25CA1269 Boulder Valley v Roetto 04-09-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1269 Office of Administrative Courts No. TC 2024-0002
Rebecca Roetto,
Respondent-Appellant,
v.
Boulder Valley School District,
Petitioner-Appellee,
and
Office of Administrative Courts,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 9, 2026
Euell Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., Holly Ortiz, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 Rebecca Roetto, who was employed for fifteen years as a
teacher with the Boulder Valley School District, appeals the district
school board’s decision dismissing her for insubordination, neglect
of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Roetto argues
that (1) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally
impermissible and (2) the admission of hearsay evidence at her
administrative hearing requires reversal. We disagree with her
arguments and therefore affirm the school board’s decision.
I. Background
¶2 The following facts are undisputed.
¶3 Roetto was a teacher at Fairview High School from 2009 to
2024. During the 2023-2024 school year, she taught health and
physical education classes. At some point during the previous
school year, she had received an informal discipline for failing to
maintain appropriate student boundaries.
¶4 All Fairview graduating seniors were required to have their
teachers sign a senior clearance form — an official school
document — verifying that they had turned in all equipment, had
paid all fees, and were cleared to graduate. Teachers could verify
1 that a student met the graduation requirements for their class by
signing the sheet or using a stamp.
¶5 During the last week of school in 2024, Roetto was signing
senior clearance forms during an informal study hall. Roetto asked
her student aide to get a stamp from the office; the aide returned
upset because she was unable to obtain one. To ease the tension,
Roetto asked the student if she could draw a picture instead. The
student requested a penis, and Roetto drew one.
¶6 Roetto then gave other seniors the option of having her draw a
flower, a sunshine, a star, or a penis on their forms. Roetto
admitted to drawing a penis on nine students’ senior clearance
forms and in one student’s yearbook.
¶7 One student reported the drawing on her senior clearance
form to a staff member, who made a report to the administration.
The student discussed the incident with school personnel and
submitted a written report about it. She said she felt
uncomfortable after the incident, and, upon her request, she was
excused from her last three days of classes with Roetto.
¶8 On the day of the incident, Dr. Scarlett Chopin, the principal
at Fairview, was made aware of the drawings and immediately went
2 to Roetto’s office. Before Dr. Chopin could speak, Roetto admitted
to the drawings, apologized, and said she wouldn’t do it again.
Dr. Chopin verbally directed Roetto not to make any more penis
drawings, and she didn’t make any more after that.
¶9 A few days later, Dr. Chopin gave Roetto a nondisciplinary
letter of expectation regarding the incident. Roetto completed the
school year, receiving an award for her “tireless[] support[]” and
service as “a trusted adult” for her students. No investigation was
initiated before or during the summer break.
¶ 10 Just before the start of the next school year, Roetto was placed
on administrative leave pending an investigation into the incident.
That investigation included interviewing Roetto, Dr. Chopin, and
five other staff members. Although the staff interviews included
summaries of their conversations with the complaining student and
other students, no students were interviewed as part of the
investigation. In her interview, Roetto admitted to making the penis
drawings, but she denied being aware of any student who was
uncomfortable with them. Roetto also confirmed that she was
aware of school district policies GBEB-R, JBB, and GBAA.
3 ¶ 11 District policy GBEB-R pertains to professional boundaries
with students. It provides, in relevant part:
All district employees are expected to observe and maintain proper professional boundaries, in accordance with this regulation and accompanying policy.
....
Prohibited communication[] . . . by a staff member with a student includes, but is not limited to . . . sexual jokes, notes, drawings, . . . or pictures [and] displaying or transmitting sexual pictures, objects or depictions . . . .
In determining whether a violation of professional boundaries has occurred, the district shall consider the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and extent of the conduct involved, the job description and duties of the employee, the employee’s intent or purpose in engaging in the conduct, and whether the conduct caused harm to the student or adversely affected the education of students.
¶ 12 District policy JBB pertains to sexual harassment. As relevant
here, it provides the following:
It shall be a violation of policy for any staff member to harass students . . . through conduct or communications of a sexual nature . . . .
4 ....
[N]on-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature may constitute sexual harassment . . . when . . . [s]uch conduct is sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive such that it limits a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from an education program . . . or it creates a hostile or abusive educational environment. For a one-time incident to rise to the level of harassment, it must be severe.
