Bottorff v. Meyer

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 23, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00819
StatusUnknown

This text of Bottorff v. Meyer (Bottorff v. Meyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bottorff v. Meyer, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TILMON TYLER BOTTORFF,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-cv-0819-bhl

CO M. MEYER,

Defendant.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Tilmon Tyler Bottorff, who is currently incarcerated at the Brown County Jail1 and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Bottorff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Bottorff has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Bottorff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). He lacks the funds to pay an initial partial filing fee, so the Court will waive the initial partial filing fee and grant his motion for leave to

1 About a week after Bottorff filed his complaint, two pieces of mail were returned to the Court as undeliverable. Both envelopes indicated Bottorff was no longer at the jail. However, a review of the jail’s online inmate locator shows that Bottorff was again incarcerated at the jail beginning on July 15, 2021. proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Bottorff will be required to pay the entire $350 filing fee over time in the manner described at the end of this order. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT According to Bottorff, on May 23, 2021 he was placed in a detox unit at the jail. Bottorff

asserts that he asked Defendant CO Meyer if he could use the telephone, but Meyer refused to let him use the telephone in the unit because Bottorff had “corrected” another officer. Bottorff asserts that because he could not use the phone, he was unable to release his personal property, including his debit card. Bottorff alleges that, because he could not access his debit card, he was unable to retain a lawyer and had to represent himself. He explains that he made too much money to qualify for the services of a public defender. Bottorff also asserts that he lost all the personal property he kept in storage, including his grandfather’s ashes and pictures. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3. On June 9, 2021, another officer allegedly approved the release of Bottorff’s property. Bottorff’s mother came the next day to pick up the property, including his debit card, but the jail would not release the property to her. Bottorff explains that “the whole time” he was not allowed

to use the phone, so he passed notes to other inmates to contact his mother. Bottorff seeks $2 million in damages and changes to the jail’s policies. Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4. ANALYSIS Bottorff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendant. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he engaged in a protected First Amendment activity, (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter future First Amendment activity, and (3) the protected activity caused the deprivation.” Harris v. Wall, 604 F. App’x 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). According to Bottorff, Defendant refused to let him use the telephone because he had “corrected” one of Defendant’s fellow officers. The Seventh Circuit has explained that in order for a prisoner’s speech to be protected activity, the speech and the manner in which the prisoner engaged in the speech must be consistent with legitimate penological interests. Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2010). Bottorff’s description of his interaction with the other officer is too vague for the Court to

reasonably infer that his speech was consistent with penological interests and thereby protected activity. While it is conceivable that Bottorff’s “correction” of another officer was protected speech (for example, if he raised concerns through the grievance process), it is equally conceivable that his “correction” was not protected speech. See Watkins, 599 F.3d at 797 (finding than an inmate’s “public challenge to [a prison official’s] directive was inconsistent with her legitimate interests in discipline and library administration”). The Court will not speculate on this point. Instead, the Court will allow Bottorff to file an amended complaint. His amended complaint should set forth facts describing his “correction” of the officer to allow the Court to determine whether he engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment. Bottorff’s complaint is also too vague to state a claim based on his assertions that he was

not allowed to call his mom to release his property to her while he was in detox.

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Related

Watkins v. Kasper
599 F.3d 791 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Larry Harris v. J. Walls
604 F. App'x 518 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Bottorff v. Meyer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bottorff-v-meyer-wied-2021.