J-A02003-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
WENDY BOUSLOUGH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANNY WASNEY : : Appellant : No. 392 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Civil Division at No: 2024 04183
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: April 9, 2026
Danny Wasney (Appellant) seeks review of an order entered by the
Court of Common Pleas of Blair County (trial court) granting the protection
from abuse (PFA) petition filed by Wendy Bouslough (Appellee). Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a PFA order prohibiting all contact
between Appellant and Appellee for a period of 36 months and requiring
Appellant to surrender his firearms. Appellant now contends that the PFA
order must be vacated because the evidence was legally insufficient to support
it; the trial court relied upon several pieces of evidence that were erroneously
admitted at the PFA hearing; and the length of the PFA order was excessive.
Finding no merit in these claims, we affirm.
The underlying facts of this case are as follows. Appellee filed a PFA
petition on December 30, 2024, alleging that she and Appellant had been
romantically involved for the prior six years, since April 2018. However, J-A02003-26
Appellee became afraid of Appellant due to his behavior both before and after
the date on which they split up, in early April 2024. Specifically, Appellee was
concerned that Appellant seemed to be stalking her, as evidenced by his
unexpected appearance at various places Appellee would go. On one
occasion, Appellee discovered that the passenger side door of her car had
been vandalized in a parking lot. Her car had been “keyed,” and video
surveillance of the area appeared to show Appellant committing the act.
The trial court held a hearing on the PFA petition at which Appellee took
the stand. See N.T. Hearing, 3/4/2025, at 1-54. She testified that, over the
course of their relationship, Appellant became increasingly possessive and
demanded to know her whereabouts at all times. Appellant would verbally
abuse her with condescending language; he also spoke of his ex-girlfriends in
vulgar terms. See id., at 15. There had been little to no physical harm
inflicted by Appellant, but (over Appellant’s objection) Appellee did recount
that he once, in June 2024, “grabbed a hold of [her] arm and whipped [her]
around” when Appellee did not walk beside him at a concert. Id, at 4.
As to Appellant’s possessiveness, Appellee testified that he had
purchased a Garmin watch for her as a Christmas present in 2022. Appellant
had purchased the same watch for his son, who was away at college, and
Appellant explained that he could “track” him with the device. Id., at 17.
After they had split up, Appellee feared that Appellant had also been using the
watch to learn her own whereabouts. Appellant demonstrated this by
appearing at places Appellee would go or knowing where she had gone without
-2- J-A02003-26
Appellee having told him. This behavior seemed to fit a pattern, as Appellant
had confided to Appellee that he had once broken into an ex-girlfriend’s
apartment when she was not home. See id., at 14-15.
Appellee described two incidents in which Appellant would harass her by
playing “games” while the two were driving in separate cars. In
August/September 2024, Appellant pulled out of his office parking lot and
began following Appellee down the road. He then repeatedly sped up and
slowed down but did not pass Appellee’s vehicle even after she slowed down
to let him go by. See id., at 4. Appellant followed Appellee in this manner
for about a half mile. See id., at 5.
Again, on October 30, 2024, Appellee was driving near Appellant’s home
to pick up medication for her daughter at a grocery store. Appellant then
quickly pulled out in front of her. Appellee tried to slow down to put distance
between herself and Appellant’s vehicle, but he would then also slow down so
that she would have to catch up. This continued until Appellant turned at a
traffic light and Appellee drove straight through an intersection. See id.
However, after picking up the medication, Appellee saw Appellant pulling into
the grocery store parking lot. Appellee then got back into her car and drove
to work. See id., at 6.
Later that same day, while Appellee was at work, she was advised by
an acquaintance that the passenger side of her car had been “badly keyed.”
See id., at 7. Appellee suspected that Appellant had vandalized her vehicle
earlier that day when it was parked at the grocery store. She then reported
-3- J-A02003-26
the incident to the police who obtained a copy of a surveillance video of the
parking lot.
At the PFA hearing, Appellant objected to the video’s admission on
authentication grounds and the objection was overruled. See id., at 9-10.
The video was played in court and it showed an individual (identified by
Appellee as Appellant), parking his own vehicle a few rows away from
Appellee’s car. Appellant is seen sitting in his vehicle for a moment before
exiting it and walking straight toward the passenger side of Appellee’s car.