Any conduct of a sexual nature directed . . . by a staff member to a student is presumed to be unwelcome and shall constitute sexual harassment.
In determining whether [particular] conduct constitutes sexual harassment, [the district shall investigate] the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the . . . conduct occurred ....
¶ 13 District policy GBAA provides, in part:
It shall be a violation of policy for any member of the district staff to harass . . . [a] student through conduct or communications of a sexual nature. . . .
[U]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment if . . . [s]uch conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s . . . educational performance or
5 creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive . . . educational environment.
Sexual harassment . . . may include but is not limited to . . . [s]ex-oriented verbal “kidding,” abuse or harassment.
All reports of sexual harassment received by any district employee shall be promptly forwarded to the compliance officer . . . [who] shall ensure that every complaint is promptly investigated . . . .
¶ 14 Another district policy — policy AC — also requires the district
to “promptly . . . investigate allegations of . . . harassment.”
¶ 15 After the investigation, the district superintendent
recommended Roetto’s dismissal on the grounds of insubordination,
neglect of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Roetto
objected, and the matter proceeded to a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant to section 22-63-302(4)(a),
C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 16 Following a three-day hearing, the ALJ entered an order
detailing his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ
recommended that Roetto be retained as a teacher because the
6 school district had failed to meet its burden to establish any of the
four cited grounds for dismissal.
¶ 17 Disagreeing with the ALJ’s recommendation, the school board
adopted the ALJ’s findings but determined that Roetto’s conduct
met all four grounds for dismissal — insubordination, neglect of
duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Accordingly, the
school board discharged Roetto.
II. Grounds for Dismissal
¶ 18 Roetto first contends that the school board’s decision
dismissing her was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally
impermissible. We aren’t persuaded. In our review, we first set
forth the relevant legal standards and then consider each of the
four grounds the board cited in its decision. The board asserts that
any of the four grounds can support the dismissal, so it is sufficient
if they prevail on only one of them. Nonetheless, because it’s not
clear to us whether the board based its dismissal decision on all
four grounds collectively, or whether it might have taken a different
action if it had considered only three or fewer of the grounds, we
consider all four of the cited grounds.
7 A. Relevant Legal Standards
¶ 19 Under section 22-63-301, C.R.S. 2025, a teacher may be
dismissed for a number of reasons, including insubordination,
neglect of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. If a
school administrator recommends dismissal on one or more of
these grounds and the teacher objects, the matter proceeds to a
hearing, at which the administrator has the burden of establishing
the grounds for dismissal. § 22-63-302(2)-(4), (8). Following the
hearing, the hearing officer or ALJ issues written factual findings
and a recommendation. § 22-63-302(8). The matter then goes to
the school district’s board of education for a final written decision.
§ 22-63-302(9). If, as in this case, the school board chooses to
dismiss the teacher over an ALJ’s retention recommendation, its
decision must include “a conclusion, giving its reasons therefor,
which must be supported by the [ALJ’s] findings of fact.” Id.
¶ 20 Any teacher dismissed under these provisions may file an
action for review of the school board’s decision in this court.
§ 22-63-302(10)(a). Our role then is to “determine whether the
action of the board was arbitrary or capricious or was legally
8 impermissible” based upon the record before the ALJ. § 22-63-
302(10)(c); see Ritzert v. Bd. of Educ., 2015 CO 66, ¶ 26.
¶ 21 While the school board is bound by the ALJ’s findings of
evidentiary fact so long as those findings are supported by the
record, it is not bound by the ALJ’s recommendation and may issue
its own findings of ultimate fact applying the facts to the law and
settling the parties’ rights and liabilities. Ritzert, ¶¶ 24, 30; Bd. of
Educ. v. Flaming, 938 P.2d 151, 157-58 (Colo. 1997). To survive
arbitrary and capricious review, a school board’s findings of
ultimate fact must be “fully warranted” by the ALJ’s findings of
evidentiary fact. Ritzert, ¶ 27 (citations omitted).
¶ 22 Findings of ultimate fact are the “exclusive prerogative” of the
school board, and “a reviewing court may not freely substitute its
comparatively uninformed judgment for the board’s experienced
appraisal of the harm inflicted on the school community by
particular instances of a teacher’s conduct.” Ricci v. Davis, 627
P.2d 1111, 1118 (Colo. 1981); accord Flaming, 938 P.2d at 158.
