IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 189A22
Filed 23 August 2024
BOTTOMS TOWING & RECOVERY, LLC
v. CIRCLE OF SEVEN, LLC
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals, 283 N.C. App. 446 (2022), affirming an order and judgment
entered on 26 February 2021 by Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Superior Court, Nash
County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 18 April 2024.
Fields & Cooper, PLLC, by Ryan S. King and John S. Williford Jr., for petitioner-appellee.
Q Byrd Law, by Quintin D. Byrd, for respondent-appellant.
DIETZ, Justice.
This appeal involves a dispute over a few thousand dollars for a truck that got
towed. In the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the truck’s owner raised a series
of straightforward legal arguments about the validity and amount of the towing
company’s lien. The lower courts rejected those arguments.
The appeal then came to this Court based on a dissent at the Court of Appeals
that does not have anything to do with the party’s arguments. The dissent concocted
a new theory for the truck owner and reasoned that, based on that new theory, the BOTTOMS TOWING & RECOVERY, LLC V. CIRCLE OF SEVEN, LLC
Opinion of the Court
trial court erred.
The dissent’s theory of the case is not properly before this Court. We do not
review issues raised by a Court of Appeals dissent that were not first raised and
argued by the parties. See M.E. v. T.J., 380 N.C. 539, 562 (2022). This rule is
particularly apt here because addressing the dissent’s theory requires evidence that
no party presented below and fact-finding that never took place in the trial court.
Accordingly, we decline to address the matters raised by the dissent and affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
Circle of Seven is a limited liability company that has now ceased operations.
Several years ago, Circle of Seven left a Dodge Ram truck on property that it lost in
a foreclosure sale. At the time, Circle of Seven’s sole managing member, Sainte Deon
Robinson, was incarcerated after pleading guilty to federal crimes. Robinson left
Eulanda Elliot, a Circle of Seven employee, in charge of the company’s affairs when
he went to prison.
The purchaser of the foreclosed property hired Bottoms Towing & Recovery to
tow the Dodge Ram away from the property. Bottoms Towing later petitioned to sell
the truck to satisfy the lien for unpaid towing and storage expenses. Circle of Seven
opposed the sale and challenged the amount of the purported lien.
The trial court held a hearing to address the contested issues. Relevant to this
appeal, Circle of Seven presented the testimony of both Robinson and Elliot. Elliot
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testified that she repeatedly attempted to pick up the truck from Bottoms Towing but
was unable to do so because Bottoms Towing did not believe she had sufficient proof
that she was authorized to take the truck. Circle of Seven asked the trial court to
reduce the amount of the lien by removing storage costs for the period after Bottoms
Towing refused to release the truck to Elliot.
In addition, Robinson testified that he had the truck serviced shortly before it
was towed and had documentation indicating the truck’s mileage at that time was
roughly 81,000 miles. Later, when Circle of Seven sought to reacquire the truck, the
mileage was roughly 90,000 miles. Bottoms Towing also had the truck serviced and
made cosmetic changes such as adding chrome wheel covers and removing vinyl
decals. Circle of Seven argued that this evidence proved Bottoms Towing had used
the truck without authorization. It argued that the lien amount should be reduced
because Bottoms Towing cannot charge for storage time when the towing company
was improperly using the truck rather than simply storing it.
After the hearing, the trial court entered an order and judgment reducing the
lien amount by $1,427.14 due to unnecessary maintenance and cosmetic alterations.
The trial court also found that Bottoms Towing drove the truck for approximately 250
miles when the truck should have been stored, and therefore further reduced the lien
by $62.50 to account for the time when Bottoms Towing used the truck.
Circle of Seven appealed, arguing that the trial court had not reduced the lien
by a sufficient amount based on the evidence. The Court of Appeals issued a divided
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opinion affirming the trial court’s order and judgment. Bottoms Towing & Recovery,
LLC v. Circle of Seven, LLC, 283 N.C. App. 446 (2022). The majority held that
competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings and corresponding
conclusions concerning the appropriate amount of the lien. Id. at 455–56.