The video purports to show Appellant reaching into his pocket for an object
and then extending the hand holding that object as he walks from one side of
the passenger side door to the other, leaving a deep scratch. See id., at 9-
10.
After verifying that Appellant had vandalized her car, Appellee pressed
criminal charges against him and petitioned for a PFA Order. Appellee testified
that she had not reported the previous incidents other than the car vandalism
because she was afraid of how Appellant would react and she lacked video
evidence.
Moreover, Appellee stated that she feared that Appellant would cause
her physical harm, and that when in public places, she would “look over [her]
shoulder all the time.” Id., at 14. This fear would compel Appellee to stay at
home. She stated that her “whole family is afraid.” Id.., at 44. Over
Appellant’s hearsay objection, Appellee testified that her mother (who
-4- J-A02003-26
Appellee lived with) would stay home often as well, to the extent that “she
feels like she lives in a dungeon.” Id., at 14.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s
petition, and a PFA order was entered.1 Appellant was directed not to have
any contact with Appellee for 36 months, and to surrender to the sheriff all of
his firearms within 48 hours. See Trial Court Order, 3/6/2025; N.T. Hearing,
3/4/2025, at 59-60. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on March 14,
2025, alleging numerous errors in the order. The motion was denied, and
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In his brief, Appellant now raises the following eight issues for our
consideration:
I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the granting of the [PFA Petition] and the entry of the [PFA] Order.
II. Whether there was any evidence presented at the hearing, that would support a finding of abuse under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a), subsections (1) through (4) under the definition section which defines "Abuse" for purposes of the [PFA] Act.
III. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the granting of the [PFA Petition] and the entry of the [PFA] Order based on 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a), subsection (5) under the "Abuse" definition, which requires proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused party, was "knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury." ____________________________________________
1 The trial court had entered a temporary PFA order on December 30, 2024.
-5- J-A02003-26
IV. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that any of the encounters averred in the Appellee's PFA Petition, or about which the Appellee testified at the hearing, involved any threat or suggestion that the Appellant might inflict on the Appellee physical pain or impairment of a physical condition, pursuant to the definition of "bodily injury" under 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2301.
V. Whether the [trial] court erred and/or abused its discretion, and deprived the Appellant of his right to due process as provided in the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, by permitting the Appellee to testify about an incident that allegedly took place in June of 2024 in which the parties were allegedly at a concert, and the Appellant grabbed her arm and "whipped her around," when the same was never averred in the Petition, nor did the Appellee testify about it at the preliminary hearing involving criminal charges arising from the same allegations as set forth in the PFA Petition.
VI. Whether the [trial] court erred and/or abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's counsel's objection to the admission and viewing of a security camera video from the . . . Grocery Store parking lot, and permitting the Appellee to testify about its contents, without it properly being authenticated by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the video fairly and accurately represented that which it purported to depict. (See Nyce v. Muffley, 119 A. 2d 530 (Pa. 1956)).
VII. Whether the [trial] court erred and/or abused its discretion by permitting, over the objection of counsel for the Appellant, testimony of the Appellee that she lives with her 85 year old mother who feels like she lives in a dungeon.
VIII. Whether the [trial] court erred and/or abused its discretion in directing that the [PFA] Order have a duration of three years under all of the facts and circumstances of this case.
Appellant’s Brief, at 8-11 (claims reordered).2 ____________________________________________
2 Appellant had, in his 1925(b) Statement included a challenge to the firearm
restriction imposed in the order on review. That issue was subsequently (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-6- J-A02003-26
For ease of disposition, we address Appellant’s first four claims together,
as they all implicate nearly identical facts and governing law. Appellant
contends in these claims that the PFA order was not supported by legally
sufficient evidence of “abuse,” as the term is defined in the Protection From
Abuse Act (PFA Act). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a).
On review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting
a PFA order, the following standard applies:
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inference, determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared before it.
S.G. v. R.G., 233 A.3d 903, 909 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Fonner v.
Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Super. 1999)).
“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence
from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance
prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519
(Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262
(Pa. Super. 2008)).
The Protection From Abuse Act defines “abuse,” in pertinent part, as
follows:
____________________________________________
withdrawn (see Appellant’s Brief, at 24), so it is unnecessary for this Court to address its merits.
