Bosse v. Blades

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedOctober 30, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-00271
StatusUnknown

This text of Bosse v. Blades (Bosse v. Blades) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bosse v. Blades, (D. Idaho 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MICHAEL EARL BOSSE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:19-cv-00271-BLW

vs. INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE RANDY BLADES, SICI WARDEN, RDU STAFF, RDU SERGEANTS 8- HOUSE, SERGEANT LEE,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Michael Earl Bosse, a prisoner in custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), filed a civil rights action and a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkts. 2, 1.) The Court is required to review prisoner and pauper complaints seeking relief against a government entity or official to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915. The Court must dismiss a complaint that states a frivolous or malicious claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff will be required to file an amended complaint if he desires to proceed. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Standard of Law

Plaintiffs are required to state facts, and not just legal theories, in a complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Iqbal, the Court made clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. In other words, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state

a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects convicted felons against cruel and unusual punishment in prison. To state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment, Plaintiff must state facts showing that he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” or that he has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as a result of Defendants’ actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff must also allege facts showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. To exhibit deliberate indifference, a prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Prison officials who act with deliberate indifference “to the threat of serious harm or injury” by one prisoner against another are subject to

liability under § 1983. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff must allege facts showing how each defendant personally violated his constitutional rights. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, “[l]iability under section 1983 arises only upon a

showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). There is no respondeat superior liability under §1983, meaning a supervisor cannot be sued simply because he or she is a supervisor. Id. Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a supervisor participated in an alleged constitutional violation by: (1)

“setting in motion a series of acts by others”; (2) “knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (3) failing to act or improperly acting in “the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (4) “acquiesc[ing] in the constitutional deprivation”; or (5) engaging in “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-09 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).

A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint; instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of such a claim. He must allege facts showing a causal link between the Defendant and the injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 2. Factual Allegations

Before or upon arriving at the IDOC Receiving and Diagnostic Unit (RDU), Plaintiff, a 60-year-old prisoner, warned unidentified prison officials that he was going to be beaten up by other prisoners. He conveyed his warnings both verbally and in a written “kite” (Offender Concern Form). However, on or near January 8, 2017, within eighteen hours of having arrived, he was attacked by an unknown prisoner and beaten until he was

unconscious. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. He asserts that the assailant was able to attack Plaintiff because Defendants purposely left his cell door open, allowing prisoners in the common area to come into the cell to harm him. He does not know who attacked him, because prison officials have kept that information confidential. Plaintiff believes that prison staff may have been angry at him for quitting his job

with the IDOC, or for another reason of which he is unaware. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Randy Blades had the incident report “erased,” but video footage of the incident remains on surveillance video. 3. Discussion

Plaintiff’s allegations state a colorable failure-to-protect claim, other than the fact that he has not sufficiently alleged the personal participation of any of the defendants. The Court is aware that, because Plaintiff is a prisoner, many of the facts surrounding what happened are not discoverable to him without litigation. One of the only allegations specific to any defendant is that Sergeant Lee forced Plaintiff to return to the same housing unit after he was assaulted, but Plaintiff does not specify whether any harm occurred to him after he returned. Plaintiff does not state

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Martinez v. Aaron
570 F.2d 317 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Keith A. Berg v. Larry Kincheloe
794 F.2d 457 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Starr v. Baca
652 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Bosse v. Blades, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bosse-v-blades-idd-2019.