The dissent argued that Bottoms Towing unlawfully converted the truck for
personal use and that the case should be remanded for the trial court to reduce the
lien based on the truck’s loss in fair market value as a result of the conversion. Id. at
457–58 (Tyson, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
Circle of Seven timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court based on the dissent.
It also petitioned for discretionary review, asking this Court to review the issues that
it raised in the lower courts but that the dissent did not address. This Court denied
the petition for discretionary review as to additional issues.
Analysis
We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the issues brought before us
based on the dissent. Because we denied Circle of Seven’s petition for discretionary
review, the sole basis for our appellate jurisdiction in this case is the dissent at the
Court of Appeals. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023).1
1 The General Assembly repealed the portion of N.C.G.S. § 7A-30 that conferred a
right to appeal to the Supreme Court based on a Court of Appeals dissent. Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2023, S.L. 2023-134, § 16.21(d). This appeal was filed and docketed at the Court of Appeals before the effective date of that act.
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Under Rule 16(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, our jurisdiction in this
circumstance is limited to those issues “specifically set out in the dissenting opinion
as the basis for that dissent.” N.C. R. App. P. 16(b). We recently emphasized that this
requirement limits our review solely to those issues for which the dissent provides
“reasoning.” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569, 575 (2023); Morris v.
Rodeberg, 385 N.C. 405, 415 (2023). On matters where the dissent does not provide
any reasoning, this Court lacks jurisdiction unless we separately allow discretionary
review of those additional issues. See Cryan, 384 N.C. at 575.
Here, the dissenting judge concurred in the majority’s “conclusion that
petitioner possesses a valid statutory lien” but asserted that the trial court “erred in
its calculation of the offset to reduce the lien amount due to Bottoms’ unlawful
conversion and personal use” of the truck. Bottoms Towing, 283 N.C. App. at 456
(Tyson, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
reasoned that Bottoms Towing’s unauthorized use of the truck while it should have
been stored awaiting pickup was a form of unlawful “conversion.” Id. at 457. “Our
General Statutes should provide a statutory remedy and offset” for this unlawful
conversion, the dissent reasoned. Id.
Because the dissent believed the trial court’s reduction of the claimed lien
amount was not a permissible way to “compute this offset value against the lien,” the
dissent would have reversed the trial court’s order and judgment and remanded for
the trial court to assess “the loss in value” of the truck—in other words, an offset
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based on the reduction in the truck’s “book value” due to Bottoms Towing’s
unauthorized use. Id. at 457–58.
The dissent provided extensive reasoning for this position, and we therefore
have appellate jurisdiction over the issue. See Cryan, 384 N.C. at 575. But possessing
appellate jurisdiction does not automatically mean the issue is one that we can
properly address. It is well-settled that “the Court of Appeals may not address an
issue not raised or argued by [the appellant] for it is not the role of the appellate
courts to create an appeal for an appellant.” In re R.A.F., 384 N.C. 505, 512 (2023)
(cleaned up). This rule applies equally to both the Court of Appeals majority and the
dissent.
Indeed, even where the dissent raises issues that would void the trial court’s
judgment, this Court has declined to examine those issues because the parties did not
raise them at the Court of Appeals. See M.E., 380 N.C. at 564. In M.E., for example,
the dissent argued that the plaintiff failed to join necessary parties under Rule 19 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which rendered the trial court’s order void ab initio. Id.
at 551–52. We held that “the necessary joinder issue was raised neither by defendant
nor by the trial court ex meru motu and was not mentioned until the Court of Appeals
dissent. Accordingly, this issue is not properly before this Court, and we therefore
decline to consider it.” Id. at 564.
Here, Circle of Seven never raised a conversion argument, never argued that
Bottoms Towing’s unauthorized use had reduced the value of the truck, and never
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presented any evidence as to the value of the truck. This makes sense because Circle
of Seven operated under entirely different legal theories in the courts below. The
company argued that the applicable statute only permitted a lien for unpaid amounts
related to the towing and storing of the truck. See N.C.G.S. § 44A-2 (2023). As a result,
Circle of Seven argued that the lien must be reduced for two reasons.
