Boulter v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore, LP

District Court, D. Colorado·Decided August 17, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-01459·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 24-cv-01459-SKC-KAS

MIKE BOULTER, BOULTER LLC, RALPH NIX PRODUCE, INC., and BARCLAY FARMS, LLC, on behalf of themselves and classes of similarly situated persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KERR-MCGEE OIL & GAS ONSHORE, LP

Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________

OMNIBUS MINUTE ORDER ON VARIOUS MOTIONS TO RESTRICT _____________________________________________________________________ ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA

This matter is before the Court on 11 unopposed motions to restrict (the “Motions”):

(1) Plaintiffs Mike Boulter and Boulter, LLC’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Certain Exhibits as Level 1 Restricted Access [#63] (“Motion #1”);

(2) Defendant Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore, LP’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Kerr-McGee’s Motion Challenging the Admissibility of Phyllis Bourque’s Expert Testimony Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and All Exhibits [#66] (“Motion #2”);

(3) Defendant Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore, LP’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Kerr-McGee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Certain Exhibits [#71] (“Motion #3”);

(4) Plaintiffs’ (Unopposed) Motion for Leave to Restrict [#74] (“Motion #4”);

(5) Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Onshore, LP’s Motion Challenging the Admissibility of Phyllis Bourque’s Expert Testimony Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 [#81] (“Motion #5”); (6) Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Onshore, LP’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#90] (“Motion #6”);

(7) Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Kerr- McGee’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Certain Exhibits [#93] (“Motion #7”);

(8) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Their Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motion to Exclude, and Exhibits Thereto as Level 1 Restricted Documents [#98] (“Motion #8”);

(9) Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Onshore, LP’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment [#105] (“Motion #9”);

(10) Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Exhibits Thereto [#110] (“Motion #10”); and

(11) Defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Portions of Kerr- McGee’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment [#113] (“Motion #11”).

In accordance with D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2, the Motions were publicly posted to allow for any objections to the sealing of the documents. No timely objections were filed. All Motions were referred to the undersigned. See [#67, #72, #76, #82, #94, #99, #106, #114].

I. Applicable Law

“Courts have long recognized a common-law right of access to judicial records.” United States v. Bacon, 950 F.3d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2012)). “Although this common law interest is not absolute, there is a strong presumption in favor of public access.” Id. at 1293 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The strong presumption of openness can “be overcome where countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access to the judicial record.” Id. (quoting Colony Ins. Co., 698 F.3d at 1241) (quotations omitted). Thus, in exercising discretion to restrict access to judicial records, courts must “weigh the interests of the public, which are presumptively paramount, against those advanced by the parties.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

Motions seeking restriction must “articulate a sufficiently significant interest that will justify continuing to override the presumption of public access” and must demonstrate that no remedy short of restricted access can adequately protect the identified privacy interests. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(c) specifically requires that a party seeking to restrict public access describe: (1) the nature of the materials or proceedings at issue; (2) the interest to be protected and why that interest outweighs the presumption of public access; (3) a clearly defined and serious injury that would result if access is not restricted; (4) why no alternatives to restricted access are unavailable; and (5) the level of restriction sought. The parties’ designation of documents as “confidential” pursuant to a protective order does not, by itself, justify restricted filing. See Miller v. Inst. for Def. Analyses, No. 17-cv-02411-NYW, 2019 WL 13200056, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019) (noting that, per “Local Rule 7.2 and the case law of this Circuit[,] . . . a Protective Order alone is an insufficient basis for restricting information or documents from the public record, particularly when such information is offered in the context of the court deciding a dispositive motion.”) (citing Local Rule 7.2 and collecting cases).

II. The Motions

A. Motion #1 [#63]

In Motion #1, Plaintiff seeks to maintain Level 1 restriction for three documents: (A) the unredacted version of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Defendant Kerr- McGee Oil and Gas, LP’s Retained Expert Lesa Adair [#62]; (B) Exhibit 1 attached to that motion, the Original Expert Report of Lesa Adair [#62-1]; and (C) Exhibit 2 attached to that motion, the Rebuttal report of Lesa Adair [#62-3]. Level 1 is the least restrictive and limits access to the parties and the Court. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2. Plaintiffs represent that the “materials contain confidential business information related to [Defendant’s] business practices, including [Defendant’s] marketing arrangements, and its methodology for calculating royalties.” Motion #1 [#63] at 3, ¶ 6. Plaintiffs further assert that “[p]ublic disclosure of this information [which the parties have treated as confidential in the course of discovery pursuant to the Stipulated Protective Order (#38)] would be detrimental to [Defendant’s] business operations and relationships with its contractual partners as it would provide commercially sensitive information.” Id.

The Court has reviewed and compared the unredacted [#62] and redacted [#61] versions of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude. Five statements are redacted on page 5 of the Motion to Exclude. Those statements are Ms. Adair’s “statements and opinions related to her interpretation of the Leases oil royalty provisions[.]” Statements ##1 and 2 are specific to the Lease provisions. Statements ##3 and 4, however, concern purportedly “common” practices or customs in the industry. Statement #5 concerns Ms. Adair’s opinions about the contracting parties’ assumptions. Plaintiffs’ Motion #1 adequately explains why Statements ##1, 2, and 5 need to be protected from public access. Motion #1, however, is silent as to why statements about common industry practices or customs need to be protected from public access. Plaintiffs’ Motion #1 is also silent as to why the public cannot access the redacted statement on page 7. That statement, while couched as Ms. Adair’s “opinion,” pertains to a common practice in the industry.

Then, six additional statements or opinions from Ms.

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Boulter v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore, LP, (D. Colo. 2025).

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