Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.

483 F. Supp. 2d 390, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25100, 2007 WL 989192
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedApril 4, 2007
DocketCiv. 03-283-SLR, 03-1138-SLR
StatusPublished

This text of 483 F. Supp. 2d 390 (Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 390, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25100, 2007 WL 989192 (D. Del. 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. and Boston Scientific Corporation (collectively “BSC”) filed the above captioned related actions 1 against defendants Cordis Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, Incorporated, Guidant Corporation, Guidant Sales Corporation, and Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (collectively “Cordis”), alleging that Cordis’ Cypher stent infringes claims 33 and 40 of U.S. Patent No. 6,251,-920 (“the '920 patent”). 2

Pending before the court are Cordis’ renewed motion for summary judgment of non-infringement' and invalidity (Civ. No. 03-283, D.I. 277; Civ. No. 03-1138, D.I. 289); BSC’s motion to exclude Dr. Sabati-ni’s testing evidence and related testimony (D.I.480); and BSC’s motion for summary judgment that claims 33 and 40 are not anticipated by Morris (D.I.482). The court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338.

II. BACKGROUND

The '920 patent generally relates to a method for treating or preventing cardiovascular pathologies by administration of a therapeutic agent. Claim 40 3 depends from claim 33 4 and discloses localized administration of the therapeutic agent at a site of vascular trauma. The accused stent, the Cypher stent, is a drug-eluting BX Velocity balloon expandable stent.

The pending motions comprise a second round of summary judgment proceedings based on testing by Cordis’ expert, Dr. Sabatini. The extended proceedings were allowed by the court in an effort to illuminate, as fully-as possible, the issues presented by this litigation. Of course, the parties disagree on the extent and scope of illumination provided by Dr. Sabatini’s *392 testing, confirming the fact once again for this judicial officer that mixing science, linguistics and litigation strategies rarely produces results that reverberate with scientific certainty.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court shall grant summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material,’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n. 1 (3d Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). If the moving party has demonstrated an absence of material fact, the nonmoving party then “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court will “view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party, however, will not be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmoving party on that issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on . an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

IV. ANALYSIS

A patent is infringed when a person “without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States ... during the term of the patent.” 35 U-S.C. § 271(a). A court should employ a two-step analysis in making an infringement determination. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995). First, the court must construe the asserted claims to ascertain their meaning and scope. Id. Construction of the claims is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). The trier of fact must then compare the properly construed claims with the accused infringing product. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. This second step is a question of fact. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998). Literal infringement occurs where each limitation of at least one claim of the patent is found exactly in the alleged infringer’s product. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 836 F.2d 1329, 1330 n. 1 (Fed.Cir.1987). An accused product that does not literally infringe a claim may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if each limitation of the claim is met in the accused product either literally or equivalently. See Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 826 (Fed.Cir.1999). The patent owner has the burden of proving infringement and must meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith-Kline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. *393 Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citations omitted).

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Company, Inc.
836 F.2d 1329 (Federal Circuit, 1987)

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483 F. Supp. 2d 390, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25100, 2007 WL 989192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boston-scientific-scimed-inc-v-cordis-corp-ded-2007.