First, it argued that it sent Elliott, its authorized representative, to pick up the
truck, but Bottoms Towing refused to release it. Thus, it argued that the lien “amount
is limited to the period of 5 March 2021 through 27 March 2021, representing the
date of the tow through the date Ms. Elliott contacted Petitioner to retrieve the
Truck.”
Second, Circle of Seven argued that the truck’s mileage and other evidence
showed Bottoms Towing had driven the truck for personal use. This, it argued, meant
the trial court should determine when the truck was being used, rather than stored,
and “reduce the amount of the lien” because Bottoms Towing “could not be said to
have been storing the Truck when using it for personal use.”
Importantly, Circle of Seven did not bring a claim for conversion and did not
make any argument that Bottoms Towing diminished the value of the truck—the sole
basis for the dissent in this case. That issue “was not mentioned until the Court of
Appeals dissent.” See M.E., 380 N.C. at 564.
If we were to review this issue, it would be unjust for a number of reasons.
First, and most obviously, it would require departing from the well-settled procedural
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rule that appellate courts may not address issues not raised by the parties because
“it is not the role of the appellate courts to create an appeal for an appellant.” In re
R.A.F., 384 N.C. at 512 (cleaned up). The public, and other jurisdictions that may be
called upon to recognize our state’s court judgments, expect us to apply these
procedural rules uniformly to all litigants who appear before us.
Second, Bottoms Towing never had an opportunity to disprove the fact-
intensive assertions made by the dissent. There is no evidence in the record
concerning the “book value” of the truck or how much that value depreciated, or any
of the other facts necessary to calculate the “damages” that the dissent describes
based on “the difference between the market value immediately before the injury and
the market value immediately afterwards.” Bottoms Towing, 283 N.C. App. at 457–
58.
The dissent’s approach to this case would effectively require the trial court to
start over from the beginning—conduct another hearing, receive evidence on the
change in the truck’s fair market value, and then enter an entirely different order.
Our rules of preservation exist precisely to discourage this sort of unfair do-over in
the trial court. Circle of Seven had the opportunity to present this evidence to the
trial court and the opportunity to raise this issue in its appellate briefing to the Court
of Appeals. It did neither—understandably so, because Circle of Seven had different
(and, to be fair, more appropriate) arguments to contest the claimed storage charges
under the language of the applicable statute. See N.C.G.S. § 44A-2. This is a statutory
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proceeding to authorize the sale of a motor vehicle under a lien. The dissent’s theory
concerns affirmative claims for conversion or negligence on the part of a bailee. These
are claims that must be raised in a complaint or counterclaim, not as statutory
defenses to the sale proceeding.
Accordingly, the conversion theory raised by the dissent is not properly before
us and we decline to address it. Because this is the only issue before this Court (as
we denied Circle of Seven’s petition for discretionary review as to additional issues),
our review is at an end.
Conclusion
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
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Earls, J., dissenting
Justice EARLS dissenting.
Circle of Seven, LLC and Bottoms Towing & Recovery, LLC have a genuine
property dispute which is properly before this Court based on a dissent in the Court
of Appeals pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2), a statute that has now been amended to
eliminate such appeals in the future. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023); Current
Operations Appropriations Act of 2023, S.L. 2023-134, § 16.21(d)–(e),
https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2023/Bills/House/PDF/H259v7.pdf (eliminating right
of appeal based on a dissent for cases filed in the Court of Appeals on or after 3
October 2023).
Bottoms Towing contends that it acted in good faith when it towed and stored
Circle of Seven’s truck and that it properly seeks reimbursement for the associated
fees by way of a lien on the truck. Circle of Seven contends that despite repeated
attempts to recover possession of the truck, Bottoms Towing improperly refused to
release it and not only purposefully amassed months of storage fees, which it then
used as the basis for the lien, but also made unauthorized changes to the truck and
used it extensively for personal purposes, driving it almost 10,000 miles while it was
supposedly in storage. At the trial level, considerable evidence was introduced by
Circle of Seven to support its version of events. The legal question for the appellate
courts is whether the trial court applied the law correctly to the facts it found to be
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established by the evidence. I dissent because in my view this Court takes a hyper-
technical and unjustifiably narrow approach to determining whether Circle of Seven
made the necessary legal arguments regarding conversion at trial and whether the
dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals legitimately addressed issues properly
before it.
