal portions of the parties’ settlement agreement in relation to Defendants’ motion to enforce settlement—which motion the undersigned will address—the Parties “who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that “‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.’” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. The burden to show compelling reasons is not met by conclusory assertions; rather, the movant must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings.” Id. at 1178. For example, the Ninth Circuit has rejected efforts to seal documents under the “compelling reasons” standard based on “conclusory statements about the contents of the documents–that they are confidential and that, in general,” their disclosure would be harmful to the movant. Id. at 1182. Such “conclusory offerings do not rise to the level of ‘compelling reasons’ sufficiently specific to bar the public access to the documents.” Id. In allowing the sealing of a document, the Court must “articulate the basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis and conjecture.” See, e.g., Pintos, 605 F.3d at 679 (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). Any request to seal must also be “narrowly tailored” to remove from the public sphere only material that warrants secrecy. E.g., Ervine v. Warden, 214 F. Supp. 3d 917, 919 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Press-Enterp. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984)). To the extent any confidential information can be easily redacted while leaving meaningful information available to the public, the Court must order that redacted versions be filed rather than sealing entire documents. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003); see also in re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Ore., 661 F.3d 417, 425 (9th Cir. 2011). “[T]he mere fact that the parties’ settlement agreement may contain a confidentiality Environmental Planning Inc. v. Helix Environmental and Strategic Solutions, No. 3:18-cv-02000- AJB-AHG, 2021 WL 120829, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021); see also FTC v. AMG Servs., No. 2:12-cv-00536-GMN-VCF, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 232231, at *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2020) (“the confidentiality of the settlement agreement alone does not provide a compelling reason to seal”). That is particularly true in the context of a motion to enforce settlement, as the local rules put the parties on notice that the Court may order the disclosure of otherwise confidential information as part of the resolution of that motion. See Local Rule 16-5. The logic behind this approach is clear: although parties to a confidential settlement agreement may prefer to keep its terms secret, “once they turn to the federal court to resolve their disputes ... the public administration of justice demands transparency.” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Freska Produce Int’l LLC, No. 2:19-cv-06451- RGK-JC, 2019 WL 12345580, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (quoting Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Tech. Co., No. SA CV 16-00300-CJC(RAOx), 2017 WL 2806897, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017)). At the same time, courts recognize the general benefits of keeping settlement discussions and settlements confidential when feasible. See, e.g., U.S. E.E.O.C. v. ABM Indus. Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01428 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 582049, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) (“Confidentiality of the mediation process encourages settlement” (citing United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1998)). Moreover, courts are loath to reward gamesmanship whereby a litigant seeking to challenge a confidentiality provision can defeat such confidentiality simply by requiring the filing of a motion to enforce. Cf. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 3948 Applecrest, No. 2:17-cv-01360-APG-VCF 2020 WL 2311560, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2020) (noting that “[i]f Saticoy had not acted in bad faith and signed the settlement agreement, then the settlement amounts and negotiations would have remained confidential”). In addition, courts must balance the parties’ need for secrecy against the public’s interests in transparency, including its interest in “understanding the judicial process.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 679 & n.6. Given all of these considerations, some courts have taken a middle approach in the context of a motion to enforce a settlement whereby the terms of settlement pertinent to analyzing the motion to enforce will not be kept secret, but the terms that are Eisenmann SE, No. 16-cv-01120-LHK, 2021 WL 2092944, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2021); see also Pizza v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., Inc., No. 13-cv-0688 MMC (NC), 2015 WL 1383142, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). II. Discussion. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to seal. Defendant seeks to seal Exhibits 1, 2-A-1, 2-A-2, 2-A-4, 2-A-5, and 2-A-6 to its motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. Exhibit 1 is the hearing transcript where the parties put their settlement on the record after their settlement conference. Exhibit 2-A-1 is the draft settlement agreement, attached to an email to Plaintiff. Exhibit 2-A-4 is a letter to Plaintiff asking her to sign the settlement documents and including the settl

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Boware v. Levi Strauss Distribution Center, (D. Nev. 2023).

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