Thus, we will uphold a school board’s application of the dismissal
criteria to a specific instance of teacher conduct if its decision “is
9 warranted in the record and has a reasonable basis in law.” Ricci,
627 P.2d at 1119.
B. Insubordination
¶ 23 Insubordination within the meaning of section 22-63-301 is
the willful or intentional refusal to obey a superior’s reasonable
order. Ritzert, ¶ 29. It only requires intentional conduct in
violation of a superior’s directive — not a specific intent to violate
such a directive. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159. Even a single instance
of violating a directive can amount to insubordination justifying
dismissal under the statute. Ware v. Morgan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No.
RE-3, 748 P.2d 1295, 1300 (Colo. 1988); Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cornish,
58 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 24 In his recommendation, the ALJ suggested that Roetto’s
conduct didn’t amount to insubordination because there was no
evidence that she made the drawings with the conscious or willful
purpose of contravening district policies. Instead, the ALJ said, she
made them “to lighten the mood” and because she got “caught up in
the humor.” The ALJ also noted that Roetto didn’t violate any
specific directive not to draw penises on school documents and that
10 she didn’t draw any more penises after receiving Dr. Chopin’s verbal
directive and written letter of expectation.
¶ 25 The school board rejected that recommendation, determining
that Roetto’s conduct constituted insubordination because she
“knowingly drew penises on ten students’ official papers, including
one student’s yearbook,” and she was admittedly aware of the
relevant district policies and had in the past been informally
disciplined for failing to maintain appropriate student boundaries.
Thus, the board concluded, Roetto “engaged in insubordination by
knowingly violating [district] policies on professional boundaries
and harassment.”
¶ 26 Roetto argues that the ALJ got it right — that there was no
evidence that she willfully violated any policy or directive, as she
was merely aware of the relevant policies but didn’t actually intend
to violate any of them, she hadn’t received any specific directives
before she made the drawings, and she ceased the conduct as soon
as she was told to do so.
¶ 27 But specific intent to violate a directive isn’t necessary, so long
as the underlying conduct is intentional. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159.
Indeed, in Flaming, the supreme court expressly rejected a standard
11 for insubordination that would’ve required the conduct to have been
“deliberately executed with the purpose of contravening prior
directives.” Id. at 158. Thus, in some instances, it is sufficient that
a teacher engaged in intentional conduct that violated a prior
directive or a known policy. See id. at 159 (the evidence supported
the school board’s finding of insubordination when, among other
things, a teacher engaged in conduct that violated school and
district policies, she’d previously been disciplined for violating such
policies, and she’d been told that failure to follow the policies would
be considered insubordination).
¶ 28 Whether a teacher’s conduct in a particular instance amounts
to insubordination is a question of ultimate fact for a school board
to resolve. Ritzert, ¶ 32. Thus, here, the school board was free to
reject the hearing officer’s recommendation that Roetto’s conduct
didn’t constitute insubordination. See Flaming, 938 P.2d at 158.
To be sure, the board was bound by the hearing officer’s findings of
evidentiary fact — such as the findings that Roetto drew penises on
nine students’ senior clearance forms and in one student’s
yearbook and that one student complained about the drawings.
See Ritzert, ¶ 24. Indeed, the board adopted all those findings.
12 ¶ 29 And the board reasonably concluded, based on those findings,
that Roetto engaged in intentional conduct that violated district
policies. Roetto’s drawing of penises on student forms, leading one
student to express discomfort and ask to be excused from Roetto’s
class for the rest of the year, could constitute a violation of student
boundaries under policy GBEB-R, which prohibits communications
from a staff member to a student that include “sexual . . . drawings”
or “display[s] or transmi[ssion of] sexual pictures, objects or
depictions.” It also could constitute sexual harassment under
policy JBB, which prohibits “[a]ny conduct of a sexual nature” that
is “directed . . . by a staff member to a student” or that “limits a
student’s ability to participate in or benefit from an education
program” or “creates a hostile or abusive educational environment.”