The majority declines to reach the merits of the appeal because, in its view,
Circle of Seven’s evidence about Glenn Bottoms’s unauthorized personal use of the
truck and the impact that should have on the proper amount of any lien on the truck
did not raise the issue of conversion. However, in fact, Circle of Seven did raise the
issue of conversion at the trial court and with the Court of Appeals, it just did not use
that specific terminology. Recently, this Court professed a disinclination to rest on
mere technicalities of this nature. See State v. Singleton, 900 S.E.2d 802, 823–24
(N.C. 2024) (“As we recognized in 1898, we reiterate that ‘[t]he practical sense of the
age demands’ that technicalities should not carry the day . . . .” (first alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Hester, 122 N.C. 1047, 1050 (1898))). It is unfair to do so
here.
In addition, the majority’s decision not to reach the merits of this case rests on
a principle that is only selectively followed. Contrary to the majority’s authoritative-
sounding recitation of a supposedly cardinal rule of appellate practice, this Court does
address issues and decide cases on grounds that were not raised or argued below. See,
e.g., Stark ex rel. Jacobsen v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 480, 483 (2012) (engaging
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in a sufficiency of the evidence analysis not ruled on by the Court of Appeals); Ha v.
Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., No. 312A19-2, slip op. at 10 (N.C. Aug. 23, 2024) (deciding
the case on “narrower grounds” not raised by the parties); Old Republic Nat’l Title
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 N.C. 500, 507, 510 (2017) (analyzing a judicial
estoppel issue that was not briefed or argued by the parties); N.C. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Hebert, 385 N.C. 705, 715–16 (2024) (addressing “whether [a] defendant
may stack and compare in order to activate his [underinsured motorist] coverage”
despite the parties never having briefed or argued this theory below). This makes the
majority’s decision not to rule on the merits in this case all that more egregious.
I. Background
In 2018, Sainte Deon Robinson—the head of Circle of Seven, LLC—was
charged with and pled guilty to a federal tax crime. On 22 March 2019, Robinson was
sentenced to a thirty-month active sentence, which commenced on 10 September
2019. Before entering prison, Robinson gave Eulanda Elliot, a Circle of Seven
employee, express authority to handle the company’s affairs.
In July 2018, Anne Cliett, one of Robinson’s creditors, started foreclosure
proceedings against Robinson for a property located on Wesleyan Boulevard in Rocky
Mount, North Carolina. Cliett subsequently purchased this property at a judicial sale.
Because Robinson had left personal belongings on the Wesleyan property—including
the 2018 Dodge truck, which is the subject of this dispute—Elliot contacted Dan
Howell, who oversaw Cliett’s affairs, to arrange for the retrieval of Robinson’s
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property. However, Howell instructed Elliot to make those arrangements with
Cliett’s attorney, John Williford.
As was agreed, Elliot arrived at the Wesleyan property on 28 February 2020
with a U-Haul truck to retrieve Robinson’s remaining items. While Robinson testified
that he had left one key in the truck’s ignition before locking up the Wesleyan
property and beginning his period of incarceration, that key was not available to
Elliot when she arrived to retrieve Robinson’s belongings. The existence of the truck’s
key remains disputed as Mr. Bottoms testified that because he was unable to locate
a key for the Dodge truck, he incurred a $150 fee to contract with a locksmith to create
one. Since Elliot did not have a key for the truck, she was unable to start it, let alone
remove it from the Wesleyan property. Elliot communicated this to Howell, and the
two arranged for her to retrieve the truck at a later, undetermined date.