-7- J-A02003-26
The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood.
****
(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury[.]
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a) (emphasis added). “Bodily injury,” in turn, means an
“[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2301.3
The evidence of abuse is subject to a preponderance of the evidence
standard. See K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. 2019). A
preponderance of the evidence means “the greater weight of the evidence,
i.e., [enough] to tip a scale slightly.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724
(Pa. Super. 2004).
In the present case, we find that Appellee introduced sufficient evidence
of abuse to support the trial court’s PFA order. Appellee testified at the PFA
hearing that Appellant had harassed and followed her, reasonably putting her
in fear of bodily injury. The trial court credited her testimony that Appellant
played “games” on the roadway when the two were in their respective
vehicles, and that he used electronic devices to track Appellee’s whereabouts.
3 The PFA Act does not define “bodily injury” for purposes of the Abuse of Family Chapter, but the definitions section of that chapter provides that the “[t]erms not otherwise defined in this chapter shall have the meaning given to them in 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to crimes and offenses).” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(b).
-8- J-A02003-26
These allegations were corroborated in part by surveillance video
footage showing Appellant appearing at a grocery store where Appellee’s car
was parked, and vandalizing the car with a sharp object. In addition, Appellee
testified that Appellant admitted to breaking into the apartment of an ex-
girlfriend. Appellee testified that she was living in fear that Appellant might
become violent against her and her family. All of these combined
circumstances allowed the trial court to find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Appellant had engaged in a course of conduct which reasonably
placed Appellee in fear of bodily injury. Thus, Appellant’s first four claims
have no merit.
Appellant’s fifth claim is that trial court erred in permitting Appellee to
testify that he once grabbed her by the arm and “whipped” her around. He
argues that this incident was beyond the scope of the PFA hearing because it
was not included in the allegations of the PFA petition and had not been
mentioned at the preliminary hearing for the related criminal case.
The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and such rulings may only be reversed on appeal to remedy an
abuse of that discretion. See Soda v. Baird, 600 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Super.
1991). In the context of a PFA hearing, a person seeking a protective order
will not be “rigorously limited to the specific allegation of abuse found in the
Petition.” Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. 1993). The
purpose of the PFA Act is to “prevent imminent harm to abused person(s),”
justifying a liberal approach concerning the admissibility of evidence relating
-9- J-A02003-26
to past acts of abuse. Id., at 982 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106); see also
Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2004) (same); Miller on
Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(same).
In the present case, Appellant’s alleged grabbing of Appellee’s arm was
certainly relevant to the central inquiry as to whether Appellee had a
reasonable fear of bodily harm. Although Appellee did not specifically refer to
this conduct in her petition, the timing of the act (June 2024) corresponded
to the general time frame which the petition addressed (from 2018 until the
date the petition was filed (December 30, 2024)). It was therefore within the
trial court’s discretion to consider Appellee’s testimony about this incident,
and then to determine the assigned weight. See Raker, 848 A.2d at 726.
Finding no abuse by the trial court in this regard, we conclude that Appellant’s
fifth claim has no merit.
Appellant’s sixth claim is that the trial court erred in admitting a
recording of video surveillance footage which purported to show him
vandalizing Appellee’s vehicle on October 30, 2024. According to Appellant,
this evidentiary ruling was erroneous because the video had not been properly
authenticated prior to its admission.
The admission or exclusion of evidence is “within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and may be reversed on appeal only when a clear abuse of
discretion is apparent.” Soda, 600 A.2d at 1277. “Unless stipulated, to
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,
- 10 - J-A02003-26
the proponent must produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Demonstrative
evidence, such as a video recording, may be authenticated by testimony from
a witness who has knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to
be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1); see also Nyce v. Muffley, 119 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa.
1956). One relevant example of authenticating evidence is for the proponent
to present evidence concerning its “appearance . . . , or other distinctive
characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Pa.R.E.
901(b)(4).
Here, Appellee authenticated the video surveillance recording by
identifying where and when the video was taken (the parking lot of a grocery
store), and how it was obtained (from the Altoona Police Department). She
identified her own vehicle in the video, and its location at the grocery store
where she was picking up medication on the day in question. Additionally,
Appellee testified that she could recognize Appellant in the video based on “his
walk, his mannerisms and the jacket that he is wearing and his truck.” N.T.