And it could constitute sexual harassment under policy GBAA,
which prohibits “[s]ex-oriented verbal ‘kidding,’ abuse or
harassment” as well as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature”
that “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s . . . educational performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive . . . educational environment.”
13 ¶ 30 Because the board reasonably determined that Roetto violated
district policies and because, as the board noted, Roetto was aware
of those policies and had been informally disciplined for failing to
maintain professional boundaries in the past, the board’s ultimate
finding of insubordination is fully warranted by the ALJ’s findings of
evidentiary fact. Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto hasn’t shown
that the board’s ultimate insubordination finding was arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise legally impermissible.
C. Neglect of Duty
¶ 31 Neglect of duty occurs when a teacher fails to carry out their
obligations and responsibilities in connection with classroom and
other school sponsored activities, including by failing to comply
with school policies. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159; Blaine v. Moffat
Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re No. 1, 748 P.2d 1280, 1292-93 (Colo. 1988).
¶ 32 The ALJ recommended finding that there was no neglect of
duty because Roetto hadn’t violated the relevant policies. More
specifically, the ALJ suggested there was no violation of professional
boundaries and no sexual harassment when considering the totality
of the circumstances, including the facts that Roetto made her first
penis drawing because a student had requested it, she made the
14 other drawings after students who were given a choice asked for a
penis drawing, she intended the drawings to “lighten the mood” and
not to be sexual or harass any students, the drawings occurred over
a two-hour period near the end of the school year and involved
seventeen- and eighteen-year-old graduating seniors, and only one
student complained. The ALJ also submitted that the district
hadn’t promptly investigated the student complaint as required by
policies GBAA and AC.
¶ 33 The school board disagreed, concluding that Roetto’s conduct
constituted neglect of duty because she “fail[ed] to comply with
[district] policies” created to maintain a safe and secure learning
environment and, “by doing so[,] negatively impacted the learning
environments for [Fairview] students.” The board further reasoned,
“[It] expects that teachers will create learning environments that are
free of harassment, including sexual harassment, and that they will
maintain appropriate boundaries with students” and “expect[s] that
students of all ages served by the [district] will have teachers who
do not engage in conduct, like making drawings of genitalia, that is
specifically prohibited by [district] [p]olicy.”
15 ¶ 34 As before, whether Roetto’s conduct amounted to neglect of
duty was a question of ultimate fact for the school board to resolve.
See Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1292. And, as before, the board’s
conclusion that Roetto violated district policies is both reasonable
and supported by the ALJ’s findings of evidentiary fact.
¶ 35 Roetto nonetheless raises two arguments challenging the
board’s decision. First, she argues that the board failed to consider
the totality of the circumstances, as required by policies GBEB-R
and JBB. But there is no indication that the board didn’t consider
the totality of the circumstances. It simply focused on facts
different from those the ALJ had highlighted, as was its prerogative.
See id. (concluding that a school board “properly exercised its
statutory prerogative when, after adopting the hearing officer’s
findings of evidentiary fact . . . , it nonetheless made a finding of
ultimate fact that [a teacher] was guilty of neglect of duty and
ordered her dismissal over the hearing officer’s recommendation of
retention”).
¶ 36 And second, Roetto argues that the school district violated its
own policies requiring a prompt investigation by delaying its
investigation until the following school year. But under the
16 circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the school board
was bound by the ALJ’s supposition that the district waited too long
to start its investigation. While the board was bound by the
underlying findings of evidentiary fact as to the timeline of events,
the issue of whether the timing of the investigation was sufficiently
“prompt” to comply with the policies is, at the very least, a mixed
question of law and fact properly determined by the board. See
Ritzert, ¶¶ 24, 30; Flaming, 938 P.2d at 157-58. And although we
sympathize with Roetto’s arguments that the district should have
begun the investigation more promptly and should have interviewed
the students involved, we cannot say as a matter of law that the
board’s resolution of this issue was arbitrary and capricious or
otherwise contrary to law. Nor does Roetto explain what impact the
district’s failure to conduct a more timely or more thorough
investigation might have had on the ultimate finding, based on the
investigative results, that Roetto was subject to dismissal.