Eight days later, on 5 March 2020, Cliett contracted with Bottoms Towing &
Recovery, LLC to remove the Dodge truck from the Wesleyan property for $150 and
to store it for $40 per day. Accordingly, Mr. Bottoms towed the truck and stored it at
his place of business on May Drive in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. On 13 March
2020, Mr. Bottoms filed the necessary documents with the North Carolina Division
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to sell the truck under a possessory lien pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 44A-2(d).
Elliott made several attempts to retrieve the Dodge truck. In doing so, she
placed five calls to Williford’s law firm, Fields & Cooper, PLLC; sixteen calls to
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Howell; and eight calls to Mr. Bottoms. Elliot’s repeated attempts to regain
possession of the truck yielded differing responses from Mr. Bottoms.
On 27 March 2020 when Elliot contacted Mr. Bottoms the first time, he
directed her to speak with Howell. Then on 30 March 2020, Mr. Bottoms informed
Elliot that he was required to hear from the DMV before releasing the truck. Later,
on 9 April 2020, Elliot received a letter from the North Carolina Department of
Transportation stating that Mr. Bottoms had submitted an unclaimed vehicle report
for the truck. In response, Elliot placed four calls to Mr. Bottoms, informed him of the
letter she received, and asked again about obtaining the truck. This time, Mr.
Bottoms explained that he could not release the truck until he heard back from the
bank. Then, in a fourth attempt to retrieve the truck, on 17 April 2020, Elliot placed
two calls to Mr. Bottoms who stated that he could not release the truck because the
bank had instructed him not to.
On 24 April 2020, Mr. Bottoms completed DMV Form LT-262, titled Notice of
Intent to Sell a Vehicle to Satisfy Storage and/or Mechanic’s Lien. Circle of Seven
subsequently received a letter dated 10 September 2020, which indicated that
Bottoms Tire & Auto1 had claimed a lien in the amount of $2,230. Because Bottoms
Tire & Auto failed to secure delivery by certified mail, the Department of
Transportation informed it that a judicial hearing was required for authorization to
1 Mr. Bottoms has two businesses, Bottoms Towing & Recovery and Bottoms Tire &
Auto.
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sell the truck.
After Robinson finished his term of imprisonment on 13 October 2020 and
learned that Bottoms Towing still had possession of his truck, he too made an attempt
to regain possession of the vehicle. But Mr. Bottoms refused to release the truck
unless Robinson provided “some paperwork from the bank.” On 9 November 2020,
Robinson visited Bottoms Towing and noticed that his truck had undergone a number
of changes since he last saw it: his company’s business decals and logos had been
removed, the rims on the truck’s tires had been replaced, there was damage to the
truck’s bumper and passenger side fender, the fifth tire and tools inside the truck had
been removed, and transport tags had been placed on the vehicle. Mr. Bottoms
admitted to making changes to the truck and reported he incurred the following
charges to prepare the truck for sale:
2 Interstate batteries 379.00 Right front tire 129.65 Bottom fuel filter 89.40 Def fluid 16.95 12 quarts oil 59.40 Oil filter 12.50 Chrome wheel covers 395.00 Shop supplies 20.00 Fuel 50.00 Install two batteries 28.00 Remove and replace fuel filters 98.00 Change oil and filter 35.00 Sales tax 114.24
The total for these expenses was $1,427.14.
Additionally, Mr. Bottoms testified that he only drove the truck five or six
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times, for a total of about 250 miles, “to make sure everything was running good.”
However, Robinson presented evidence—receipts from an oil change and tire
replacement that detailed the truck’s odometer reading—that the Dodge truck had
almost 10,000 more miles on it than when he left it parked at the Wesleyan property.
When Robinson visited Mr. Bottoms on 9 November 2020, he also noticed laundry
and a coffee cup inside the Dodge truck.
Moreover, while Mr. Bottoms asserted that Robinson owed him $10,000 for the
work he had completed on the vehicle, he never provided Robinson with an invoice.
Similarly, Mr. Bottoms never communicated to Elliot the $150 towing fee or the $40
per day storage fee or provided her with an invoice.