Hearing, 3/4/2025, at 10.
Moreover, it was undisputed that on October 30, 2024, the morning
Appellee’s car was keyed, Appellee reported the incident to the police. In fact,
as noted by Appellant at the hearing, there was a pending criminal case
against him stemming from that incident. This established that Appellee’s car
was indeed vandalized on that particular date, so the video capturing that
incident was necessarily created at a contemporaneous point in time.
- 11 - J-A02003-26
Appellant had the ability to cross-examine Appellee on her ability to
properly authenticate the video but did not do so. None of the facts pertinent
to the authentication of the video were otherwise called into question. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video, as it was
properly authenticated.
Appellant’s seventh claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Appellee to testify that her elderly mother “feels like she lives in a
dungeon.” Id., at 14.
Hearsay is defined as a “statement” made out-of-court by the
“declarant,” which is offered into evidence “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). “‘Statement’ means a person's
oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended
it as an assertion.” Pa.R.E. 801(a). “Declarant” means “the person who made
the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(b).
Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial unless a recognized exception
applies. See Pa.R.E. 802. One such exception is a statement in which a
declarant conveys a “state-of-mind” or physical condition “such as mental
feeling, pain, or bodily health[.]” Pa.R.E. 803(3).
In the present case, the trial court did not run afoul of the hearsay rule
in admitting Appellee’s testimony about her mother feeling “like she lives in a
dungeon.” First of all, the hearsay rule was not implicated because the
testimony does not convey a “statement,” as it contained no out-of-court
assertion or nonverbal conduct. See Pa.R.E. 801(a). Appellee merely
- 12 - J-A02003-26
conveyed how her mother “felt,” and there was no mention of any assertion,
or nonverbal conduct, by her mother.
Moreover, even if this testimony could be construed as a “statement”
by Appellee’s mother, it was clearly not introduced for the truth of the matter
asserted. The truth of whether Appellee’s mother felt as if her home was a
“dungeon” had no bearing on any issues at hand. In context, rather, Appellee
recounted this statement only to explain that she and her family had been
reluctant to go out in public, for fear of encountering Appellant. See
generally Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 471-72 (Pa. 2021)
(explaining that statement “I can fly to the moon” is not hearsay because it
“would not be introduced to prove that [the declarant] actually can fly to the
moon.”).
Alternatively, even assuming Appellee’s reference to her mother’s
“feeling” could qualify as hearsay, it would be admissible under a recognized
exception. The statement would be relevant to prove the then-existing state-
of-mind of Appellee’s mother. See Pa.R.E. 803(3). That is, the statement of
mental expression by Appellee’s mother tended to show that she was
uncomfortable remaining in her home. The logical implication of that
statement is that Appellee and her family were involuntarily staying home
often due to their fear of Appellant. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Appellee’s testimony on this subject, as the hearsay
rule was not implicated, and an exception would have applied regardless.
- 13 - J-A02003-26
Appellant’s eighth and final claim is that the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing a PFA order with a three-year term. He contends that
the facts of this case would justify a term of no more than 60 days because
no actual abuse occurred, and Appellee never sustained a bodily injury.
Under section 6108(d) of the PFA act, the trial court may enter
protective orders that remain in force for a “fixed period of time not to exceed
three years.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(d). Subsection 6108(e) authorizes
unlimited extensions of a PFA order where one of the enumerated grounds for
an extension has occurred, such as a violation of an existing PFA order, or
when a defendant’s conduct “indicates a continued risk of harm to the plaintiff,
minor child or companion animal.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(e)(1)-(3).
We discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
imposing a three-year term for the PFA order. Appellee presented evidence
that Appellant engaged in a course of conduct, over a period of at least several
months, which reasonably placed Appellee in fear of bodily injury. The PFA
Act itself does not require the plaintiff seeking a protective order to establish
bodily harm in order for a three-term to be imposed. Nor does Appellant cite
any such authority. See generally T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974, 978 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (holding that appellant waived claims of an excessive three-year
term for a PFA order by not citing any relevant authority to support that
contention). Thus, we find no merit in Appellant’s final claim, and the order
on review must be upheld.
Order affirmed.
- 14 - J-A02003-26
4/9/2026
- 15 -