¶ 37 Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto has not shown that the
school board’s ultimate finding as to neglect of duty was arbitrary,
17 D. Immorality
¶ 38 For purposes of section 22-63-301, immorality is conduct that
indicates a teacher’s unfitness to teach based on past harm or likely
future harm to the school community. Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1117. In
determining fitness to teach, a school board may consider the
factors set out in Weissman v. Board of Education, including the age
and maturity of the teacher’s students, the likelihood that the
teacher’s conduct had an adverse effect on those students, the
degree of that adversity, the proximity or remoteness in time of the
conduct, any extenuating or aggravating circumstances
surrounding the conduct, the likelihood the conduct may be
repeated, the motives underlying the conduct, and the extent to
which discipline may have a chilling effect upon the rights of the
teacher or other teachers. 547 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 1976).
¶ 39 The ALJ recommended finding that Roetto’s conduct didn’t
impact her fitness to teach. Considering the Weissman fitness-to-
teach factors, the ALJ noted, among other things, that Roetto only
offered the penis drawing to seniors who were seventeen or eighteen
years old; the conduct was unlikely to be repeated; Roetto’s intent
was to be humorous; Roetto had been a teacher for twenty years
18 with only one informal disciplinary issue; the adverse impact on the
complaining student was “minimal,” as she was excused from her
last three classes with Roetto before graduation; and there was no
indication the conduct had impacted anyone else.
¶ 40 Nonetheless, the school board concluded that “statutory
grounds exist[ed] to find [that Roetto] engaged in immorality by
failing to comply with [district] policies and engaging in misconduct
towards students that [wa]s likely to harm the school community.”
The board explained that, of the ten students who had Roetto draw
penises on their papers, one said he wasn’t bothered and one
reported the conduct the same day and never went back to that
class. The board further noted that it “[could] not assume that
none of the other students were or that future students would not
be adversely affected because of their age or because a teacher was
trying to be humorous.” The board also explained that “[s]tudents
are entitled to learning environments free of harassing and
potentially harmful conduct.”
¶ 41 As with the other cited grounds, whether Roetto’s conduct
constituted immorality was a question of ultimate fact for the school
board to resolve. See Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118-19. And “[a]lthough
19 the determination . . . is subject to judicial review, considerable
discretion is left in the [school board] to define the limits of such
broad general grounds as . . . ‘immorality[]’ in the educational
context.” Blair v. Lovett, 582 P.2d 668, 672 (Colo. 1978).
¶ 42 Roetto contends that the school board failed to sufficiently
explain the basis for its ultimate finding and failed to demonstrate
that it considered the relevant factors. We disagree. The board
explained that its primary concern was ensuring that students have
a learning environment free of harassing and potentially harmful
conduct. And as part of its reasoning, it referenced almost all the
Weissman factors as follows:
• The age and maturity of the teacher’s students and the
likelihood that the teacher’s conduct had an adverse
effect on those students — The board said it couldn’t
assume that none of the eight students who received
penis drawings and didn’t say anything about them
weren’t adversely affected merely because of their age.
• The degree of any adversity — The board noted that while
one student said he wasn’t bothered by Roetto’s conduct,
20 another student reported it and never went back to
Roetto’s class.
• The proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct —
The board noted that the student who reported the
incident did so on the very same day.
• Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances
surrounding the conduct — The board highlighted that
Roetto’s conduct violated district policies.
• The likelihood the conduct may be repeated — The board
didn’t expressly consider whether Roetto might engage in
similar conduct in the future, but it alluded to the
potential harm that future students might suffer if she
were to do so.
• The motives underlying the conduct — The board found
that it couldn’t discount the adverse effects of Roetto’s
conduct just because she was trying to be humorous.
See Weissman, 547 P.2d at 1273.
¶ 43 Although we are troubled by the board’s speculation as to the
potential adverse impact Roetto’s conduct may have had on the
eight students who were never asked about the penis drawings, we
21 acknowledge that the board found the investigation to be sufficient
and that the board’s ultimate finding on the issue of immorality
relies on the relevant factors and is supported by the ALJ’s findings
of evidentiary fact. See Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118; Flaming, 938 P.2d
at 158. Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto has not shown that
the board’s ultimate immorality finding was arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise legally impermissible.
E. Other Good and Just Cause
¶ 44 Other good and just cause includes any cause for dismissal
that “bear[s] a reasonable relationship to [a] teacher’s fitness to
discharge [their] duties” or that “materially and substantially affects
performance.” Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159 (quoting Fredrickson v.