On 17 November 2020, Bottoms Towing filed a petition in the trial court to sell
the Dodge truck under a towing and storage lien. Circle of Seven objected to the sale
and filed its response on 16 December 2020. The trial court entered its order and
judgment in the matter on 26 February 2021, concluding that Bottoms Towing was
“entitled to a possessory lien on the Truck,” pursuant to subsection 44A-2(d), “in the
amount of $13,557.50.” Because the trial court found the expenses Bottoms Towing
incurred in preparing the truck for the sale were “unnecessary,” the court calculated
the lien based only on (1) the towing charge and storage for 333 days, from 5 March
2020 to 1 February 2021; and (2) “the locksmith key creation charge.” This amount
was then reduced by $62.50 to account for the 250 miles Mr. Bottoms drove the truck
while it was stored.
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Circle of Seven raised three arguments at the Court of Appeals. First, it
questioned the validity of Bottoms Towing’s contract with Cliett because Cliett was
not the legal possessor of the truck. Bottoms Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Circle of
Seven, LLC, 283 N.C. App. 446, 452 (2022). Second, it challenged the possessory lien
on the truck, claiming that N.C.G.S. § 44A-4(a) only allows a lien to be enforced if
towing and storage charges are unpaid for “10 days following the maturity of the
obligation to pay any such charges.” Id. at 454 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 44A-4(a) (2021)).
In support of this, Circle of Seven claimed that a reviewing court could not find that
the lien had remained unpaid because Bottoms Towing had “never communicated or
attempted to communicate” an obligation to pay until November 2020—after it had
claimed a lien and amassed months of storage fees. Id.
Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this appeal, Circle of Seven
contended that even if the lien was valid, its amount should only reflect the costs
accumulated in the days prior to Elliot’s first attempt to retrieve the truck and
“should be substantially reduced by Bottoms’s personal use of the Truck.” Id. at 455
(emphasis added). To support its argument that the lien should be reduced based on
Mr. Bottoms’s personal use of the truck, Circle of Seven provided the following facts:
“[Mr.] Bottoms drove the Truck, kept personal items inside, made alterations, and . . .
increased [the Truck’s mileage] by approximately ten thousand miles during the
storage period.” Id.
While the dissent at the Court of Appeals ultimately agreed that the statutory
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lien on the truck was valid, it disagreed with the trial court’s calculation of that lien.
Id. at 456 (Tyson, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). In doing
so, the dissent explained that “diminished market value” has been applied “as a
measure of damages for conversion and physical harm to property.” Id. at 457. Thus,
in the dissent’s view, Mr. Bottoms’s personal use of the Dodge truck resulted in a
diminution of the truck’s value, and the lien amount should be reduced based on that
resulting monetary loss. Id. at 458.
II. Conversion
Conversion is defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right
of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration
of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Wall v. Colvard, Inc., 268
N.C. 43, 49 (1966) (quoting Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 (1956)). This
means that there are “two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the
plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Variety
Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 (2012).
The majority’s refusal to reach the merits of this case because “a conversion
argument” was not raised below is unsupported by both the Court of Appeals opinion
and the trial court’s order. First, the Court of Appeals opinion explicitly states that
Circle of Seven argued that the “lien should be limited by [Mr.] Bottoms’s personal
use of the Truck,” which included that “[Mr.] Bottoms drove the Truck, kept personal
items inside, made alternations, and that the Truck’s mileage increased by
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approximately ten thousand miles during the storage period.” Bottoms Towing, 283
N.C. App. at 455. Similarly, the trial court’s order compensated Circle of Seven for
Mr. Bottoms’s unlawful use of the Dodge truck.
