Bostwick v. SN Servicing Corporation

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 20, 2021·No. 3:21-cv-02560·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 San Francisco Division 11 TIMOTHY S. BOSTWICK, et al., Case No. 21-cv-02560-LB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 14 SN SERVICING CORPORATION, et al., THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 15 Defendants. Re: ECF No. 42 16 18 After the July, 2021, dismissal order, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) 19 against SN Servicing Corporation and U.S. Bank, claiming that they violated the Rosenthal Fair 20 Debt Collection Practices Act.1 Cal. Civ. Code § 1788. According to the TAC, SN committed a 21 predatory lending act when, at the plaintiffs’ request, it allegedly issued an incorrect reinstatement 22 quote. There are no allegations about any conduct by U.S. Bank. The defendants then moved to 23 dismiss the TAC for failure to state a claim.2 In light of the Rule 8(a) pleading standard, the court 24 25 1 TAC – ECF No. 37. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. U.S. Bank Trust National 26 Association, as trustee of the Chalet Series III Trust, has filed many entries in this case asserting that it was “erroneously sued as U.S. Bank, N.A.” 27 2 Mot. – ECF No. 42. The other defendant, Seterus Inc., filed an answer to the TAC (ECF No. 41) and does not take part in this motion. The court previously denied Seterus’s motion to dismiss the 1 denies the motion to dismiss as to SN but grants and dismisses without prejudice U.S. Bank as a 2 defendant in this suit. 4 The facts and standards of review are in the court’s earlier order.3 Relevant to this motion, the 5 TAC asserts that SN acted as the plaintiffs’ loan servicer on behalf of U.S. Bank. The TAC puts two 6 pieces of the defendants’ conduct at issue. First, on December 12, 2020, defendant Seterus sent a 7 letter to plaintiff stating that future payments should be sent to SN. 4 This was quickly retracted, and 8 no coordination in this communication between Seterus and SN is alleged. Second, on December 9 14, 2020, the plaintiffs allegedly received a reinstatement quote from SN, as they had requested. 10 The TAC claims that the reinstatement quote was “incorrect with mystery charges and missing 11 bankruptcy payments.”5 13 The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the TAC did not plead that they engaged 14 in debt collection sufficient to state a claim under the Rosenthal Act and, alternatively, that the 15 TAC fails to allege damages attributable to the defendants. 16 To state a claim for a violation of the Rosenthal Act, a plaintiff must allege that (i) plaintiff is a 17 “debtor,” (ii) the debt at issue is a “consumer debt,” (iii) the defendant is a “debt collector,” and 18 (iv) the defendant violated a provision of the Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10; Ansari v. Elec. 19 Document Processing Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01245-LHK, 2013 WL 4647621, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20 29, 2013). There is no dispute that the plaintiffs qualify as debtors. In Section 1788.17, the 21 Rosenthal Act incorporates sections 1692b through 1692j of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 22 (FDCPA) and requires every debt collector abide by its provisions. Thus, a violation of the 23 FDCPA constitutes a violation of the Rosenthal Act. 24 Each defendant’s liability is assessed independently. 25 26 33 Order – ECF No. 35. This order incorporates the facts, standards, and analysis by this reference. 27 4 TAC – ECF No. 37 at 18–19 (¶ 91). 1 1.1 SN 2 The defendants’ first argument, that foreclosure does not invoke the Rosenthal Act protections, 3 misses the mark as the plaintiffs do not cite the foreclosure as an attempt to collect a debt.6 4 The defendants’ second argument posits that providing a reinstatement quote does not 5 constitute an attempt to collect a debt under the Rosenthal Act. For their part, the plaintiffs allege 6 it violates several sections of the FDCPA,7 but neither party cites to any case to support whether 7 supplying a reinstatement quote constitutes an attempt to collect debt under the Rosenthal Act, or 8 a violation of any of those four sections of the FDCPA. The defendants argue that the 9 reinstatement estimate was “in anticipation of a foreclosure sale” and “provided at Plaintiff’s 10 request,” but fail to show argue why this justifies dismissal.8 As was discussed in the order 11 dismissing the second amended complaint, the California courts have interpreted this language 12 before and have held that a mortgage servicer who engages in debt collection practices in 13 attempting to obtain repayment of mortgage debt is a debt collector under the Rosenthal Act. 14 Davidson v. Seterus, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 5th 283, 304, (2018). 15 To determine whether the alleged conduct would violate the FDCPA, the court must objectively 16 analyze whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by the alleged 17 communication. Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the 18 least-sophisticated-debtor standard to alleged violations of 1692e); see also Guerrero v. RJM 19 Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the same standard under § 1692d). A 20 debt collector’s false statement regarding the amount due may be material to the least sophisticated 21 debtor who “may well have simply paid the amount demanded,” without inquiry. Afewerki v. Anaya 22 Law Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 777 (9th Cir. 2017) (a debt collector’s incorrect statement of the principal 23 due was material and constituted a Rosenthal Act violation). In determining materiality, a court 24 25 26 6 Opp’n – ECF No. 45 at 15. 27 7 Id. at 16 (claiming violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692f). 1 should look for “genuinely misleading statements that may frustrate a consumer’s ability to 2 intelligently choose his or her response.” Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034. 3 The allegations in the TAC are threadbare and merely say the reinstatement quote was 4 “incorrect with mystery charges and missing bankruptcy payments.” This is uncontested by 5 defendants and must be taken as true at this stage. Other courts have found that allegations of 6 communications that misrepresented an amount due sufficiently plead a violation under the 7 FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act. Peebles v. Seterus, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-242, 2019 WL 4464126, at 8 *5 (E.D. Cal. September 18, 2019) (denying a motion to dismiss and finding a misrepresentation 9 as to the amount a borrower must pay was material); Maronyan v. Fin. Credit Network Inc., No. 10 2:15-cv-2953, 2017 WL 57835, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017) (denying a motion to dismiss 11 because the lender issued a material misrepresentation when it reported that the plaintiff could owe 12 $1,000 more than it actually did); Ruvalcaba v. Ocwen Loan Servs,. LLC, No. 15-cv-744, 2016 13 WL 7178855, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2016) (finding a misrepresentation of the amount of a debt 14 was material). Thus, the plaintiffs have plead enough to state a claim against SN.

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