Denv. Pub. Sch Dist. No. 1, 819 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Colo. App. 1991)).
School boards may apply the Weissman fitness-to-teach factors in
assessing other good and just cause. Id. at 160.
¶ 45 In his recommendation, the ALJ indicated his belief that
Roetto’s actions “d[id] not bear a reasonable relationship to her
fitness to discharge her duties” and “d[id] not materially or
substantially affect her performance.”
¶ 46 Rejecting that recommendation, the school board concluded,
22 It is hard to understand how a teacher can discharge their duties to teach if a student finds the conduct sufficiently offensive to warrant not attending class for the rest of the school year, even if that only means a few days. All of our students deserve schools and classrooms that challenge them intellectually and academically, while supporting them emotionally. At a minimum, this means not being subjected to sexual harassment by a teacher and adult misconduct. The [b]oard finds that statutory grounds exist to find [Roetto’s] conduct constitutes other good and just cause.
¶ 47 Again deferring to the school board’s determination of the
ultimate issue, we conclude that the evidentiary facts and the
board’s reasoning sufficiently support its decision. See Flaming,
938 P.2d at 160. As before, the board was justified in concluding
that Roetto’s conduct constituted sexual harassment within the
meaning of district policy, in being concerned about the student
who found the conduct sufficiently offensive to ask to be excused
from Roetto’s class for the rest of the school year (even though that
was only a few days), and in endeavoring to create an environment
where students are supported emotionally without being subjected
to harassment and misconduct.
23 ¶ 48 Therefore, we conclude Roetto has not shown that the school
board’s ultimate finding as to other good and just cause was
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally impermissible.
III. Hearsay Evidence
¶ 49 Roetto also contends that the ALJ’s erroneous admission of
hearsay evidence at the hearing warrants reversal. We disagree.
¶ 50 “In a hearing of this nature, the rules of evidence are
somewhat relaxed and hearsay testimony may be allowed.”
Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831, 834 (Colo. App.
1984). Moreover, “[r]eversal is proper only if . . . inadmissible
hearsay is the sole evidence relied upon by the finder of fact.” Id.
¶ 51 Roetto challenges the ALJ’s admission of (1) an investigative
report with summaries of witness interviews from the district’s
investigation and (2) an incident report written by the complaining
student — who did not testify at the hearing — stating that Roetto
drew a penis on her form and that she left the class afterward
because she found the situation “very random and awkward.” Even
assuming this evidence was erroneously admitted, Roetto hasn’t
shown that it warrants reversal.
24 ¶ 52 In particular, as to the student’s incident report, there is
other, unchallenged evidence regarding the same facts. Specifically,
Dr. Chopin and the district employee relations investigator both
testified at the hearing that the student reported Roetto’s conduct
and, upon request, was allowed not to return to Roetto’s classroom
for the remainder of the year. Roetto also acknowledged that she
drew a penis on the complaining student’s paper and that the
student didn’t return to her class for the rest of the year. And
Roetto doesn’t cite any other facts that she claims were presented
through hearsay evidence that were not established through other
admissible evidence at the hearing.
¶ 53 Thus, even if the ALJ erred by admitting the challenged
evidence, there was substantial other evidence supporting the same
facts. Accordingly, Roetto hasn’t shown that any error warrants
reversal. See id.; see also Benke v. Neenan, 658 P.2d 860, 862
(Colo. 1983) (even if the hearing officer erred by allowing hearsay
25 evidence, it was harmless because “there was ample, direct and
substantial evidence to support” his factual findings).1
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 54 Roetto requests reimbursement of her reasonable attorney fees
and costs pursuant to section 22-63-302(e), which allows teachers
to recover their fees and costs if they are ordered reinstated by this
court and the nonprevailing party’s defense on appeal lacked
substantial justification. Because we affirm the school board’s
dismissal, Roetto isn’t entitled to an award of fees and costs under
the statute. Therefore, we deny her request.
V. Disposition
¶ 55 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
1 We decline to consider Roetto’s argument concerning violation of
the Confrontation Clause, as she neither develops the argument nor cites any legal authority supporting it. See Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 14 (“We . . . will not ‘consider undeveloped and unsupported arguments.’” (quoting Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12)).