Taking this information into consideration, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
dissent did not “create an appeal for an appellant.” Indeed, Circle of Seven did raise
the issue discussed by the dissent: that the amount of Bottoms Towing’s lien should
be reduced based on Mr. Bottoms’s personal use of the truck, which included driving
the truck, leaving personal items inside the truck, and making alterations to the
truck. Id. Because conversion occurs when one party exercises a right of ownership
over another party’s property and either alters that property or excludes the rightful
owner of their rights in that property, Wall, 268 N.C. at 49, the crux of Circle of
Seven’s claim is the conversion of the Dodge truck by Mr. Bottoms. Accordingly, the
unauthorized use of the Dodge truck and the resulting diminution in value based on
that use provides a method for calculating damages, which would reduce the amount
of Bottoms Towing’s lien. See Bottoms Towing, 283 N.C. App. at 457–58 (Tyson, J.,
concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) (citing Phillips v. Chesson,
231 N.C. 556, 571 (1950)).
In holding otherwise, the majority elevates form over substance, effectively
determining that because Circle of Seven framed its argument using plain English,
rather than legal terminology, the dissent was not permitted to address Circle of
Seven’s argument using its legal name: conversion. This is contrary to this Court’s
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constitutional mandate under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina
Constitution, unfair to the parties, and an unfortunate waste of this Court’s and the
parties’ time and resources.
III. This Court’s Duty to Reach the Merits of a Claim
“All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and
justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 18.
Litigants in this state must have free access to courts as a means to settle private
claims and disputes. Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 658 (1979). This means that
“the courts of North Carolina cannot fail to provide a forum to determine a valid cause
of action.” Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 174 (1989).
“Appellate courts perform two important functions: (a) correcting errors that
occurred at the trial level, and (b) clarifying, standardizing, and developing the rules
and principles of law that apply in the jurisdiction.” Thomas L. Fowler, Appellate Rule
16(b): The Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely Upon a Dissent in the Court of
Appeals, 24 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2001). While N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) has now been
repealed, Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2023 § 16.21(d), its enactment
furthered this Court’s error-correcting function. For when a three-judge panel at the
Court of Appeals disagrees on the correct outcome of a case, the likelihood that an
error has been committed below increases. This notion is supported by our caselaw,
which limits the scope of these appeals to only those issues that the three-judge panel
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disagreed on. See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 376 N.C. 407, 413 (2020). The majority’s
failure to reach the merits of this case leaves an open question: was error committed
below?
While the majority states that it would be “unjust” to review this issue, it does
not address the injustice that necessarily results from not addressing the issue.
Although this Court could disagree with the Court of Appeals’ dissent or either of the
parties’ arguments on the matter, failure to conclusively rule on the issue presented
harms not only the parties in this case but also North Carolinians more generally.
See Mole’ v. City of Durham, 384 N.C. 78, 100 (2023) (Earls, J., dissenting). The
parties in this action both filed briefs and participated in oral argument before this
Court, no doubt expending a considerable amount of time, effort, and money to
present their respective positions. As it pertains to Circle of Seven, this Court’s failure
to address the merits of this claim allows the Court of Appeals’ conclusion to stand,
without so much as an explanation or ruling on whether the majority opinion or
dissenting opinion was correct in its application of the law.
Similarly, by declining to reach the merits of this claim, this Court has also
failed to establish binding precedent on the legal issue raised by the dissent. A
holding in favor of either party on the merits would give litigants in this state a
greater understanding of the tort of conversion and the proper procedure for
calculating damages based on a diminution of value that may later be used to offset
a lien. See id.
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Additionally, although the majority states that addressing the merits of this
case would deprive Bottoms Towing of the opportunity “to disprove the fact-intensive
assertions made by the dissent,” this concern is illusory because the facts necessary
to resolve this claim were introduced at the hearing in this case and Bottoms Towing
had the opportunity to contest the evidence at that time. Because Circle of Seven
argued below that the value of Bottoms Towing’s lien should be reduced by Mr.
Bottoms’s personal use of the truck, there would be no “unfair do-over in the trial
court,” and our preservation rules do not act as a bar to a proper resolution of this
case on the merits. See M.E. v. T.J., 380 N.C. 539, 563 (2022).
IV. Conclusion
For appeals arising under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2), this Court should reach the
merits of the dissent so long as it addresses the substance of a party’s claims and sets
out the dissenting judge’s reasoning for breaking with the majority. See Cryan v. Nat’l
Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569, 579 (2023). Judge Tyson’s dissent clears that hurdle.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Court of Appeals’
holding without reaching the merits of this case.
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